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RÉSUMÉ 
La présente thèse examine les liens entre le sommeil, la mémoire épisodique et les rêves. 
Dans une première étude, nous utilisons les technologies de la réalité virtuelle (RV) en 
liaison avec un paradigme de privation de sommeil paradoxal et de collecte de rêve en vue 
d'examiner l'hypothèse que le sommeil paradoxal et le rêve sont impliqués dans la 
consolidation de la mémoire épisodique. Le sommeil paradoxal a été associé au rappel des 
aspects spatiaux des éléments émotionnels de la tâche RV. De la même façon, 
l'incorporation de la tâche RV dans les rêves a été associée au rappel des aspects spatiaux 
de la tâche. De plus, le rappel des aspects factuels et perceptuels de la mémoire épisodique, 
formé lors de la tâche VR, a été associé au sommeil aux ondes lentes. Une deuxième étude 
examine l'hypothèse selon laquelle une fonction possible du rêve pourrait être de créer de 
nouvelles associations entre les éléments de divers souvenirs épisodiques. Un participant a 
été réveillé 43 fois lors de l'endormissement pour fournir des rapports détaillés de rêves. 
Les résultats suggèrent qu'un seul rêve peut comporter, dans un même contexte 
spatiotemporel, divers éléments appartenant aux multiples souvenirs épisodiques. Une 
troisième étude aborde la question de la cognition lors du sommeil paradoxal, notamment 
comment les aspects bizarres des rêves, qui sont formés grâce aux nouvelles combinaisons 
d'éléments de la mémoire épisodique, sont perçus par le rêveur. Les résultats démontrent 
une dissociation dans les capacités cognitives en sommeil paradoxal caractérisée par un 
déficit sélectif dans l'appréciation des éléments bizarres des rêves. Les résultats des quatre 
études suggèrent que le sommeil aux ondes lentes et le sommeil paradoxal sont 
différemment impliqués dans le traitement de la mémoire épisodique. Le sommeil aux 
ondes lentes pourrait être implique dans la consolidation de la mémoire épisodique, et le 
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sommeil paradoxal, par l'entremise du rêve, pourrais avoir le rôle d'introduire de la 
flexibilité dans ce système mnémonique. 
Mots clefs: mémoire épisodique; sommeil paradoxal; sommeil aux ondes lentes; rêves; 
réalité virtuel 
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SUMMARY 
The present dissertation examines relationships between sleep, episodic memory and 
dreaming. In Articles I and II we use a novel virtual reality (VR) task in conjunction with a 
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep deprivation (REMD) paradigm and dream sampling to 
examine the hypothesis that REM sleep and dreaming are involved in the consolidation of 
episodic memory. REM sleep was associated with the successful retrieval of the spatial 
aspects of emotionally charged elements of the VR task. Similarly, dreaming was 
associated with improved performance on the spatial aspects of the retrieval task. Retrieval 
of the factual and perceptual aspects of episodic memories formed with the VR task was 
associated with increased slow wave sleep (SWS) during the post-exposure night. Overall, 
the results suggest that SWS is associated with the perceptual and factual aspects of 
episodic memories while REM sleep is not, a finding which may relate to observations that 
REM sleep dreaming is composed of deconstructed fragments of loosely associated 
episodic memories. Study II examines the hypothesis that a function of dreaming may be to 
create new associations between previously unrelated memory items. A participant, highly 
trained in introspection and mentation reporting, was awakened 43 times during theta 
bursts at sleep onset and provided detailed reports of resulting imagery and associated 
memory sources. This technique provided evidence that elements of distally related 
memory sources are brought together in temporal and spatial proximity within a novel 
context provided by the dream, suggesting a role for dreaming in memory processing. To 
allow for this possibility, we speculate that dreaming experiences may be functionally 
equivalent to waking experiences in their ability to induce neural plasticity. Study III 
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addresses an aspect of this functional equivalence by examining if dream bizarreness is 
incompatible with behavioral and cognitive features associated with waking state 
experience-driven plasticity, i.e., whether the dreamer can act upon, emote and be 
motivated towards an element of the dream that is bizarre and that violates basic 
assumptions of physical reality. The results demonstrate a dissociation in cognitive ability 
during dreaming characterized by a selective deficiency in appreciating bizarreness in face 
of a maintained ability for logical thought. This finding thus addresses the problem of the 
wake-like mind reflecting upon dream bizarreness and suggests that dreaming is a state in 
which the cognitive aspects associated with synaptic plasticity (attention, emotion and 
motivation associated with believing a situation to be reality) are present while allowing for 
the presentation of memory item combinations which may transcend the limits of physical 
reality. The results of the four studies are discussed in light of how REM and SWS sleep 
stages are differentially involved in specific aspects of episodic memory (episodic replay 
vs. episodic novelty) and the possible role that dreaming, as a driver of synaptic plasticity, 
may have in these relationships. 
 
Key words: episodic memory, REM sleep, slow wave sleep, dreaming, virtual reality. 
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General introduction 
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Preface 
 It is unclear why we sleep. In recent years a veritable explosion of research has led 
researchers to propose several functions for sleep, including the restoration of cellular 
components (Mignot, 2008) and the conservation of energy (Zeplin et al., 2005). However, 
these functions do not explain why sleeping is associated with the loss of awareness of the 
environment, a change that renders animals particularly vulnerable to predators, and yet 
has been selected for evolutionarily in almost all vertebrates. One intriguing possibility is 
that during sleep memory systems undergo processing that interferes with conscious 
awareness of the environment. For example, it has been proposed that immediate 
processing of information and its long-term storage utilize the same limited neural 
networks (Marshall and Born, 2007). Because of the restricted capacity of these neural 
networks, the brain can either process new information or consolidate information for 
long-term storage, but not both at the same time. While this hypothesis is applicable to 
slow wave sleep (SWS) that is typically void of conscious experiences, it stands in conflict 
to mounting phenomenological and neurophysiological evidence that consciousness and 
vivid sensory experiences are present during REM sleep dreaming. Could the sensory 
experiences occurring during dreaming therefore play a role in memory processing in 
REM sleep? 
 The present thesis examines this question. Memory is a subjective experience, and 
this is particularly true for episodic memories where life events are replayed in some of 
their initial perceptual richness. It is these life moments that interact with dreams wherein 
fragments of episodic memories appear to be woven into novel experiences. Indeed, both 
episodic memory and dreaming concern the visualization of events that occur within a 
distinct spatial-temporal context, but that use memory sources in opposing ways. Episodic 
memory deals with recreating past events, while dreaming deals with creating novel events 
with memory items that may be loosely associated.   
 One reason why the link between memory consolidation and dreaming has not been 
properly examined is that episodic memory and dreaming concern realistic life events, yet 
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the experimental stimuli used in memory tasks typically consist of word lists and 
decontextualized pictures. To overcome this methodological limitation, we programmed a 
virtual reality (VR) task that allows subjects to participate in lifelike events in a systematic 
manner and in a carefully controlled environment. We expected that immersing 
participants in a lifelike VR environment would lead to the creation of contextually and 
visually rich episodic memories even while key aspects of the environment could be 
experimentally controlled. We used the VR task in conjunction with a REM deprivation 
(REMD) procedure to examine the role of REM sleep and dreaming in episodic memory 
processing during sleep. Contrary to expectations, results indicated that REM sleep and 
dreaming were associated only with learning the spatial locations of items in the episodic 
memory task whereas SWS is associated with the consolidation of factual and perceptual 
features of episodic memory. We also observed that the VR task was incorporated into 
dreaming in a fractionated manner.  
We subsequently examined whether dreaming is involved in creating novel, 
meaningful associations between memory items. A participant trained in introspection was 
repeatedly awakened during theta bursts at sleep onset. The procedure resulted in numerous 
and highly detailed reports of dreaming and associated memory sources. Results suggest 
that dreaming incorporates items from distal memories in a manner that may promote 
integration among memories spanning one’s lifetime.  
Finally, we examined the perception of bizarreness in dreaming. The results indicate 
that during dreaming subjects report a diminished awareness of bizarreness in face of a 
maintained ability to engage in logical thinking. This particular sleep-dependent cognition 
allows for bizarre memory item combinations within the dream to be perceived as 
“normal”, thus allowing the dreamer to interact, emote and be motivated towards bizarre 
elements of the dream in the same manner as elements that are compatible with waking 
reality.  
 The results of these studies together support the notion that SWS and REM sleep 
are implicated in different aspects of episodic memory consolidation. SWS may be 
implicated in consolidating memories resulting from experience-induced plasticity (i.e., 
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learning). In contrast, REM sleep may be involved in a complementary process that 
generates flexibility within memory representations via experience-induced plasticity 
resulting from dreaming. 
 
Introduction 
 During sleep the brain cycles though a series of successive states characterized by 
unique patterns of cerebral, physiological and psychological activity. The widely adopted 
Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968) method for sleep scoring divides human sleep into five 
stages based predominantly on the frequency of brain oscillations: stage 1 as a shift from 
of alpha activity (8-13Hz) to theta activity (5-7 Hz), stage 2 as containing bursts of sigma 
activity (sleep spindles) and brief negative high-voltage peaks (K-complexes), stage 3 and 
stage 4 as the presence of delta activity (0.2-2 Hz) and REM sleep as desynchronized 
activity with a predominance of theta that is accompanied by rapid eye movements and a 
large reduction in muscle tone (atonia). Because of the behavioural particularities of REM 
sleep, including its close association with dreaming, sleep stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 were 
distinguished from this state and collectively referred to as non-REM (NREM) sleep 
(Dement et al., 1957).  
A large body of research has sought to clarify the neurobiology and 
psychophysiology of sleep, and has done so largely within the Rechtschaffen and Kales 
(1968) scoring framework. More recently, advances in brain imaging and intra-cranial 
recording techniques have provided unprecedented observations of the brain while asleep. 
These results are summarized briefly in the following sections and Table 1.  
 
Sleep Neurophysiology & Psychophysiology 
REM sleep 
 REM sleep is found only in mammals and birds and has been studied primarily, but 
not exclusively, in humans, cats and rats (see Tobler, 1995 and Siegel, 2008 for reviews). 
Compared to all other sleep stages, REM sleep is characterized by increased levels of brain 
activity and increased levels of whole body metabolism. The early discovery that REM 
5 
 
sleep consisted of a highly active brain in face of reduced behavioral activity led early 
investigators (Jouvet & Michel, 1959) to refer to this state as paradoxical sleep, a term 
widely used today in animal research. REM sleep is characterized by an organized set of 
phenomena that differentiates it from other stages of sleep. For the identification of REM 
sleep, the standard scoring method (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968) requires three 
physiological events to co-occur within a 20-30 second epoch: 1) rapid eye movements 
(REMs), 2) reduction of muscle tone (atonia) and 3) fast, desynchronized, low voltage 
EEG featuring theta band activity. REM sleep can be further categorized into phasic and 
tonic on the basis of the presence or absence of REMs, respectively. 
 Positron emission tomography (PET) studies characterize REM sleep as a state of 
selective prefrontal deactivation and increased limbic activation. These and other regional 
changes are taken to indicate selective processing of emotional memories (Maquet et al., 
1996), processing of information in isolation of external inputs and motor outputs (Braun 
et al., 1997) and integration of the executive capacities of the neocortex with motivational 
and reward capacities of the basal forebrain and hypothalamus (Nofzinger et al., 1997). A 
more recent meta-analysis of several PET studies of REM sleep (Maquet et al., 2005) has 
revealed hypoactivation of specific areas within the parietal lobes and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and other prefrontal regions.  
 Overall, these observations are consistent with reports that REM sleep dreaming is 
emotional in nature and characterized by diminished capacity to reason (Hobson et al., 
2000). Indeed, since the first investigations of REM sleep (Aserinsky and Kleitman, 1953; 
Dement and Kleitman, 1957), dreaming has been closely associated with this stage of 
sleep. While dreaming is reported from other stages of sleep (Nielsen, 2000), REM sleep is 
associated with dreaming that is longer, more frequent, more perceptually vivid, more 
emotional, and less related to waking life (see review in Hobson et al., 2000).  
 During REM sleep the hippocampus is active and hippocampal reactivation of pre-
sleep exploratory behavior is observed at the cellular level in rats (Louie & Wilson, 2001). 
The hippocampus and the amygdala are co-activated and synchronized in the theta 
frequency band at this time (Pare & Gaudreau, 1996; Hegde, et al., 2008; Karashima et al, 
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2010). Ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves (or P-waves in animals) are recorded from 
the pons, the lateral geniculate nucleus, and the occipital regions of the brain during REM 
sleep and are associated with REMs (Datta and Hobson 1994; Datta 1995). 
Hippocampal/amygdalar theta synchronization is enhanced in association with increased 
PGO wave density (Karashima et al., 2010).  
  
Stage 3 & 4 sleep (SWS sleep) 
 Stages 3 and 4 sleep are characterized by high-voltage 1-4 Hz slow oscillations 
originating in the neocortex (Achermann & Borbely, 1997). Stage 3 contains 25-50% of 
slow wave activity and stage 4 contains over 50%. For this reason, these two stages are 
often grouped together and referred to as slow wave sleep (SWS). SWS is only found in 
mammals and birds (Siegel, 2005) and has been studied predominantly in the rat where, 
like in REM sleep, cellular activity in the hippocampus associated with pre-sleep 
exploratory behavior during wake was observed (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Lee & 
Wilson, 2002; Ji & Wilson, 2007). This hippocampal reactivation occurs in conjunction 
with sharp wave ripples (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Molle et al., 2006; Peyracheet al., 
2009), high-frequency oscillations originating from the hippocampus that are also found in 
waking state. In contrast to REM sleep, hippocampal reactivation in SWS is paralleled by 
cellular replay in neocortical areas such as the prefrontal (Peyrache et al., 2009), parietal 
(Qin et al., 1997) and visual cortex (Ji & Wilson, 2007). Early PET studies (Maquet et al., 
1997; Braun et al., 1997) characterized SWS in terms of an overall reduction of activity in 
cortical and thalamic areas. A later fMRI study (Kaufmann et al., 2005) identified only 
localized areas of reduced activity, as compared to wakefulness, in frontal areas, 
association cortices, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, thalamus and hypothalamus. 
Moreover, small clusters of increased activation were found in the inferior frontal gyrus, 
temporal areas, the cerebellum and the parahippocampal areas. Similarly, a recent study 
(Dang-Vu et al., 2008) found slow oscillations to be correlated with increases in activity 
across several cortical areas, effectively challenging the notion that SWS is characterized 
by overall brain quiescence. 
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 Dreaming is found after awakenings from SWS although less frequently than 
awakenings from REM sleep (for review see Nielsen, 2000). In one study, one to five 
additional nights were required in order for 20 of 60 participants to report any form of 
mentation from SWS, while 10 of 60 participants reported no mentation at all from this 
stage (Cavallero et al., 1992). 
 
Stage 2 sleep 
 Stage 2 sleep is characterized by the presence of sleep spindles, which consist of 
11–16 Hz phasic oscillations with a fusiform shape and of approximately 500 ms (Gibbs et 
al., 1950), and K-complexes, which are brief, negative, high-voltage peaks followed by a 
slower positive complex and a final negative peak (Roth et al., 1956). Stage 2 is 
characterized by decreased activity in adjacent regions of the temporal lobe, the inferior 
parietal lobule and the inferior/middle frontal gyri, the cingulate cortex, the right insula and 
thalamic and hypothalamic regions (Kaufmann et al., 2006). The functional meaning of 
these patterns of activation is still unclear.  
   
Stage 1 sleep 
 The transition from wake to sleep occurs during NREM sleep stage 1 (NREM1). 
NREM1 sleep is characterized by a series of alternating periods marked by alpha trains, 
theta ripples, or vertex waves. Hori et al. (1994) proposed that these patterns can be 
classified into 9 sub-stages starting with alpha wave trains (sub-stage 1; wake state), 
intermittent alpha >50% (sub-stage 2; wake state); intermittent alpha <50% (sub-stage 3; 
NREM1), EEG flattening (sub-stage 4; NREM1 sleep), theta waves (sub-stage 5; NREM1 
sleep), solitary humps or solitary vertex waves (sub-stage 6; NREM1 sleep), hump trains 
or vertex waves (sub-stage 7; NREM1 sleep), humps or vertex waves with incomplete 
spindles (sub-stage 8; NREM1 sleep) and stage two sleep with spindles (sub-stage 9; stage 
2 sleep). 
 Very few studies have examined the neurobiology of NREM1 sleep, and no brain 
imaging or intra-cranial studies have assessed the Hori sub-stages. fMRI studies do depict 
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stage 1 as a state of reduced thalamic and cingulate activity, increased occipital 
(precuneus) and temporal activity (Kaufmann et al., 2006.) and increased hippocampal 
activity (Picchioni et al., 2008). A MEG study found that gamma-band activity increases in 
precuneus during stage 1. A recent fMRI study comparing the first 30 seconds vs. the last 
30 seconds of NREM1 sleep found an increase of hippocampal activity during the last 30 
seconds (Picchioni et al., 2008). Hippocampal activity that is normally characteristic of 
REM sleep has been found also to characterize NREM1 sleep (Bódizs et al., 2005; 2008). 
In a recent fMRI study, Magnin and colleagues (2010) found thalamic deactivation 
occurring several minutes before cortical deactivation at sleep onset, but synchronized 
reactivation of both structures during awakening.  
 Several similarities between REM and NREM1 sleep, including hippocampal 
activation, increased theta band activity, vivid dream mentation, and the sensitivity of both 
states to REM sleep deprivation, support the proposal that NREM1 sleep is a brief episode 
of REM sleep (see Nielsen, 2000 for review) that can be more easily assessed 
experimentally for evidence of REM sleep-related memory processing. Indeed, if 
participants are probed for the presence of mentation, dream-like visual experiences are 
reported after NREM1 sleep awakenings with a prevalence as high as after REM sleep 
awakenings (Germain and Nielsen, 1997; Hayashi et al., 1999; Nielsen et al., 2005). 
 
Sleep stages and “covert” sleep phenomenon 
 Some sleep features such as spindles and slow oscillations are not unique to a single 
stage but found across several; other features such as theta and slow wave ripples are also 
found in wake. Reports that REM sleep atonia (Werth et al., 2002) and rapid eye 
movements can be found in Stage 2 sleep suggest that sleep stages are fluid as opposed to 
all-or-nothing segregations (Nielsen, 2000). The traditional scoring system requires the 
presence of a specific quantity of slow oscillations for SWS and the co-occurrence of 
multiple, physiological events for REM sleep (i.e., REMs, atonia and wake-like EEG). Yet 
phenomena related to REM sleep and SWS are found beyond borders established by the 
standard scoring criteria of Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968). The Covert REM (C-REM) 
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model (Nielsen, 2000) posits that dreaming outside of REM sleep (e.g., NREM1) is 
nonetheless associated with REM sleep-phenomena such as eye movements, hippocampal 
activity or muscle atonia that can be expressed in non-REM sleep stages of sleep in a 
partial, dissociated or covert manner. This model accounts for why dreaming is primarily 
associated with REM sleep but can also be found in other stages of sleep, albeit less 
frequently. As can be seen in Table 1, stages of sleep in which elements of REM sleep are 
found are also those featuring the most frequent and vivid dreaming. 
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Table 1. Phenomena associated with sleep and their typical distribution across sleep stages 
and wake.   
 
X = Defining feature 
x = Feature sometimes present 
 
 Wake NREM1 Stage 2 SWS Phasic 
REM 
Tonic 
REM 
Distribution 
across a sleep 
period 
  Late & 
early 
sleep 
Mostly 
early 
sleep 
Mostly 
late sleep 
Mostly 
late sleep 
Slow 
oscillations 
  X (K-
Complex)
X   
Theta x x   X X 
Spindles   X x   
PGO X    X  
Slow wave 
ripples 
X   X   
Atonia  x x  X X 
Wake-like eye 
movements 
X x   X  
Mentation  Frequent Less 
frequent 
Rare Frequent  Frequent 
 
The functions of sleep and sleep stages 
 Numerous functions of sleep have been proposed. Of these, three have received 
substantial empirical scrutiny (Mignot, 2008). First, it is proposed that sleep reduces 
energy demands (Zepelin et al., 2005). However, this hypothetical function does not 
appear to apply to REM sleep as the latter is characterized by an augmented energy 
expenditure, e.g., increased whole body oxygen consumption (Parmeggiani, 2003). This 
function also does not explain why consciousness is lost during sleep, a factor which 
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heightens vulnerability to predators. A second proposed function is that sleep plays a role 
in restoring cellular infrastructure, such as the replenishment of macromolecules (Huber et 
al., 2006) and transmitter vesicles (Mignot, 2008). However, this possible function, too, 
concerns mostly NREM sleep stages (Mignot, 2008). A third proposed function is a role 
for sleep in memory processing. A growing body of evidence supports the notion that sleep 
is not only involved in, but also sometimes critical for, the consolidation of learning and 
memory. And, in contrast to the previous two proposed functions, this function includes 
roles for both REM and NREM sleep. Only the latter function will be considered in more 
detail here.  
 Before reviewing results from studies that have examined sleep stages in 
relationship to memory, a brief overview of memory systems is presented.  
 
Memory Systems  
 Memory consolidation refers to the time-dependent processes of strengthening or 
stabilizing labile memory traces, converting them into more long-lasting forms. Memory 
systems are divided into two broad categories that differ, in large part, in whether learning 
and retrieval are accompanied by conscious awareness (i.e., declarative memory) or not 
(non-declarative or procedural memory) (Cohen & Squire 1980). These two memory 
systems may also differ in that individuals have voluntary access to declarative memories 
whereas non-declarative learning is stimulus driven (Squire, 1992). For instance, tasks 
such as texture discrimination or motor learning, where participants are not explicitly 
aware of encoding and retrieval when learning, are considered to require non-declarative 
memory. The non-declarative memory system includes conditioning, priming, and 
procedural memory (e.g., motor and visual discrimination skills). In contrast, the 
declarative memory system is consciously accessible.  
 Declarative memory is composed of both semantic and episodic types of memory 
(Tulving 1983). Semantic memory consists of general knowledge (e.g., London is the 
capital of England) whereas episodic memory describes memory for specific events 
(Boarding the London subway for the first time). The retrieval of an episodic memory is 
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the ability to recreate, in some perceptual detail, a moment that had previously been 
experienced. In this sense, episodic memory enables one to “travel back in time” to 
reexperienced events (Tulving, 2002). Thus, central to episodic memory is the re-
experiencing of unique events, specified in time (‘when’) and space (‘where’). Each 
episodic memory thus has a unique context consisting of the temporal, spatial and 
perceptual details surrounding an event. Also central to episodic memory is the concept of 
autonoetic awareness, i.e., a conscious recollection of the original events by mentally 
reliving them. In contrast, noetic awareness refers to the knowledge that an event has 
occurred without the ability to consciously recollect the event itself. 
 Autobiographical memory refers to episodic memories of personally relevant 
events. It is a term often appearing in models arguing the interconnectedness of the self 
with memory (e.g., the self-memory system; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The term 
is also used by some authors to refer to episodic memories that span an individual’s entire 
life (e.g., Steinvorth et al., 2005). Autobiographical memories are a subset of episodic 
memories and will therefore not be expanded upon further.  
 It is generally agreed that the declarative memory system is critically dependent on 
the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe more generally (Cohen & Squire 1980; Squire 
1992; Squire et al. 2004) whereas non-declarative memory is independent of the 
hippocampus (Spiers et al. 2001; Squire et al. 2004). According to the standard 
consolidation theory (Squire, 1986; 2004), an episodic memory is dependent upon the 
hippocampus for a time-limited period. It undergoes a consolidation process involving the 
transfer of information from hippocampal areas to distributed neocortical sites and thereby 
eventually becomes independent of the hippocampus. In contrast, the multiple trace theory 
(Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997) posits that the hippocampus is always required for the 
acquisition and recollection of episodic memories. It is responsible for providing the 
spatial-temporal context with which neocortical traces are bound into a coherent 
representation during recall (‘binding’). Episodic memory recall is thus a constructive 
process that involves the re-activation of a hippocampal-neocortical trace. Nonetheless, 
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with repetition and rehearsal multiple traces are created and therefore episodic memories 
become more resistant to hippocampal damage. 
 
Sleep and memory 
Studies examining REM sleep and memory 
REM sleep deprivation studies 
 Several techniques used to examine the role of REM sleep in learning and memory 
in humans are summarized in Table 2. One method consists of reducing REM sleep prior 
to a task and assessing if subsequent learning is disrupted. Using this technique, REM 
sleep deprivation resulted in reduced performance on the Guilford Utility Test (Lewin & 
Glaubman, 1975), which measures divergent thinking.  
 A second method involves reducing the amount of REM sleep after having 
participants learn a task and examining the consequences for subsequent performance, a 
technique widely referred to as post-learning REM sleep deprivation. This form of REM 
sleep deprivation was found to have a detrimental effect on the recall of meaningless 
sentences and anomalous prose passages (Empson & Clarke, 1970), anagram solutions 
(Grieser et al., 1972), the recall of adjectives indicative of personal dissatisfaction 
(Cartwright et al., 1975), a visual discrimination task (Karni et al., 1994), the Wff’n Proof 
complex logic task, (Smith 1993; Smith & Lapp, 1986), word fragment completion, the 
Corsi block tapping task and the Tower of Hanoi (Smith, 1995). REM sleep deprivation 
was also found to have a detrimental effect on the retention of stories (Empson et al., 1980; 
Tilley and Empson, 1978). It is of note that Tilley and Empson (1978) found that small 
amounts of REM sleep deprivation could significantly decrease the accuracy of recalling a 
story. Although the emotional character of the stories used in these studies was not 
explicitly mentioned, one story utilized by Tilley and Empson (1978) “The war of the 
ghosts”, was considerably emotional in nature. Similarly, Wagner et al., (2001) found that 
curtailing late night sleep, which is rich in REM sleep, was associated with poor retention 
of emotional, but not neutral, stories. This study used an alternative method of REM sleep 
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deprivation that takes advantage of the fact that the proportion of SWS decreases through 
the sleep period while the proportion of REM sleep increases.  
Using the same REM sleep deprivation method, it was found that reduction of late 
night sleep was associated with worsened performance on the mirror tracing task, but not 
on the recall of word pairs (Plihal and Born, 1997). Late night sleep was also associated 
with an episodic-like task measuring the ‘what’ ‘where and ‘when’ features of word list 
information (Rauchs et al., 2004). Specifically, curtailment of late sleep was associated 
with worsened recall of ‘where’ and ‘when’ information, as well as with lower recall of 
contextual details of encoding, a measure of autonoetic awareness.  
 Some studies have utilized pharmacological interventions to suppress or alter REM 
sleep. In one study, a nicotinic receptor antagonist mecamylamine, that induces cholinergic 
receptor blockade, impaired the consolidation of a finger sequence tapping task but did not 
affect word-pair memory (Rasch et al. 2009). This result suggests that high levels of 
acetylcholine in REM sleep may be critical to the consolidation of motor memories. In a 
second study, Rasch et al. (2009) found that selective serotonin or norepinephrine re-
uptake inhibitors, that suppress REM sleep, did not disrupt memory consolidation for word 
pairs and, surprisingly, enhanced memory for finger-tapping skills. 
REM sleep deprivation does not negatively impact all types of memory task 
however (see Table 2). It was found not to disrupt the learning of trigrams (Chernik, 1972) 
or performance on a word fluency test (Lewin & Glaubman, 1975). It was also found to 
have no detrimental effect on memory tasks such as verbal paired associates (Castaldo et 
al., 1974; Chernik, 1972; Ekstrand, 1972; Ekstrand et al., 1971; Genzel et al., 2009; Lewin 
& Glaubmann, 1975; Smith, 1993) serial or clustering verbal memory (Lewin & 
Glaubman, 1975), serial word lists (Empson & Clarke, 1970), word recognition or visual 
non-verbal figures (Smith, 1995), mirror-tracing (Tweed et al., 1999) or sequential finger-
tapping (Genzel et al., 2009). 
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Post-training REM sleep modulation studies 
 Another class of studies has determined whether learning is associated with 
subsequent changes in REM sleep parameters. Typical REM sleep parameters include 
REM sleep % (proportion of total sleep time occupied by REM sleep), REM sleep time 
(total time in REM sleep) and REM density (frequency of REMs per unit of time).  
 Changes in REM sleep parameters were found following administration of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (increased REM time, REM sleep % and number of 
REM periods) (Feinberg et al., 1973), viewing of an anxiety arousing film (increased REM 
sleep respiratory irregularity; Baekland et al., 1968) (increased REM density; Goodenough 
et al., 1975), exposure to a task eliciting curiosity, emotions and divergent thinking 
(increased REM time) (Lewin & Gombosh, 1973), exposure to ego-threatening social 
interactions (increased REM density) (Cohen, 1975), successful completion of Thematic 
Appreciation Test solutions (increased REM %) (Cartwright, 1974), intensive learning 
during summer exams (Smith & Lapp, 1991) and the novel complex motor learning 
required for trampolining (increase in REM sleep %) (Buchegger et al., 1988; 1991). Some 
studies report correlations between learning and REM sleep variables, such as positive 
correlation between retention of Morse code learning and REM sleep duration, number of 
REMs and REM density (Mandai et al., 1989). Fischer et al (2002) report an association 
between REM sleep % and learning of a sequential finger tapping task. Stickgold et al., 
(2000) found that REM sleep % in the fourth quarter of the night and SWS in the first 
quarter of the night strongly correlated with learning on the visual discrimination task.  
 DeKoninck and colleagues examined dreaming as a function of learning and its 
effects on REM sleep variables. Wearing vision-inverting lenses produced an increase in 
REM sleep %, while adaptation to them was associated with a reduced REM density 
(DeKoninck & Prevost, 1991; DeKoninck et al., 1996). Further, those better adapted to the 
lenses reported dreams that contained more visual and motor difficulties. In a third study 
by this group, increases in REM sleep % were found to be correlated with learning a 
second language in a total immersion setting. Students demonstrating higher rates of 
learning reported communicating the most in French during dreaming and also reported 
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that French was introduced earlier in the dreaming diaries (DeKoninck et al., 1989). 
Similarly, Smith and Hanke (2004) found evidence that participants incorporate elements 
of a mirror tracing task into dreaming, although a relationship between task-related 
incorporation and performance was not demonstrated.   
 A study by Smith (2004) took into consideration the intelligence levels of 
participants in performing the Tower of Hanoi and mirror tracing tasks. Posttraining 
increases in REM densities and learning were found in participants with the higher 
intelligence scores. Another study found that REM density was correlated with 
performance in a pursuit rotor task in low-skill participants only (Peters et al., 2007).  
 Although not typically considered a REM sleep parameter, theta band activity in 
REM sleep has also been associated with learning. Fogel et al., (2007) found theta power 
increases at central regions during REM sleep following paired associates learning. The 
presence of REM sleep and theta band activity in naps was found to be associated with 
memory for emotional but not neutral pictures (Nishida et al., 2009).  
 In another nap study, the presence of REM sleep was associated with creative 
problem solving measured by the remote associates task (Cai et al., 2009). Similarly, as 
compared to a period of post training NREM sleep, REM sleep was associated with 
accurate solving of anagrams, but not trigrams (Scrima, 1982).   
 A series of PET studies by Maquet and colleagues have demonstrated the effects of 
an implicit learning task (a serial reaction time task) on posttraining brain activation during 
REM sleep. Relative to the brains of non-trained subjects, those of subjects trained on the 
task revealed that many areas activated during waking state learning of the task were also 
more active during REM sleep (Maquet et al., 2000). A subsequent study showed an 
increase in functional connectivity between the left posterior parietal cortex and bilateral 
pre-supplementary motor areas in the trained participants (Laureys et al., 2001). In a third 
study, REM sleep specific posttraining functional connections between the reactivated 
cuneus and the striatum were found in relation to the implicit acquisition of the 
probabilistic rules that defined stimulus sequences, leading the authors to hypothesize that 
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reprocessing and optimization of available high-order information occurs in REM sleep 
(Peigneux et al., 2003).  
 Again, not all memory tasks have resulted in post-training REM sleep changes. No 
changes were observed for learning verbal paired associates (Castaldo et al., 1974, 
experiment 1; Bertini & Torre, 1973; Yaroush et al., 1971; Fowler et al., 1973), trigram 
serial list learning (Castaldo et al., 1974), recall of nonsense-shape paired associates 
(Fowler et al., 1973), crossword puzzles or the remote-associates task (Cartwright, 1974). 
 
Cueing Studies 
 Another technique for assessing the implication of REM sleep in learning and 
memory consists of presenting a task-associated sound during REM sleep as a means of 
“cueing” a reactivation of the task at this time. After having participants learn Morse code, 
Guerrien et al., (1989) presented a task-related sound during the eye movements of REM 
sleep and found greater improvements in performance on a later test than did a group for 
whom the task-related sound was presented during quiescent lulls between the eye 
movements. A similar but better controlled experiment involving a complex logic task 
(Wff’n Proof logic task) found that playing a sound that had been associated with the task 
during the eye movements of REM sleep led to more improvement on a subsequent 
performance test than did presentation of the sound during quiescent lulls (Smith and 
Weeden, 1990). Finally, using rose odor as a cue during REM sleep, Rausch et al. (2007) 
failed to see any improvement on either finger-tapping or visual-motor tasks.  
 
Discussion of REM sleep and memory studies 
 A number of trends can be observed from REM sleep /learning studies. First, tasks 
requiring divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility are consistently associated with REM 
sleep. Positive findings were reported in cases in which 1) divergent thinking was directly 
assessed, e.g., with the Guilford's utility test (Lewin & Glaubman, 1975), 2) divergent 
thinking was a component of the test, e.g., Lewin & Gombosh (1973), and 3) divergent 
thinking was only indirectly involved, e.g., the Thematic Apperception Test (Cartwright, 
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1974). Second, tasks involving cognitive flexibility, such as anagram tasks (Greiser et al., 
1972; Scrima, 1982) and the remote-associates task (Cai et al., 2009), show a dependence 
on REM sleep. One exception was a study finding no changes to REM variables following 
training in the remote-associates task (Cartwright, 1974), although it is not clear what 
dependent variables were used to determine this lack of effect. Overall these studies 
suggest that REM sleep may have a role in the brain’s preparation for (Lewin & 
Glaubman, 1975), and processing of, divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility tasks. 
 There is some evidence that the brain is primed towards an increased strength of 
weak associations during REM sleep. Stickgold et al., (1999) found subjects awakened 
from REM sleep demonstrate a pattern of priming whereby weak primes (thief-wrong) 
lead to greater priming than strong primes (hot-cold)--the contrary of what is normally 
observed in either the waking state or NREM sleep. Similarity, Walker et al. (2002) found 
that participants awakened from REM sleep solved more anagrams than did participants 
awakened from NREM sleep. While it is not clear what neurophysiological mechanisms 
may underlie this bias towards weak associations in REM sleep, it has been suggested that 
low aminergic levels characterizing this state may account for the effect. Performance on 
tests measuring cognitive flexibility, including anagrams, is improved following b-
adrenergic blockade with propranolol and reduced following the administration of the 
adrenergic agonist ephedrine (Beversdorf et al. 1999).  
  REM sleep is also reliably associated with emotional materials. This effect was 
found for emotional pictures (Nishida et al., 2009), emotional stories (Tilley and Empson, 
1978. Wagner et al., 2001) emotional films (Baekland et al., 1968; Goodenough et al., 
1975), the recall of adjectives indicative of personal dissatisfaction (Cartwright et al., 
1975) and threatening social interactions (Cohen, 1975). The unique neurophysiology of 
REM sleep, namely the increased activity in cortical theta, elevated acetylcholine levels 
and increased amygdala activity, may implicate this stage of sleep in emotional memory 
processing (Walker, 2009; Walker & van der Helm, 2009). Moreover, REM sleep is 
characterized by the co-activation of the hippocampus and the amygdala, which become 
synchronized in the theta activity band of the EEG (Pare & Gaudreau, 1996; Hegde et al., 
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2008; Karashima et al., 2010). Because emotional memory formation in the waking state 
involves such co-activation (Hamann et al., 1999; Canli et al., 2000; Dolcos et al., 2004) 
and theta-band synchronization (Seidenbecher et al., 2003; Pape et al., 2005), a similar 
relationship in REM sleep may underlie this stage's association with emotional declarative 
memory processing.  
 A third trend relates to Smith et al.'s (2004) proposal that REM sleep is associated 
with complex procedural tasks whereas Stage 2 sleep is involved in the refinement of 
simple and or existing procedural skills. Accordingly, REM sleep was associated with 
novel complex motor learning, i.e., trampolining (Buchegger et al., 1988; 1991), the 
pursuit rotor task (Peters et al., 2007; Plihal and Born 1997), and complex cognitive 
procedural tasks, namely the Wff’n Proof complex logic task (Smith 1993, Smith & Lapp, 
1986, Smith & Weeden, 1990), the tower of Hanoi (Smith 1995; 2004), the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (Fienberg et al., 1973) and adaptation to inverted lenses 
(DeKoninck & Prevost, 1991; DeKoninck et al., 1996).  
 Complex declarative learning is also associated with REM sleep; tasks such as 
learning Morse code (Guerrein et al., 1989; Mandai et al., 1989), intensively learning 
French (DeKoninck et al., 1989), and learning meaningless sentences and anomalous prose 
passages (Empson & Clarke, 1970). The association of declarative tasks with REM sleep is 
at odds with the ‘dual-process hypothesis’ that posits that this stage is associated with non-
declarative tasks that are independent of the hippocampus. The association of REM sleep 
with learning stories (Empson et al., 1980) and an episodic-like memory task (Rauchs et 
al., 2004) further argues against the ‘dual-process hypothesis’. It is also of note that only 
two studies have examined episodic-like memory. In contrast, numerous studies have 
demonstrated that REM sleep is not involved in learning simple declarative tasks (see table 
2).  
 That REM sleep is involved in divergent thinking, cognitive flexibility and the 
processing of emotional memories fits well with the notion that dreams are bizarre and 
emotional. Indeed, dreams are known for mixing loosely related elements together in a 
single scene (Freud, 1900) that can sometimes lead to creativity. Indeed, several scientific 
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and artistic achievements are attributed to dreams (Maquet & Ruby, 2004) and feature 
examples of divergent thinking. Dreams are also known for their emotional, often dramatic 
qualities (Freud, 1900). However, it is not known if REM sleep dreaming is associated 
with the instigation of cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking or the improved learning 
of emotional materials. Nevertheless, studies that have taken into account dreaming have 
found a relationship between the presence of task-related elements in dreaming and 
language acquisition (DeKoninck et al., 1989) and adapting to inverted lenses (DeKoninck 
& Prevost, 1991; DeKoninck et al., 1996). Two additional studies not previously reviewed 
also suggest a link between dreaming and memory processes. First, Cipolli et al. (2005) 
found that dream elements that are interrelated are better remembered in a surprise 
morning recall task. Second, stories learned before sleep are better recalled the next day 
when elements of the story are incorporated in a dream (Fiss et al., 1977).  
 
Table 2. Summary of studies that have examined REM sleep in relation to memory and 
cognition in humans. 
 Studies indicating a role for REM sleep Studies indicating no role for REM 
sleep 
Declarative tasks   
Divergent thinking 
and cognitive 
flexibility 
Guilford's utility task 
• Lewin & Glaubman, 1975 
Anagram solutions 
• Greiser et al., 1972 
• Scrima, 1982 
Task designed to elicit curiosity, emotions 
and divergent thinking 
• Lewin & Gombosh, 1973 
Thematic apperception test solutions    
• Cartwright, 1974 
Remote-associates task 
• Cai et al., 2009   
Remote-associates task 
• Cartwright, 1974 
Emotional 
declarative  
Adjectives indicative of personal 
dissatisfaction  
• Cartwright et al., 1975 
Emotional stories 
• Tilley and Empson, 1978 
• Wagner et al., 2001  
Anxiety arousing film 
• Baekland et al., 1968 
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• Goodenough et al., 1975 
Threatening social interactions,   
• Cohen, 1975 
Emotional pictures  
• Nishida et al., 2009 
Declarative word 
tasks 
 
Word pair associates 
• Fogel et al., 2007 
Guilford's word fluency task 
• Lewin & Glaubman, 1975  
Trigrams 
• Chernik, 1972 
• Castalda et al., 1974 
• Scrima, 1982 
Verbal paired associates 
• Castaldo et al., 1974 
• Chernik, 1972 
• Ekstrand, 1972 
• Ekstrand et al., 1971 
• Lewin & Glaubmann, 1975 
• Smith, 1993  
• Plihal and Born, 1997 
• Genzel et al., 2010 
• Rasch et al. 2009 
Serial or clustering verbal memory  
• Lewin & Glaubman, 1975 
Serial word lists  
• Empson & Clarke, 1970  
• Castaldo 1974, experiment 1 
• Bertini & Torre, 1973 
• Yaroush et al., 1971 
• Fowler et al., 1973 
Word recognition task   
• Smith, 1995 
Crossword puzzles   
• Cartwright, 1974 
Declarative 
anomalous word 
tasks 
Meaningless sentences and anomalous 
prose passages  
• Empson & Clarke, 1970 
 
Complex 
declarative tasks 
Morse code   
• Mandai et al., 1989 
• Guerrein et al., (1989)   
Learning French  
• DeKoninck et al., 1989 
Exam period  
• Smith & Lapp, 1991 
Learning stories  
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• Empson et al., 1980 
 
Episodic-like 
memory 
What-When-Where Episodic task  
• Rauchs et al., 2004 
 
 
Procedural tasks   
Visual tasks Visual discrimination task  
• Karni et al., 1994 
• Stickgold et al., 2000 
Visual non-verbal figure task 
• Smith, 1995 
Visual motor 
• Rasch et al. (2007) 
Implicit word 
tasks 
Word fragment completion 
• Smith, 1995 
 
Implicit motor 
task 
Serial reaction time task 
• Maquet et al., 2000 
• Laureys et al., 2001 
• Peigneux et al., 2003 
 
Motor tasks Novel complex motor learning 
• Buchegger et al., 1988; 1991 
Mirror tracing  
• Smith 2004 
Pursuit rotor task  
• Peters et al., 2007  
• Plihal and Born, 1997  
Sequential finger-tapping task  
• Fischer et al., 2002 
• Rasch et al., 2009 
Mirror-tracing task  
• Tweed et al., 1999 
Sequential finger-tapping task  
• Genzel et al., 2010 
• Rasch et al., 2009 
 
Complex logic 
Tasks 
Wff’n Proof logic task  
• Smith & Lapp, 1986  
• Smith, 1993   
• Smith and Weeden, 1990 
Tower of Hanoi  
• Smith 1995 
• Smith 2004 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale  
• Fienberg et al., 1973 
 
 
Spatial Tasks Corsi block tapping task  
• Smith, 1995 
 
Adaptation Adapting to inverted lenses  
• DeKoninck & Prevost, 1991 
• DeKoninck et al., 1996 
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 In sum, previous studies converge in supporting the possibility that REM sleep is 
involved in 1) tasks requiring divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility, 2) declarative 
materials that are of an emotional nature and 3) complex tasks of a motor, cognitive 
procedural or declarative nature. Furthermore, episodic memory has been largely neglected 
by studies of sleep and memory and, although preliminary evidence suggests that dreaming 
may be associated with adaptation and learning, very few studies have taken dreams into 
account.   
 In the following section the role of SWS, stage 2 and NREM1 in memory 
processing will be reviewed. Because of the focus the present dissertation is on REM 
sleep, other sleep stages will be reviewed only briefly.  
  
Studies examining SWS and memory 
 Studies utilizing early-night/late-night paradigms have consistently associated 
SWS-rich early night sleep with the learning of word lists but not motor tasks (Fowler et 
al., 1973; Plihal & Born, 1999; Gais et al., 2002; Gais & Born, 2004), suggesting that this 
stage is involved in the processing of declarative but not procedural memories. However, a 
recent study deprived participants of SWS and found no effect on verbal paired associates 
(Genzel et al., 2009). This may mean that the small amount of SWS received by SWS-
deprived participants was sufficient for the consolidation of simple declarative memory. In 
addition to simple declarative tasks, SWS is also associated with spatial tasks (Plihal & 
Born, 1999; Peigneux et al., 2004), which can also be considered as declarative in nature. 
Early night sleep has also been linked to autonoetic awareness during the recall of word 
lists (Drosopoulos et al, 2005; Daurat et al., 2007).  
   Recent studies have provided evidence consistent with the notion that the 
cortical slow wave and hippocampal ripple activity characterizing SWS sleep support the 
reactivation of declarative memory traces and facilitate their integration within neocortical 
areas (Diekelmann & Born, 2010). Evidence that slow oscillations are causal to declarative 
memory consolidation was found in a study by Marshall et al. (2004) in which increasing 
the magnitude of slow oscillations with transcranial direct current stimulation during SWS 
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facilitated the recall of word-pairs learned before sleep, but did not affect procedural motor 
tasks. That the reactivation of memory traces occurs during SWS is suggested by the 
finding that sleep-dependent learning of a spatial task is associated with hippocampal 
reactivation during SWS (Peigneux et al., 2004). Using a “cue dependent recall” paradigm, 
two studies have demonstrated that memory processing or “reactivation” relating to 
specific tasks can be triggered during SWS. Rasch et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
presenting a task-associated odor during SWS, but not during REM sleep, improved the 
consolidation of visual paired associate stimuli. Rudoy et al., (2009) played unique sounds 
during the presentation of individual objects in an object-location associations task. 
Memory for object locations was improved after sleep for objects whose associated sound 
was played during SWS, and not REM sleep. These results suggest that a selective 
reactivation of individual memory items can occur during SWS sleep and lead to their 
consolidation.   
In the context of the standard model of memory (Squire, 1986; 2004), it is argued 
that the reactivation observed in these studies underlies the transfer of memory traces from 
the hippocampus to diffuse neocortical areas (Diekelmann & Born, 2010). In rodents, 
hippocampal reactivation of pre-sleep exploratory behavior is observed at the cellular level 
during SWS (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Lee & Wilson, 2002; Ji & Wilson, 2007) and 
is paralleled by replay in neocortical areas such as the prefrontal (Peyrache et al., 2009), 
parietal (Qin et al., 1997) and visual (Ji & Wilson, 2007) cortex. This hippocampal 
reactivation occurs in conjunction with sharp wave ripples (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; 
Molle et al., 2006; Peyrache et al., 2009) which have been associated with learning (Ego-
Stengel & Wilson, 2009; Girardeau et al., 2009; Ramadan et al., 2009) and which may 
promote synaptic potentiation (Bramham & Srebro, 1989). Together these findings suggest 
that SWS sleep is ideally suited for processing declarative memories and integrating them 
within neocortical areas (Diekelmann & Born, 2010). Moreover, it is believed that the 
transfer and integration of memory traces from the hippocampus to neocortical networks 
may result in the reorganization of memory information (Sirota et al., 2003; Steriade, 
2006). The association between SWS and gaining insight from hidden regularities in the 
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number reduction task (Yordanova et al., 2008, 2009; 2010) may lie in this reorganization 
of memory (Walker, 2009).  
 Several studies have linked procedural learning to SWS. Sleep dependent 
improvement of the texture discrimination task was found to be strongly correlated with 
SWS in the first quarter of the night and REM sleep in the last quarter of the night 
(Stickgold et al., 2000). Aeschbach et al. (2008) found the same task impaired by a sound 
stimulation-induced decrease in the amount of slow wave activity in SWS by 30 %. Huber 
et al. (2004) found a correlation between sleep-related improvements in a visual-motor 
adaptation task and local increase in slow wave activity the right parietal cortical area 
involved in the task. Sleep-dependent learning in this same visual-motor adaptation task 
was diminished by a decrease in the amount of slow wave activity induced by sound 
stimulation (Landsness et al., 2009).  
 In summary, the studies reviewed here suggest that SWS is involved in simple 
declarative memory, spatial learning, insight into hidden regularities and procedural 
learning of visual-discrimination and visual-motor tasks.  
 
Studies examining stage 2 and memory 
 Studies examining a role for stage 2 in memory have found that overnight 
improvement on a motor sequence learning task is correlated with the amount of stage 2 
sleep (Fogel et al., 2007; Morin at al., 2008; Tucker & Fishbein, 2009; Walker et al., 2002, 
2003). The relationship between the amount of stage 2 and learning was found to be 
stronger late night than for early night stage 2 sleep for both a motor sequence task 
(Walker et al., 2002; 2003) and the pursuit rotor task (Fogel et al., 2007). Similarly, stage 2 
sleep deprivation was found to reduce sleep-related learning of the pursuit rotor task 
(Smith & Fazekas, 1997) and a simple tracing task (Tweed et al., 1999); these same tasks 
were not disrupted by REM sleep deprivation. 
 Spindles are closely associated with the sleep-dependent learning of motor tasks. 
An increase in spindle activity was found in relationship to sleep-related improvements of 
the motor sequence learning task (Morin at al., 2008; Nishida and Walker, 2007; Tucker & 
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Fishbein, 2009) and a mirror tracing task (Tamaki et al. 2008). Increased spindle activity 
was also observed as a consequence of training in a variety of procedural tasks (Fogel and 
Smith, 2006) and more selectively, the pursuit rotor task (Fogel, et al., 2007), where sigma 
power increased in the second half of the night as the result of training. In a second study 
using the pursuit rotor task, sleep-related gains in performance were associated with 
spindle activity in high performers only. Spindle activity also increased after learning a 
new visual-motor skill (Tamaki et al., 2009).  
 Declarative memory improvements may also be associated with sleep spindles as 
suggested by studies finding increased spindle activity in relation to successful learning of 
paired-associates (Clemens et al. 2005; Gais et al., 2002; Schabus et al., 2004; 2008). The 
mechanism by which sleep spindles consolidate memory likely involves neural plasticity 
(Steriade, 1999) as suggested by a large influx of calcium ions into cortical cells 
(Sejnowski & Destexhe, 2000), an established mechanism for plasticity (Ghosh & 
Greenberg, 1995).   
 In sum, stage 2 sleep and spindle activity are reliably associated with motor tasks 
and, to a lesser extent, simple declarative learning.  
 
Studies examining NREM1 and memory 
 NREM1 sleep has received very little attention in terms of its relationship to 
memory processing. In the only study directly addressing this question, Lahl et al. (2008) 
found that free recall of a list of 30 words was improved following either 5- to 6-minute 
daytime naps or a 60 min interval consisting of daytime napping but not waking activity. 
Another study found evidence that dreaming of a spatial task during sleep onset was 
associated with increased sleep-related consolidation of this task (Wamsley et al., 2010).  
 
Summary of the sleep and memory research  
 The studies reviewed here describe a complex relationship between the five stages 
of sleep and the several types of memory that have been investigated (see table 3). 
Examining relationships between specific types of learning and sleep stages requires more 
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detailed classification than the traditional procedural and declarative distinction. For 
declarative memory, simple learning is associated predominantly with SWS and to a lesser 
extent stage 2. REM sleep seems to have a unique relationship with emotional memories 
and complex learning, while SWS is predominantly associated with tasks of a spatial 
nature. REM sleep is strongly associated with cognitive procedural tasks and those 
involving divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility. Motor tasks are associated with 
Stage 2 and REM sleep, and whether the task calls for learning new skills or the refinement 
of existing skills may determine whether its consolidation is determined by REM sleep or 
Stage 2, respectively (Smith et al., 2004).  
 
Table 3. Relationships between sleep stages and classes of learning. Bold “X” indicates 
exclusive relationships between a sleep stage and a type of learning.  
 S1 S2 SWS REM 
Declarative x x x x 
Simple  x x x  
Complex    X 
Emotional    X 
Spatial   X  
Procedural  x x x 
Motor  x  x 
Cognitive 
procedural 
   X 
Cognitive 
Flexibility 
   X 
 
 Sleep-dependent consolidation has been linked to particular sleep phenomena such 
as spindles or theta and sigma band activity. While these phenomena are associated with a 
particular sleep stage, they are also found at times in adjacent sleep stages. Studies show 
that several stages of sleep can contribute to a task, such as Stickgold et al., (2000) who 
found that REM sleep in the fourth quarter of the night and SWS in the first quarter of the 
night both strongly correlated with learning on the visual discrimination task. While 
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numerous studies have examined semantic and motor memory in relation to SWS, REM 
sleep and stage 2 sleep, there is an important lack of studies examining episodic memory 
and NREM1 sleep. Indeed, one study has examined episodic-like memory in relation to 
sleep (Rauche et al., 2004) while only two other studies examined autonoetic awareness 
and sleep (Daurat et al., 2007; Drosopoulos et al., 2005). Only 2 studies have investigated 
NREM1 sleep in relation to learning (Lahl et al., 2008; Wamsley et al., 2010). The role of 
dreaming in memory processing has also received little attention even though a 
relationship between dreaming and learning was found in all previously mentioned studies 
that examined sleep mentation (DeKoninck et al., 1989; DeKoninck & Prevost, 1991; 
DeKoninck et al., 1996; Fiss et al., 1977; Wamsley et al. 2010).  
 In sum, it is becoming increasingly clear that memory depends upon sleep. The last 
10 years have seen a surge in studies demonstrating a role for sleep in memory 
consolidation. While the joint study of sleep and memory has led to breakthroughs in both 
fields, such studies are also burdened by the multiple complexities inherent to both. Sleep 
is typically divided into 5 neurophysiologically and phenomenologically distinct stages 
(Hobson et al., 2000), while memory is usually divided into several memory systems and 
processes that are each characterized by unique phenomenologies and neural substrates 
(Tulving, 2002). Numerous studies have demonstrated that distinct stages of sleep are 
associated with distinct types of memory (Smith, 2001; Rauchs et al., 2005). Much 
research has also shown that neurophysiological processes associated with specific sleep 
stages interact with the neurophysiological processes of distinct memory types (Stickgold 
& Walker, 2007). In contrast, there is almost no research examining how the 
phenomenological characteristics of different memory systems relate to the 
phenomenological qualities of sleep stages. The research presented in the current thesis 
will address this lack by jointly examining the phenomenologies of sleep and memory to 
help clarify still unresolved issues of sleep-dependent learning.   
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Sleep and Episodic Memory  
 With the current emphasis on phenomenology, the focus of the present thesis is on 
REM sleep, which is characterized by frequent and vivid dreaming, and episodic memory, 
which is characterized by autonoetic awareness. These share common phenomenological 
and neurophysiological characteristics that will be considered in relation to sleep-
dependent memory consolidation. In line with a phenomenological approach, 
neurophysiological features of both REM sleep and episodic memory will be discussed in 
so far as they underlie the particular subjective experiences unique to each, i.e., of REM 
sleep dreaming and episodic memory recall.  
 Unlike the case for non-declarative or simple declarative memory, very few studies 
have examined the role of sleep in episodic memory. In fact, only three studies have 
looked at sleep-related episodic memory consolidation (Daurat et al., 2007; Drosopoulos et 
al., 2005; Rauchs et al., 2004). Moreover, the studies have produced conflicting results as 
to whether REM sleep or SWS is involved in its consolidation. In a later section I argue 
that the use of different measures, stemming from different conceptualizations of episodic 
memory across these studies, may explain these discrepant results. In order to do this, an 
examination of the concept of episodic memory, especially in relation to the related 
concept of recollection, is necessary.  
 
Episodic memory and recollection  
 The conceptualization of episodic memory has evolved since Tulving introduced 
the term in his seminal 1972 paper, and today the term 'episodic memory' is used in at least 
two distinct ways by different authors. Tulving first proposed that “episodic memory stores 
and retrieves information about temporarily-dated episodes or events, and temporal–spatial 
relations among events” (Tulving, 1972, p. 385). This refers to the notion of the factual 
(‘what’), spatial (‘where’) and temporal (‘when’) aspects of episodic memory. In 
subsequent publications, Tulving (1983, 1985, 2000, 2002, 2005) places the subjective re-
experiencing of events at the center of episodic memory: “[episodic memory] makes 
possible mental time-travel through subjective time—past, present and future. This mental 
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time travel allows the “owner” of the episodic memory (“self”), through the medium of 
autonoetic awareness, to remember one’s own previous “thought about” experiences. . .” 
(Tulving, 2005, p. 15). According to this view, episodic memory is the capacity to re-
experience events with the 'mind's eye'.  
 Central to this notion of episodic memory are 1) autonoetic awareness, defined as a 
conscious recollection of the original events by mentally reliving them, which allows a sort 
of “time travel”, i.e., the ability to go back in time to re-experience events, and 2) that the 
re-experiencing concerns the ‘what’ ‘where’ and ‘when’ of personally experienced events. 
Tulving differentiates between autonoetic awareness, considered to be the “standard 
experiential mode of the episodic memory system” (Duzel et al., 1997, p. 5973), and noetic 
awareness, which is characterized by an absence of ‘re-experiencing' and is considered as 
the “standard experiential mode of retrieval operations in the semantic memory (general 
knowledge) system” (Duzel et al., 1997, p. 5973).  
 A common method to study the “re-experiencing” aspects of episodic memory is to 
use personal memories as memory items. While this method allows for high ecological 
validity through the utilization of real-life events, it suffers from an important lack of 
experimental control over the memory items.  
 A second, more frequently used method addresses these concerns through the use of 
word lists as experimental stimuli. Unlike personal memories, lexical items can be 
carefully controlled and standardized. One method utilizing word lists to differentiate 
between autonoetic and noetic responses is the 'know/remember' paradigm. Typically, the 
remember/know paradigm involves a first list of words that is presented and participants 
must make old/new judgments on a second list. In a study by Tulving and colleagues 
(1977), participants “were required to respond R [remember] if they could remember 
anything about the actual event of the word’s occurrence in the study list, re-experiencing 
the episode (p.5974). Thus, when presented an item, participants must indicate if they can 
re-experience the episode of item presentation (a “remember” response, i.e., autonoetic 
awareness) or if they made an old/new decision without re-experiencing the episode (a 
'know' answer, i.e., noetic awareness).  
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However, the remember/know paradigm is more frequently used in a related but 
distinct way by other researchers, including Tulving himself. Notably, Yonelinas, a 
proponent of the dual process framework (Yonelinas, 2001) does not explicitly utilize re-
experiencing as a criterion to differentiate ‘know’ from ‘remember’ responses (see table 4). 
Instead, a “remember” response is indicated by the recollection of qualitative details 
regarding the initial moment of encoding and 'known' responses are made on the basis of 
familiarity and in the absence of recollection. For example, in one study 'remember' 
responses are measured as the ability to accurately remember the color of the studied word 
(Yonelinas and Levy, 2002). 'Know responses' are considered as reflecting 'familiarity' 
while 'remember' responses are considered to reflect 'recollection'. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Tulving’s and Yonelinas’s conceptualizations of the 
know/remember paradigm. 
 Yonelinas (as described in 
Yonelinas, 2002) 
Tulving (as described in 
Duzel et al., 1997) 
Paradigm The Know/Remember 
Paradigm  
The Know/Remember 
Paradigm  
Criteria for a 'remember’ 
response 
Some amount of detail 
information 
Re-experiencing the 
experimental event 
Criteria for a 'know' 
response 
Recognition & no detail 
information 
Recognition & absence of re-
experiencing 
Terminology for 
'remember’ response 
Recollection Episodic 
Terminology for 'know' 
response 
Familiarity Semantic 
 
 Yonelinas and Tulving thus seem to utilize the remember/know paradigm in 
overlapping but critically different ways. Yonelinas considers 'remember' responses as 
'recollection' processes (he does not use the term 'episodic') based on a threshold retrieval 
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process and measured by the presence of detail information in regards to the memory item. 
In contrast, Tulving considers 'remember' responses as 'episodic' using the criterion of 
'autonoetic awareness' that is measured by the presence of 're-experiencing' the 
experimental event. A major consequence of these differential uses of the know/remember 
paradigm concerns the criteria for a 'remember’ response,’re-experiencing' is critical to 
Tulving while only implied for Yonelinas. For example, in a word list experiment, 
remembering that a word was red is sufficient for Yonelinas to consider it a 'remember ' 
response, while Tulving's criteria would further require the participant to report that they 
can re-experience the red word with their 'mind's eye'.  
While a description of these two different uses of the remember/know task clarifies 
conceptual issues surrounding this paradigm, in reality Tulving does not always follow the 
criteria of his Duzel et al. (1997) publication; in fact, he (e.g., Solerlund et al 2007) 
sometime uses Yonelinas’ recollection criterion (Yonelinas, 2002). Nonetheless, there is a 
clear dichotomy between the two authors: Tulving has written extensively about the central 
role of re-experiencing in his conceptualization of episodic memory (Tulving, 1983, 1985, 
2000, 2002, 2005), while Yonelinas (2002) does not emply terms such as re-experiencing 
and autonoetic (both terms are absent from his lengthy 46-page review of recollection, with 
episodic memory only mentioned in relation to Tulving). Accordingly, Yonelinas 
systematically considers his work to be examining recollection and not episodic memory. 
Unfortunately, Tulving is not as systematic in his use of the term episodic memory; he 
sometimes considers remember/know studies that lack any mention of re-experiencing as 
examining ‘episodic memory’. This obscures the definition of episodic memory: on the 
one hand he writes at length on the central role of re-experiencing in episodic memory, but 
on the other does not always consider re-experiencing as a defining feature of episodic 
memory (perhaps because he uses word lists as experimental stimuli). In face of this 
inconsistency, for the present dissertation I will refer to Tulving’s conceptualization of 
episodic memory and the know/remember paradigm as critically dependent upon the 
concept of re-experiencing, as detailed in the methodology of Duzel et al. (1997), and in 
the spirit of his theoretical writings (Tulving, 1983, 1985, 2000, 2002, 2005).  
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 In sum, Yonelinas and Tulving seem to be focusing on two different phenomena 
relating to memory. Yonelinas is interested in the threshold between familiarity (I 
recognize him, but who is it?) and recollection (that's Jack, the bartender at Le St-Sulpice); 
in contrast Tulving focuses on the threshold between semantic knowledge (Jack works at 
Le St-Sulpice) and re-experiencing (I can replay in my head the first time we met). Of 
course, recollection and re-experiencing are not mutually exclusive and often co-occur: the 
participant providing the above example of recollection (Jack works at Le St-Sulpice) may 
be re-experiencing (or not), but only Tulving's approach truly ensures us of this. Tulving's 
criteria, however, cannot make the distinction between familiarity (recognizing an item in 
the absence of detail information) and recollection (recognizing an item and its related 
detail information).   
Because this dissertation is concerned with phenomenological aspects of memory 
and dreaming and in later sections will delve into concepts closely related to ‘re-
experiencing’ such as scene construction (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007) and future episodic 
thought (Szpunar, 2010), I will consider mainly Tulving's conceptualization of the 
know/remember paradigm. Accordingly, while some authors (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) limit 
the remember/know paradigm to recognition memory, episodic memory as conceptualized 
by Tulving is clearly not restricted to recognition memory. For this reason, research 
presented in the dissertation will sometimes utilize cued-recall questions in regard to the 
remember/know paradigm, which I argue is legitimate within the context of Tulving’s 
conceptualization of episodic memory (but would not be so within the framework utilized 
by Yonelinas). 
 In the following section, studies having examined the effect of sleep stage on 
episodic memories and/or recollection (Daurat et al., 2007; Drosopoulos et al., 2005; 
Rauchs et al., 2004) are examined in light of the distinctions made above. It is concluded 
that the only study finding a REM sleep-specific consolidation (Rauchs et al., 2004) is also 
the study with the stimulus and method that most closely approximates Tulving's notion of 
episodic memory. 
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Episodic memory consolidation in sleep 
 All three of the episodic/recollection memory-sleep studies used a 
“remember/know” paradigm in relation to memorizing word lists (Daurat et al., 2007; 
Drosopoulos et al., 2005; Rauchs et al., 2004). As illustrated by Table 5, the studies differ 
in regard to 1) whether 'remember' responses are associated with re-experiencing 
(Tulving's criterion) or detail information (Yonelias' criterion) and 2) the degree to which 
experimental events contained ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when’ information. The results of the 
studies also differ significantly, possibly as a consequence of these methodological 
differences.  
 
Table 5. Comparison of three studies having examined episodic memory and sleep with 
different conceptualizations of the remember/know paradigm. Shaded cells indicate 
criterion that most closely approximate Tulving's conceptualization of episodic memory.  
 Rauchs et al., 
2004 
Drosopoulos et al., 
2005 
Daurat et al., 
2007 
'What' component 14 Words 48 Words 36 Words 
'Where' component Top or bottom  -- -- 
'When' component List 1 or 2 List 1 or 2 -- 
Remember response 
criteria 
Re-experiencing 
(minimal 
criterion) 
Detail information 
(list membership) 
Re-experiencing 
(minimal 
criterion) 
Associated sleep stage REM SWS SWS 
 
 Drosopoulos et al. (2005) used 2 word lists of 24 words each in their memory task 
and responses were considered as 'remember' when participants could indicate in what list 
out of the two the word was seen. This method clearly follows Yonelinas' method and 
criterion for recollection. Accordingly, the authors consider 'remember' responses as 
indicating 'recollection' and make no explicit mention of re-experiencing or episodic 
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memory. The existence of two lists constitutes temporal (‘when’) information; spatial 
information (‘where’) is lacking in this experiment.  
 In contrast, a spatial component was present in a similar experiment by Rauchs et al 
(2004) by having participants recall word location (top vs. bottom) for stimuli consisting of 
two lists of seven nouns each. The experimenters also asked participants for word order 
(first or second list), thus in effect constituting the ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘what’ aspects of 
episodic memory (Tulving, 2002). ‘Remember’ responses needed to be justified by some 
recollection of what had occurred when the item was encoded, that is, thoughts, feelings or 
perceptions. In other words, a simple thought or evoked image occurring at the time of the 
encoding (e.g., it made me think of…) was sufficient to characterize the memory as 
episodic. While this criterion does not explicitly target re-experiencing, it is much closer to 
Tulving's notion of episodic memory than is the criterion of the Drosopoulos et al., 2005 
study (i.e., recall of word color). Also, unlike Drosopoulos et al., Rauchs et al (2004) 
consider their 'remember' responses to reflect autonoetic awareness and consider their 
study to be an investigation of episodic memory. 
 Daurat et al. (2007), who used two lists of 36 words each as memory items, had 
participants identify old and new words in a subsequent retest as in the other two studies. 
In a manner very similar to Rauchs et al. (2004), they controlled for “remember” responses 
by asking for some type of justification to ensure that participants remembered the 
circumstances surrounding the item’s presentation in the study list. However, unlike 
Rauchs et al., (2004) there was no explicit measure of the 'where' or 'when' components of 
episodic memory.  
 In sum, the three studies meet Tulving’s criteria for episodic memory to varying 
degrees. As illustrated in Table 5, Rauchs et al (2004) most closely approximates Tulving's 
conceptualization of episodic memory. This study was the only one that measured the 
‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when’ aspects of episodic memory, and in addition featured a 
remember/know methodology that approximates that used by Tulving to measure the 
presence of re-experiencing (Duzel et al., 1997) It is also the only study that found an 
association between REM sleep and ‘remember’ responses. In contrast, Daurat et al. 
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(2007) and Drosopoulos et al. (2005) found that early night sleep, which is normally rich in 
SWS, but not late night sleep, normally rich in REM sleep, was associated with increased 
number of ‘remember’ responses. These results fit well with the notion that simple 
declarative memories are associated with SWS (Gais and Born, 2004), but that complex 
cognitive tasks are associated with REM sleep. However, while the Rauchs et al., 2004 
study more closely approximates Tulving's conceptualization of episodic memory, it still 
falls short of properly evaluating the re-experiencing element. Research examining 
episodic memories of life events use much more stringent criteria to determine if recall of 
an item is a ‘know’ (noetic) or ‘remember’ (autonoetic) response. Tests to measure 
episodic memories, such as the TEMPau task (Piolino et al., 2003), emphasize the reliving 
of affective-sensory-perceptual details. Other studies (unrelated to sleep) using the 
“know/remember” paradigm also use stringent criteria for “remember” responses. For 
instance, Danion et al. (2005) required that participants give details aloud to ensure that 
they were using ‘remember’ responses (presumed to reflect episodic memory) properly. An 
example of a “remember” response from the Danion et al study is as follows:  
 
A meeting (the participant recollected very specific details of the scene, his/her 
feelings and thoughts) that took place in a particular environment (the 
participant relived the specific atmosphere, his/her position in the scene) 2 
years ago (the participant recollected the thoughts he had with regard to the 
fact that the meeting took place exactly 5 years after his school graduation, the 
time of day). [p. 539] 
 
Furthermore, in the Danion et al study a “know” response was described as knowing what 
happened including the where and when of the event, but without mention of any 
conscious recollection.  
While word lists may be particularly well suited for research examining Yonelias' 
conceptualization of recollection, Tulving's notion of episodic re-experiencing may be 
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particularly amendable to the use of real-life events as memory items. To address this 
issue, we utilized VR technology to achieve high levels of ecological validity, while at the 
same time maintaining some control over experimental items in a manner similar to word-
list studies. This component of the thesis will be described in more detail in a later section. 
 
Episodic memory recall and dreaming 
 In the following sections, it is suggested that parallels between dreaming and 
episodic memory support the possibility that the two phenomena are linked. Specifically, 
several lines of research converge on the notion that the hippocampus may be central to 
encoding contextual detail and expressing this contextual detail in both dreaming and 
episodic memory. The following sections review this convergence of findings. 
 
Hippocampus and context 
 Authors researching the spatial and temporal functions of the hippocampus usually 
define context as the set of background features that surround an event. Accordingly, 
spatial context refers to where an event occurred in relation to the environment and its 
stimuli, while temporal context refers to when an event took place in relation to other 
events. The spatial aspect of context has been widely studied and there is clear evidence 
that the encoding of spatial variables is dependent on hippocampal place cells (Bostock et 
al., 1991; Tanila et al., 1997; Anderson and Jeffery, 2003). Similarly, temporal context is 
believed to be generated by the timing patterns of hippocampal cell spiking (Bower et al., 
2005; Ferbinteanu and Shapiro, 2003; Shapiro and Ferbinteanu, 2006). Recent findings 
indicate that place cells fire in relationship to non-geometric stimuli, thus expanding the 
concept of context to encompass non-spatial and non-temporal elements. For example, in 
rats hippocampal neurons respond to changes in colors and odors associated with an 
environment (Anderson and Jeffery, 2003; Hayman et al., 2003). It has been recently 
proposed that goals also constitute an important contextual variable, as suggested by the 
encoding of reward in conjunction with spatial and temporal variables in the hippocampus 
(Smith and Mizumori, 2006a). Similarly, Tulving (1983) independently argued that goals 
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are fundamental to episodic memory. A term such as “situational context” may refer to 
aspects of context that transcend simple temporal, spatial and perceptual elements. 
Episodic memory recall and dreaming appear to possess contexts that concern all of these 
factors: a situation that unfolds in time, that describes complex relationships between items 
and that may be centered on motivation and goals. Descriptions of the medial temporal 
memory system (as first proposed by Mishkin, 1982) demonstrate the need for a concept 
such as situational context to account for phenomena such as episodic memory recall and 
dreaming.  
 Briefly, Mishkin’s system stipulates that neocortical input arrives from two separate 
streams into the parahippocampal region: 1) input concerning object features (‘what’) 
converging in the perirhinal area and 2) input concerning the object location (‘where’) 
converging in the parahippocampal cortex and medial entorhinal area. The ‘what’ and 
‘where’ streams then themselves converge and are bound together in the hippocampus. The 
resulting ‘what/where’ context accounts for various phenomena such as item recognition, 
item associations, familiarity and recollection. However, this account overlooks a 
fundamental aspect of episodic memory and dreaming: the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of an 
event. To account for episodic memory and dreaming, the broader notion of situational 
context is needed. Situational context differentiates episodic memory from other types of 
memory processes yet is also central to the process of dreaming.  
 The following section will concern how the hippocampus, via situational context, 
encodes and permits the recall of episodic memory. Then, a similar system underlying 
dreaming will be examined.  
 
Hippocampus functioning in episodic memory retrieval 
 According to one widely accepted perspective on episodic memory, the multiple 
trace theory (Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997), the hippocampus plays a predominant role in 
enabling the retrieval of sensory experiences. It is thought that the hippocampus extracts 
contextual information from incoming sensory information relayed via the sensory 
cortexes. This contextual information serves several purposes. First, it produces a memory 
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trace of the contextual information (i.e., a context memory trace) in the hippocampus 
(Mumby et al., 2002). Second, it is fed to the neocortex in parallel with information from 
primary sensory areas (Pan and Tsukada, 2006) providing the basis for encoding the event 
into episodic memory (Tulving, 2002). Consequently, context is encoded by the 
hippocampus while contents of the event per se are stored in neocortical semantic and 
perceptual networks.  
 When an episodic memory is recalled, the appropriate hippocampal context trace is 
purportedly activated and projected into the neocortex. Stored in the context trace are 
pointers to the neocortical semantic and perceptual elements required to reconstruct the 
event. Without the hippocampus, which provides contextual integration of neocortical 
memory traces (Nadel and Moscovitch, 1998), recalling episodic memories would be 
impossible, as is observed in patients whose hippocampal lesions have caused amnesia 
(Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992).  
 A number of recent studies suggest that episodic memory recall and the simulation 
of future events (often referred to as episodic future thought) share similar 
neurophysiological processes (see for review Szpunar, 2010). Hassabis and Maguire 
(2007) suggest that all forms of fictitious representations of events, from episodic memory 
to spatial navigation, share common hippocampally-mediated processes that they call 
“scene construction”.  Consequently, the multiple trace theory can be applied to many 
forms of “scene construction”, including dreaming. While fMRI studies have shown that 
episodic memory recall and imaging new situations share widely overlapping brain regions 
which include the hippocampus (Addis et al., 2009; Hassabis et al., 2007), regions that 
differentiate episodic recall from imagining new situations, i.e, the precuneus and the 
posterior cingulate cortex (Hassabis et al., 2007), show decreased activity in REM sleep 
(Braun et al., 197l; Maquet et al., 1996 Nofzinger et al., 1996). The posterior cingulate 
cortex was also found to be involved in future and past simulation of familiar, but not 
unfamiliar events (Szpunar et al, 2009). Therefore, REM sleep neurophysiology may be 
unsuited for episodic memory recall, but rather may be well suited for creating novel 
situations occurring in unfamiliar contexts, i.e., dreaming.  
40 
 
 
Hippocampus functioning in dreaming 
 In REM sleep, neurological processes underlying episodic recall are modulated to 
enable a different type of memory retrieval. The hippocampus is active in REM sleep, but 
information flow from the hippocampus to the neocortex is dramatically reduced (Buzsaki, 
1996, but see Wagner et al., 2009), possibly due to high cortisol levels that inhibit the main 
output field of the hippocampus (the CA1 region; Payne and Nadel, 2004). Consequently, 
during REM sleep the neocortical elements associated with episodic memories are 
activated without the spatial-temporal context normally afforded by the hippocampus, 
leading to the activation of memory fragments in isolation of their context at the time of 
encoding (Payne and Nadel, 2004; Stickgold, 2002; Stickgold et al., 2001). According to 
Payne and Nadel (2004), the activated memory fragments are then subject to “narrative 
smoothing”, a natural tendency of the brain to “construct narratives” from disparate 
information. The resulting phenomenology consists of the bizarre imagery and unusual 
plotlines commonly seen in REM sleep dreaming.  
 In contrast to the “narrative smoothing” hypothesis, it has been argued that the 
hippocampus plays an important role in the construction of dream imagery. Nielsen and 
Stenstrom (2005) review evidence that the hippocampus, via inputs from the neocortex that 
remain active in REM sleep, bind the disparate neocortical episodic traces into a 
perceptually and thematically coherent hallucinatory environment. It is suggested that a 
highly salient hippocampus-based context is in fact present in REM sleep dreaming 
(contra Payne and Nadel, 2004) which serves to bind the fragmentary neocortical 
semantic/perceptual traces into a coherent spatial-temporal dream environment as well as a 
situational context. Novel combinations of context traces with previously unrelated 
perceptual/semantic traces, now possible because of REM sleep-specific disrupted 
information flow from the hippocampus to the neocortex, may underlie dream imagery 
formation and offers an alternative model of dream production. Phenomenological 
examinations of REM sleep offer some support for this notion.  
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 First, that dreams are composed from episodic neocortical traces is strongly 
suggested by investigations of the memory sources of dreaming. Dreams are known for 
featuring elements from past events, both recent and distant (Freud, 1900). While whole 
episodic memories are found in only 1.6 % of dreams (Fosse et al., 2003), episodic 
elements in dream imagery can be readily traced to past events. When prompted to make 
an association between elements in the dream environment and past events, a surprising 
number of dream elements can be traced to episodic memories. For example, the 
reproduction of isolated spatial or temporal features of memories occurred in 28–38% of 
reports in one study (Cavallero et al., 1990). In another study, 65% of dream elements were 
linked to features of waking events (Fosse at al., 2003). Because incorporated elements 
include everyday objects and situations, as well as specific features of objects (e.g., a 
texture), the ability to link dream stimuli to stimuli in past waking events requires 
considerable effort. We have observed that the ability to identify memory sources in dream 
imagery increases with practice.  
 Second, that neocortical memory sources are bound together in a manner similar to 
episodic memory recall to produce dreaming is suggested by that fact that both episodic 
memories and dreaming are coherent, structured, predominantly visual experiences that 
unfold in time and mimic reality. The notion that dreams are coherent and structured 
requires some elaboration. Recent descriptions of dreaming emphasize its realistic spatial-
temporal and perceptual qualities (e.g., Revonsuo, 2000; Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005). 
Dreams are also organized around salient narrative qualities and a story-like progression 
(Freud, 1900; Nielsen, 2000; Hobson et al., 2000). It is parsimonious to assume that the 
function of the hippocampus to provide a context to bind episodic memories is also the 
process behind the very similarly structured context and binding requirements of dreaming.  
 Some studies provide some empirical support for this notion that episodic recall and 
dreaming are based on a common mechanism. First, damage to the hippocampus causes a 
deficiency in both dreaming and episodic memory recall. Indeed, the finding that 
hippocampal lesions affect episodic memory has often been replicated (Aggleton and 
Brown, 1999; Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Although 
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much less studied, there is evidence that patients with hippocampal lesions report dreams 
that are short, stereotyped, repetitious, unemotional and lacking day-residues or symbolic 
elaborations (Torda, 1969). Second, temporal references identified in episodic memories 
and dreams follow strikingly similar temporal distributions i.e., a linear decrease with a 
cubic trend reflecting a disproportionately higher number of temporal references from 
adolescence and early adulthood as compared with adulthood and childhood (Grenier et 
al., 2005). Finally, research on the chronological features of incorporations of memories 
into dreaming suggests a hippocampal-mediated link between dreaming and learning. 
Briefly, the memory sources of dreams tend to come from events occurring 12 hours (day 
residue) and 7 days (dream-lag effect) earlier. This finding has been replicated several 
times by our laboratory (see Nielsen, 2004 for review). The dream-lag effect is 
hypothesized to reflect time-limited memory consolidation processes of the hippocampus 
(Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005). Analogously, post-learning REM sleep time, including its 
accompanying elevated acetylcholine neurotransmitter levels is elevated for a period of 5–
7 days in rats (Smith, 2003), a time scale which corresponds to observed patterns of a 7-
day delay in the incorporation of stimuli into dreaming.  
 In sum, dreaming and episodic memory recall share a number of phenomenological 
and neurophysiological similarities consistent with the notion that they are closely related. 
In particular, they may both be dependent on the hippocampus to bind memory elements 
together to create contextually coherent imagery sequences and to imbue them with 
situational context. Time-limited incorporations of episodic memory fragments into 
dreaming are believed to reflect hippocampal processes and may relate to learning. In the 
following section, we will briefly examine how episodic memory and dreaming differ. 
 
Differences between episodic memory recall and dreaming 
 While both dreams and episodic memory recall are centered around structured 
representations of an event unfolding in a spatial-temporal context, they differ significantly 
in regard to the manner in which memory traces are utilized. During episodic memory 
recall, a memory trace is reactivated in order to reconstruct an event that previously took 
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place in some if its original perceptual detail. During dreaming, elements from several 
different memories are combined to give rise to a new, albeit perceptually detailed, 
experience. Dreaming and episodic recall thus differ in the manner in which memory 
traces are used. 
 Second, as compared to episodic memory recall, dreaming is immersive in the sense 
that the dreamer believes the dream to be “real.” In contrast to episodic memory recall—
which is commonly understood to be imaginary—dreaming is typically characterized by an 
unawareness of its imaginary nature (e.g., Freud, 1900), even when it possesses elements 
that are bizarre. Despite several studies having examined the frequency and nature of 
bizarreness in dreaming (Cicogna et al., 2007; Hobson et al., 1987; Revonsuo and 
Salmivalli, 1995), it is still unclear whether dream bizarreness applies only to the dreamt 
environment or whether it also applies to cognition occurring during dreaming. While it is 
claimed that logical rigor (Hobson, 1988; Hobson et al., 2000, Hobson, 2004) and the 
ability for reflection (Rechtschaffen, 1978) are diminished in dreaming, others argue that 
few differences in cognition are found between dreaming and waking states (Kahan and 
LaBerge, 1997; Purcell et al., 1986). It is therefore unclear how waking state and dreaming 
cognition differ, although important deficits are attributed to the latter. 
 
Summary and overview 
 In sum, episodic memory and dreaming share several neurophysiological and 
phenomenological qualities. Episodic memory recall and dreaming deal with 
contextualized events that are subjectively experienced from a first person perspective. The 
construction of these events may rely on a hippocampally-mediated process involving 
neocortical sensory elements that are bound within a unique spatial-temporal context. The 
latter is very likely dependent upon activity in the hippocampus. A major difference 
between dreams and episodic memory recall lies in the extent to which they reproduce or 
create new experiences. While episodic memory recall involves reconstructing an event 
with details previously experienced, dreaming draws upon multiple memory sources and 
loosely associated elements that are bound together to give rise to novel and often bizarre 
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experiences. Furthermore, unlike episodic memory recall, cognitive deficiencies are 
present during dreaming. However, it remains unclear whether dreaming is related to 
hippocampal-mediated processes, whether dreaming is involved in the processing of 
episodic memory, and whether dream bizarreness relates to both the dreamed environment 
and cognition. 
 These questions are addressed in the four articles presented in the current thesis. In 
articles I and II we used a VR task, targeted dream sampling and REM sleep deprivation to 
test whether dreaming and episodic memory are associated and whether episodic memory 
and REM sleep are associated.  In article III a participant trained in introspection 
underwent multiple awakenings during theta bursts of NREM1 sleep with dreaming. The 
dreams were assessed for indications that a) hippocampal-mediated processes are present 
during NREM1 sleep, b) dreaming during NREM1 sleep reflects memory processing and 
c) dreaming involves memory elements whose sources include loosely related episodic 
memories. In article IV we examined what aspects of cognition are active and selectively 
diminished in the face of dream bizarreness. We also examined if dream bizarreness is the 
result of incompatibilities between memory items and their context.   
Together, the studies address the lack of research on the role of sleep in the 
consolidation of episodic memory (articles I and II), the role of dreaming in memory 
consolidation and memory processing during NREM1 sleep (article III) and the nature of 
dream bizarreness (article IV). 
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CHAPTER II  
Episodic memory, REM sleep and dreaming. 
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 In articles I and II we utilize a REM sleep deprivation paradigm conjointly with a 
VR task to examine the relationship between episodic memory, REM sleep and dreaming. 
Before presenting the articles, a brief description of the central elements of the study, 
including REM sleep deprivation and VR technology, will be given. In addition, the 
rational for incorporating emotional and motivational features in the VR task is discussed.  
 
Selective REM sleep deprivation  
 Selective REM sleep deprivation has been shown in numerous studies (e.g., Karni 
et al., 1994; Ohno et al., 2002) to significantly reduce the amount of REM sleep obtained 
in a night. The procedure typically consists of waking a participant shortly after the onset 
of each REM sleep episode and maintaining wakefulness for a short interval before letting 
them return to sleep. Dreams may also be collected at this time to sample intervening 
cognitive processes. The effects of selective REM sleep deprivation are often compared to 
those produced by similar interruptions of NREM sleep that are matched for time-of-night, 
length of interruption and other factors. Alternatively, REM sleep deprivation may be 
compared with an identical procedure in which participants are awakened 15-20 min after 
the onset of each REM sleep episode. Our laboratory has used such a procedure to 
successfully deprive participants of REM sleep as suggested by various physiological 
indications of REM sleep pressure (Nielsen et al., 2005). In the current study, such a 
deprivation procedure will be used to examine the role of REM sleep and dreaming in the 
consolidation of episodic memory. Because both the incorporation of episodic memory 
fragments into dream content and the consolidation of episodic memories is thought to be 
dependent on REM sleep processes (see earlier), REM sleep deprivation is expected to 
decrease both dream incorporations of a memory task and accuracy of recall of this 
memory task.  
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Virtual reality and measures of episodic memory  
 Much like the studies of episodic memory reviewed earlier indicate, poor ecological 
validity is a problem for many types of psychological and neuropsychological tests 
(Bennett, 2001; Gioia and Isquith, 2004). It has been suggested that poor ecological 
validity is often due to the fact that tests do not visually represent the real-life situations 
faced by individuals and, as a consequence, do not predict real-world functioning 
(Schultheis et al., 2002). VR technologies have been proposed as an experimental tool to 
address this issue (e.g., Burgess et al., 2001). A typical VR configuration consists of an 
interface that allows an individual to navigate and interact with a three dimensional 
computer-generated audiovisual environment that mimics reality. The interface most often 
consists of a head mounted display (HMD), which produces a first-person visual 
perspective, a head position tracker to map real-to-virtual head movements within the 
computer-generated environment, and a hand-manipulated control (e.g., joystick or 
computer mouse) to control the direction of movements within the environment. Together 
these components maximize the participant’s sense of immersion within the virtual 
environment and thus, presumably, to draw heavily upon episodic memory systems.  
 The ability of VR technologies to allow experimenters to create life-like situations 
makes them ideal for the study of episodic memory. In fact, VR has been used to examine 
the neural correlates of episodic memory (Burgess et al., 2001; King et al., 2005); the 
construct and ecological validities of VR stimuli for assessing memory and learning have 
been demonstrated in assessments of mnemonic deficits among traumatically brain-injured 
individuals (Matheis et al., 2007). 
 The current study will similarly employ VR to assess episodic memory by creating 
stimuli that are rich in temporal, spatial and situational context, and that emulate life-like 
experiences. The stimuli will be experienced from a first person perspective and will 
presumably engage the episodic memory system selectively. 
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Emotion and motivation in dreaming and its role in episodic memory consolidation 
 In a review of episodic memory, Conway (2003) remarks that within a short 
interval of as little as 24 hours many episodic memories are no longer accessible. Indeed, 
we can remember many details from events in our day, but only a small number of these 
memories survive until the next morning. Conway (2003) proposes that goal-oriented 
episodic memories, in particular those corresponding to our current goals, are the ones 
whose ability to recall we maintain over 24 hours. Emotions are also known to enhance 
memory for events (Ochnser, 2000; Sharot et al., 2004). In light of new research on sleep-
related memory consolidation, Conway’s question of “what types of episodic memories 
survive 24 hours” could also be read as “what types of episodic memories are consolidated 
by a night of sleep”. Interestingly, much research indicates that REM sleep dreams are 
both goal-oriented and emotional in nature (e.g., Smith et al., 2004). 
Some evidence supports the possibility that the episodic memory fragments 
containing emotional qualities 1) are more likely to be incorporated in dreaming and 2) 
receive greater sleep-dependent consolidation. First, it has been known since Freud (1900) 
that dreams deal with the emotional and motivational aspects of one’s daily life. This fact 
has also been demonstrated by a limited number of empirical investigations (e.g., Nikles, et 
al., 1998; Smith et al., 2004).  
Second, the recent finding (Sharot et al., 2007) that episodic-like recollection, and 
not familiarity, is enhanced by emotional content, and this only after a 24-hour but not a 5-
min delay, supports the notion that an emotional event is consolidated by sleep. The 
finding that consolidation of emotional stories is dependent upon REM sleep (Wagner et 
al., 2001) further specifies that it is REM sleep that is involved in this function.  
 To test this notion, i.e., that REM sleep and dreaming mediate the emotional 
facilitation of episodic memory consolidation, some VR elements in the experimental 
stimulus were designed to evoke emotional reactions while other, matched elements were 
kept emotionally neutral. Subjects were subsequently tested for both episodic memory 
recall and dream references to the memory task for emotional and neutral memory 
elements separately.  
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 In line with Conway’s (2005) suggestion that goal-related events are preferentially 
consolidated over time, the VR stimulus in the present experiment is a goal-oriented task, 
i.e., it requires participants to actively search for specific locations and objects. It is 
expected that the presence of goal-orientation will contribute to enriching the situational 
context of the VR task and thus rendering the experience more conducive to both accurate 
recall and dream incorporation. 
 
Procedures 
 As the studies' procedures are described in detail in the following article, they will 
be mentioned here only briefly and primarily with respect to the VR task. There were two 
VR two tasks, an emotional and a neutral task, and each consisted of navigating towns in 
search of indoor locations. Each task featured a town within which there were four target 
houses. Each house contained a single room in which target and incidental items could 
easily be found. Target items were: a table, an object (on the table) and a character. 
Incidental items were: a piece of furniture, an object on the furniture, an object on the wall, 
a fireplace and a carpet. Incidental items consisted of objects that participants did not know 
would be included in the recall questionnaire but whose presence was entirely appropriate 
to the décor of the room, e.g., furniture or paintings. The items were included in the recall 
questionnaire as an exploratory measure of whether the participant's “intent to remember” 
would differentially modulate the nature of the sleep-dependent consolidation. This 
measure is exploratory and not elaborated further here.       
 With the help of a compass that directed them toward their target destinations, 
participants were instructed to find each house in a particular order. Upon entering a house 
they were required to listen to the residing character and pick up the target object on the 
table. The task was part of a story identical for each participant that unfolded as he/she 
visited new houses, spoke to new characters and viewed new events. Locations in the 
emotional task contained emotional characters, emotional dialogue, emotional events, and 
an emotional storyline as compared to the neutral task. The objects and characters of the 
neutral task are presented in Appendix I, and those of the emotional task in Appendix II. 
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The spatial layouts of the rooms are presented in Appendix III. As can be seen in these 
Appendixes, the items involved in later recall were systematically distributed across both 
locations and tasks.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to CTL or REMD groups upon arriving at the 
laboratory. They underwent awakenings from REM sleep after which dream reports were 
collected. They also kept dream logs for a duration of one week after their stay at the 
laboratory. For both laboratory and home dream collections, participants were specifically 
asked to rate the degree to which the VR task was incorporated within their dreams. 
 Two days after the VR task participants were emailed a questionnaire measuring 
recall and autonoetic aspects of the factual/perceptual, spatial and temporal features of the 
VR task (see Appendix VI for an example). Ten to twelve days after the VR task 
participants returned to the laboratory to hand in their dream diaries, to undergo an 
evaluation of their memory of the virtual towns, and to receive a debriefing. The latter task 
only evaluated one component of episodic memory and was separated from the episodic 
task by approximately 8 days; it contained a distinct set of findings that are presented in a 
separate article (article II). 
 We hypothesized that REM sleep deprivation would disrupt the consolidation of 
temporal and spatial features of episodic memory as well as memory for items in 
emotional locations. We also expected to find a correlation between dreaming of the task 
and later recall. 
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Article I- Sleep-dependent consolidation of episodic memory 
following REM sleep deprivation 
 
Author Contributions 
 PS and TN conceived and designed the experiment and wrote the paper. PS performed the 
experiment and PS and ES analyzed the data.  
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Through episodic memory we can relive moments of our lives in some perceptual detail. 
Studies examining the effect of sleep on this complex type of memory have used word lists as 
an experimental paradigm and report conflicting results concerning whether REM sleep or 
SWS are associated with its consolidation in long-term storage. As compared to word lists, 
everyday episodic memory concerns a wealth of perceptual details within a rich spatial-
temporal context. Moreover, episodic memories are sometimes emotional and often implicate 
items that are not the object of intentional encoding. Finally, episodic memories, but not 
words, are readily incorporated into dreaming. Here we use REM sleep deprivation in 
conjunction with a virtual reality stimulus to explore the role of sleep on these facets of 
episodic memory. Participants navigated a realistic virtual town in search of items in target 
locations that varied in their emotional load (low vs. high). Items varied in whether 
participants were instructed to pay attention to them or not (target items vs. incidental items). 
Post-task sleep was manipulated to reduce REM sleep in half of the participants. Memory of 
the perceptual details, spatial locations and temporal order of the virtual reality items was 
measured two days later, while incorporation of the task into REM sleep dream content was 
evaluated by means of mentation interviews after laboratory REM sleep awakenings and 
home dream logs. Spatial memory for incidental items, but not target items, was negatively 
affected by REM sleep deprivation. In contrast, REM sleep deprivation was associated with 
better memory for perceptual details of target items but not incidental items. SWS, which was 
increased by REM sleep deprivation, correlated with memory for perceptual details of target 
but not incidental items. Autonoetic awareness, i.e., the ability to relive the event with the 
“mind's eye”, was strongly correlated with Stage 2 in the last third of the night. Dreaming of 
the task during days proximal to the memory task was associated with improved recall of 
spatial aspects of the stimulus. Together, the findings support the notion that the main 
components of episodic memory are differently processed during sleep.  
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Introduction 
 Episodic memory allows us to relive events with some of their original perceptual 
detail and, in this sense, to “travel back in time” (Tulving, 1983). It is an inherently complex 
form of memory—even the simple recollection of the first catch on fishing trip contains a 
rich web of associations linking people, settings and objects within a distinct spatiotemporal 
and situational context. The mechanisms by which some events of our daily lives are selected 
and processed so that they remain accessible for episodic replay are largely unknown, 
although attentional and emotional factors are known to play important roles (Conway, 
2009). The notion that sleep may be involved in episodic memory formation has been 
bolstered by evidence that episodic recall is improved by a night of sleep (Aly and 
Moscovitch, 2010). It is well established that specific stages of sleep are beneficial - and 
sometime critical - to the consolidation of certain types of memory (Walker and Stickgold, 
2006). However, attempts to link episodic memory consolidation with specific sleep stages 
have yielded inconsistent results. One study showed an association between episodic memory 
and SWS (Daurat, Terrier, Foret and Tiberge, 2007); another an association with REM sleep 
(Rauchs, Bertran, Guillery-Girard, Desgranges, Kerrouche, Denise, Foret and Eustache, 
2004). These discrepant results may reflect differences in the manner with which each study 
measured episodic memory.  
 At its most basic level, episodic memory is defined by the “what” (factual/perceptual 
information), “where” (spatial information) and “when” (temporal information) of an event 
(Tulving, 2002). A second defining feature of episodic memory is ‘autonoetic’ awareness at 
the time it is remembered, i.e., the ability to ‘travel through time’ to relive an event as 
opposed to simply knowing that the event happened. Studies examining relationships 
between episodic memory and sleep stages have measured autonoetic awareness with 
“remember-know” measures (Gardiner, Ramponi and Richardson-Klavehn, 2002). Briefly, a 
“remember” response, signifying the presence of autonoetic awareness, occurs if the 
recogniton of an item is accompanied by the recall of the context in which it was encoded. A 
“know” response is associated with the recognition of an item based on its familiarity but in 
the absence of recalled context.   
 While these studies have used similar methods to measure autonoetic awareness, the 
extent to which they measured the “what, where and when” components of episodic memory 
differ and may explain their discrepant results. In the study that found a SWS association 
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(Daurat et al., 2007), episodic memory was measured using simple word lists, and thus 
contained factual information (the identity of word) but not explicit spatial or temporal 
information. In contrast, Rauchs and colleagues (2004) utilized the “What-Where-When” 
task (Guillery, 2000) that makes use of two lists of words that differ in both spatial location 
(lower vs. upper) and temporal order (first vs. second) in addition to the usual factual 
information (identity of the word). Interestingly, the later study found a REM sleep 
association that was specific to spatial and temporal aspects of the task. Although compared 
to everyday events word lists are typically impoverished in their contextual and perceptual 
detail, these findings suggest that imbuing a word list with minimal spatial-temporal context 
shifts its dependence on SWS to dependence on REM sleep. A proper understanding of the 
role of sleep in everyday episodic memory therefore requires an ecologically valid measure 
of episodic memory. 
 In the present study, a realistic VR task ensured that participants experienced events 
and objects that were rich in perceptual detail and embedded in a contextually appropriate 
narrative. Participants navigated a life-like virtual town in search of interior locations that 
contained characters and objects to collect. Reasons for visiting locations were driven by a 
simple story whose development was furthered through interactions with virtual characters.   
 
Emotions and episodic memory 
 There is strong evidence that emotions enhance episodic memory and may be a 
critical aspect in determining which experiences can be retrieved after long periods of time 
(Dere, Pause and Pietrowsky, 2010). In contrast to most declarative memory tasks, which 
involve SWS (Diekelmann and Born, 2010), the consolidation of emotional stories (Wagner, 
Gais and Born, 2001) and emotional pictures (Nishida, Pearsall, Buckner and Walker, 2009) 
are associated with REM sleep. REM sleep is characterized by features that may predispose it 
to processing emotional declarative memories, namely high levels of acetylcholine and 
increased amygdalar activation (Walker, 2009; Walker and van der Helm, 2009). However, 
the role of REM sleep in emotional episodic memory consolidation remains unclear. To 
clarify this role, we designed two version of the VR task that differed in emotional content 
(low vs. high) while being carefully matched for other visual and auditory details such as 
location and character appearance, navigational demands, etc. 
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Intention to remember and episodic memory  
 Episodic memories are formed in a mostly non-conscious and unintentional manner 
(Conway, 2009), which contrasts with the attentive, intentional encoding that takes place 
when memorizing memory items. Much evidence suggests that manipulating participants’ 
intention to remember modulates encoding of the memory (Block, 2009). While the 
modulating effect of one’s intention to remember has not been investigated in relation to 
sleep, one study found that the awareness of learning a motor skill is critical to its sleep-
dependent improvement, suggesting that intention may modulate sleep benefits (Robertson, 
Pascual-Leone and Press, 2004). To investigate this question, we manipulated the 
participants’ intention to remember specific objects by asking them to remember some 
objects in each room (target items; e.g., table, object on table, character) while objects 
unrelated to the task were also situated in the same room (incidental items; e.g., fireplace, 
painting). Incidental items were located inconspicuously in rooms as not to arouse suspicions 
that they could be the object of a surprise test. While many episodic memories that are 
selected for long-term storage are often not intentionally encoded (Conway, 2009), the 
available evidence indicates that intentional learning benefits from sleep (Robertson et al., 
2004). 
 
Dreaming and episodic memory 
 Recent research suggests that dreaming of a spatial task is associated with increased 
performance on that task (Wamsley, Tucker, Payne, Benavides and Stickgold, 2010). 
However, the relationship between dreaming and episodic memory is unique. On the one 
hand, the replay of whole episodic memories during dreaming is exceedingly rare, i.e., in 1-
2% of dreams (Fosse, Fosse, Hobson and Stickgold, 2003). On the other hand, the objects, 
settings, characters and situations found in dreams can readily be traced to specific episodic 
memories (Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005). It is thus of interest to determine whether the 
association between dreaming about features of a memory task and subsequent performance 
on that task is specific to spatial aspects of the task or extends to its temporal and 
factual/perceptual aspects as well. We used the life-like events of our VR memory task to 
examine relationships between sleep-related consolidation of episodic memory and its 
incorporation in dreaming.  
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 In sum, the current study employed a realistic VR task in conjunction with a REM 
sleep deprivation procedure and the collection of dream reports to 1) overcome limitations in 
ecological validity associated with word lists; 2) independently manipulate variables that are 
known to modulate encoding and recall/recognition, namely, the emotional salience of item 
locations and the participant's intention to remember; and 3) examine relationships between 
task performance and incorporation of task features into dreaming. The specific hypotheses 
of the study were:   
 
H1) REM sleep deprivation will disrupt spatial and temporal aspects of episodic memory 
performance.  
H2) REM sleep deprivation will disrupt the memory of emotional task elements to a greater 
extent than the memory of low-emotion task elements. 
H3) REM sleep deprivation-induced deficits (H1 & H2) will be observed for target but not 
incidental items. 
H4) Dreaming of the memory task will be associated with higher performance on the 
episodic task. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 Sixteen self-reported healthy participants (3 males, mean 25.1±5.71 years) took part in 
the study. They reported being free of sleep and dreaming problems, substance use including 
smoking, and medical and mental disorders. The study was approved by the ethics committee 
of Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal. All participants gave informed consent. Two 
participants experienced discomfort during VR immersion and only completed the low-
emotion version of the task as well as the home dream log; they were thus included only in 
analyses concerning dreaming. A third participant failed to complete the episodic memory 
questionnaire and was therefore excluded from ANOVA analyses concerning episodic 
memory.   
 
Procedures 
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 Participants arrived at the laboratory in the evening and were instructed on how to use 
the VR equipment and complete the VR task. After completing each version of the VR, they 
completed questionnaires about sense of presence and cyber sickness symptoms during their 
VR immersion. Once both versions of the task were completed, participants had scalp 
electrodes attached and the concept of autonoetic awareness and “know” and “remember” 
responses were thoroughly explained according to the criteria established in Duzel et al. 
(1997). In brief, participants were instructed to report “remember” responses if they could 
‘see’ the event involving the memory item in their “mind’s eye”, and to report “know” 
responses if they knew the answer but could not visualize the event involving the memory 
item.  
One hour before sleep, participants completed a practice episodic memory 
questionnaire on a laboratory computer. They were then randomly assigned to either a REM 
sleep deprivation (REMD) or a control (CTL) condition and slept in the laboratory. After the 
final morning awakening, electrodes were removed and the use of the dream log was 
explained. Participants were told to expect a questionnaire by email the following day and 
that its prompt and thorough completion was extremely important. Participants were then free 
to leave the laboratory. Two days after the VR task, they received the questionnaires by email 
and returned them once completed. Additional questionnaires were emailed and completed 5 
and 8 days following the VR task, but findings are not presented here. Between 9 and 11 days 
after the VR task, participants returned to the laboratory to hand in their dream logs and to 
complete additional tasks not presented here. They were debriefed and compensated 75$ for 
their participation. 
 
The VR Task 
 The two versions of the VR task were programmed with the “TES construction kit” 
(Bethesda Softworks) and utilized the “Elders Scrolls IV: Oblivion” 3D engine (Bethesda 
Softworks) running on a HP XW4600 computer (Dual Core E6850, 3.00GHz, 4 GB RAM, 
NVIDIA GeForce 8800GTX video card). The VR environment was navigated from a first 
person perspective via a head-mounted display (eMAGIN Z800 3DVisor at 1024x768 
resolution) and a virtual compass at the bottom of the screen indicating the relative direction 
to their target location. A wireless mouse was used for initiation of movement (left click = 
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forward) and interactions with the VR environment (right click = pick up object, open doors, 
initiate conversation). Surround sound was provided by a Sony Home theater 6.1 channel 
system.    
 The two versions of the VR task each lasted approximately 25 minutes, and featured 
separate towns and stories. As shown in Figure 1, the two virtual towns were similar except 
for the fact that one was designed to be emotional arousing (high emotion task), and the other 
to be minimally emotional (low emotion task). In both cases, the principal objective was to 
locate an introductory character located at the outskirts of the town. Clicking on the character 
triggered an in-game animation during which the character looked at and spoke directly to the 
participant and the participant could not move his/her virtual “body”. This dialogue, lasting 
approximately 2 minutes, engaged the participant in development of the story, for example, at 
the onset, the participant was informed of the first target indoor location and how it related to 
the scenario.  
 Each virtual town featured 4 target indoor locations attainable only through a door that 
contained a single room housing 2 target items, i.e., a character and an object on a table (see 
Figure 2 for an example). Also present were several incidental objects: 1 piece of furniture 
(other than a table), 1 object resting on the piece of furniture, one object leaning against the 
piece of furniture, one object hanging on a wall (e.g., painting), 1 fireplace and a carpet. 
Other non-target buildings had locked doors and could not be entered. When entering a 
house, participants had been previously instructed to engage the character in dialogue and to 
pick up a target object resting on a table. Clicking on the character triggered a monologue 
lasting approximately 20 seconds and advanced the story while informing participants of 
their next target location.  
 In the high emotion version of the task an emotionally arousing event took place in 
each location (e.g., character getting murdered) and sinister music played at low volume as 
long as participants remained there. Characters were in visibly and audibly negative moods 
(e.g., angry, worried or annoyed) and the story itself was emotion-provoking (a series of 
murders and arrests resulting from a corrupt official’s actions). In contrast, in the low-
emotion version of the task the story line was emotionally mild but entertaining (a “who-
done-it” mystery concerning a stolen painting) and involved characters in generally neutral or 
positive moods. Pleasant music played in each low emotion location and no emotionally 
negative events occurred at any point. All 8 locations (4 low emotion, 4 high emotion) were 
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matched for size and positioning of items and characters. Characteristics of items (e.g., color) 
and of characters (e.g., hair length, color) were systematically counterbalanced across 
locations.  
 While participants could navigate and explore the virtual locations freely, they 
experienced essentially the same contexts, events and experimental stimuli by virtue of being 
directed by the compass, the unidirectional story line, scripted dialogues, participant-
triggered events and obligatory viewing of events and character dialogues. Importantly, all 
target items on the subsequent memory test required a participant interaction, thus ensuring 
that participants spent similar amounts of time attending to the items. 
 Each participant’s progress through the VR scenario was tracked by the experimenter 
on a computer monitor in an adjacent control room; this ensured that instructions were 
followed and allowed the experimenter to end the task when all 4 objects had been collected. 
Participants took a short break (10 minutes) between the two versions of the task and filled 
out questionnaires about cybersickness symptoms and sense of presence during VR 
immersion. The order of the two versions of the task was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
REMD procedures 
 Participants slept in a sound isolated, electrically shielded room containing a single 
bed. A video camera, microphone, and intercom system were used to maintain visual and 
voice contact at all times and were used to record dream mentation reports. Sleep stages were 
recorded with an electrode montage of 19 standard 10-20 system electroencephalogram 
(EEG) channels, 4 electrooculogram (EOG) channels (left/right, vertical/horizontal), and 1 
electromyogram (EMG) channel (submental). All-night recordings were achieved using a 
Grass Model 12 Neurodata Acquisition System (-6 dB filters with cutoffs at 0.30 [time 
constant: 0.4 seconds] and 100 Hz) and archived under the control of Harmonie version 5.4 
(Stellate Systems, Montreal) software. All signals were sampled digitally at 256 Hz; EEG 
leads and A2 were all referenced to A1 during recording and re-referenced offline to A1+A2. 
 After participants slept undisturbed for 1 sleep cycle, the REMD group was awakened 
after 5 minutes of REM sleep by a 100ms, 500Hz tone and were prompted to report any 
mentation that may have occurred prior to being woken up. They then answered a series of 
directed questions concerning their dream mentation. The target question for the present 
analyses was: “To what extent was the virtual reality experience incorporated in your dream: 
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1 = not at all to 9 = very much so”. The dream interview procedure ensured that participants 
were fully awake for at least 10 minutes even in the absence of dream recall. The CTL groups 
was treated exactly as the REMD group except they were awakened for dream recall after 20 
minutes of REM sleep had elapsed in each sleep cycle. Sleep tracings were scored by an 
experienced polysomnography technician using standard sleep staging criteria (Rechtschaffen 
and Kales, 1968), whose ratings were then analyzed by an in-house program that calculated, 
for each sleep stage, 1) time in stage (number of minutes/night) and 2) percent time in stage 
(%minutes/total sleep time). 
 
Dream Log 
 Participants were instructed to complete a dream log every morning for post-VR days 
1 to 9 which consisted of questions about their previous night’s sleep and dreams. The target 
question was: To what extent was the virtual reality experience incorporated in your dream: 
1 = not at all to 9 = very much so.  
 
Episodic Memory Task 
 The episodic memory task consisted of forced choice questions that evaluated the 
memory of factual/perceptual, spatial and temporal aspects of 1 of eight target indoor 
locations visited during the VR task. Questions for each of the 8 locations were the same 
except for details specific to a location (e.g., character's name). Factual and temporal 
questions were answered by means of a dropdown menu. Spatial questions were answered by 
placing an “x” on a map of the room (see Figure 2 for an example); although there were a 
fixed number of places an “x” could be placed, this task may be considered a “cued-recall” 
task as opposed to a “recognition” task. For each question, participants specified whether 
their response was accompanied by autonoetic awareness (i.e., previously defined as able to 
visualize the corresponding scene with the mind’s eye) by use of a drop-down menu; choices 
were: I remember (presence of autonoetic awareness), I know (absence of autonoetic 
awareness), or I don’t know.  
Factual/perceptual memory elements of target items tested consisted of 1) object 
features including type of object (necklace, hourglass, gloves, shoes, perfume bottle, 
balancing scales, bow or book) and object color (orange, yellow, green, red, purple, yellow, 
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white or blue) and 2) character features including age (young or old), accent (American or 
British), hair length (long or short), hair color (blond, brown, black or red), clothing color 
(black, white, grey, green, red, blue or brown), clothing type (robe, shirt or pants). Spatial 
memory elements of target items consisted of the location of 1) the table in the room, 2) the 
object on the table, and 3) the character in the room. 
 Factual/perceptual memory elements of incidental items consisted of 1) wall-hung 
object features including type of object (painting or tapestry) and object theme (depiction of a 
forest or town), 2) type of furniture other than the table (desk, shelves or dresser), 3) 
furniture-supported object features other than those on the table (vase, cup or bowl), 4) type 
of object leaning against the furniture other than the table (shovel or broom), 5) carpet 
features including shape (square or circular) and color (red, green or blue), and 6) type of 
fireplace (round or square). Spatial memory elements of incidental items consisted of the 
locations of 1) the chair near the table 2) the object on the wall, 3) the furniture other than the 
table, 4) the object leaning on the furniture other than the table, 5) the center of the carpet, 
and 6) the fireplace. Target and incidental items were not matched for familiarity.  
 Temporal elements were assessed with the following questions: 1) “who did you see 
before X” and 2) “who did you see after X”, where X represents the current location. These 
questions were answered by selecting one of 5 characters (four target characters and the 
introductory character) from a drop down menu. Characters were identified by their name 
and short revealing description that did not involve any features of the memory task (e.g., 
“the drunk”, “the countess”, “the very tall man”). Also available was the option “this was the 
last person I saw). There were no temporal questions relating to incidental objects. All 
Temporal questions were scored as ‘correct’ (score of 1) or ‘incorrect’ (score of 0). 
 Participants were randomly assigned questionnaires from two locations (one each 
from the low and high emotion versions of the VR task) for a practice test. On post-VR day 
2, questionnaires from two other locations (one each from the low emotion and high emotion 
versions) were sent by email; this constituted the main dependent measures for the episodic 
memory task. Factual/perceptual and temporal index scores were calculated as the total 
number of correct answers on each set of questions. All factual/perceptual and temporal 
questions were scored as ‘correct’ (score of 1) or ‘incorrect’ (score of 0), for a total possible 
factual/perceptual performance index of 8 for target items and 6 for incidental items, and a 
total possible temporal performance index of 4. 
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Spatial error scores were calculated by measuring the distance, in virtual meters, 
between each participant's indicated answer and the actual location of the target (scores range 
from 0 to 20). For objects on or around the table, measurement units were scaled to a ratio of 
1:4, and scores range from a spatial error of 0 to 4 for object location on a table and 0 to 12 
for around the table. A total spatial error index consisted of the sum of spatial errors derived 
from all the spatial questions, for a maximum spatial error index score of 44 for target objects 
and 72 for incidental objects. The measure of autonoetic awareness consisted of the total 
number of “remember” responses given by each participant, for a maximum of 8 for 
factual/perceptual target items, 6 for factual/perceptual incidental items, 4 for temporal 
performance, 3 for spatial target items and 6 for spatial incidental items.  
Data was analyzed using 2x2 manovas with condition (REMD, CTL) as a between 
groups factor and task (low, high emotions) as a repeated measures factor. A first manova 
utilized factual, spatial and temporal performance scores of target items as dependent 
measures. A second manova used factual, spatial and temporal autonoetic scores of target 
items as dependent measures. Subsequent manovas used factual and spatial performance 
scores (third manova) and autonoetic scores (fourth manova) for incidental items. 
For correlations and T-tests, a single score per participant was calculated by averaging 
the score for the low emotion task from that of the high emotion task. 
 
Results 
VR task 
The low emotion task took on average 15 minutes and 51 seconds (SD = 3:47; range = 
10:24 to 21:32) and the high emotion task took on average 19 minutes and 8 seconds (SD = 
6:52; range = 10:59 to 34:29). T-tests revealed that time in task did not differ between groups 
for the low emotion (p = .96) or high emotion (p =.95) task. Two participants reported mild 
symptoms of cyber sickness and only completed the low emotion task. The data from these 
subjects was not used for task comparisons (for a total N of 14), but was used for correlations 
(total N of 16).   
 
REM sleep deprivation  
 The REMD group had fewer minutes of REM sleep (M = 29.13, SD = 5.44) than the 
CTL group (M = 56.76, SD = 24.68; t(12) = 2.89, p = .01) and lower %REM sleep (M = 9.51, 
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SD = 1.08) than the CTL group (M = 16.71, SD = 5.57; t(12) = 3.36, p = .005). The REMD 
group also had higher %Stage 4 sleep (M = 25.57, SD = 6.65) than the CTL group (M = 
18.91, SD = 5.11; t(12) = -2.10, p = .058) and more minutes of Stage 2 sleep in the last third 
of the night (M = 65.53, SD = 16.95) than the CTL group (M = 49.43, SD = 7.55; t(12) = 
2.29, p < .05). The groups did not significantly differ in terms of total sleep time (p = .5). 
Details are shown in Table 1. 
 
Task performance 
 Performance index scores were subjected to a group (REMD vs. CTL) x task (low vs. 
high emotions) manova for target and incidental items separately; results are presented in 
Table 2 and Figure 3. A group main effect for memory of factual/perceptual target elements 
(F1,25 = 5.30, p = .03) indicated that the REMD group (M = 4.50, SD = 1.65) performed better 
than the CTL group (M = 3.14, SD = 1.24). This measure correlated positively with %SWS 
(r16 = .614, p > .02) and negatively with %REM sleep (r16 = -.637, p < .01) (see Figure 4).  
 A second group main effect for memory of spatial incidental elements (F1,25 = 7.82, p 
= .01) indicated that the REMD group demonstrated more spatial errors (M =21.64, SD = 
6.09) than the CTL group (M =15.36, SD = 4.45). Spatial errors did not correlate with any 
sleep measures. Nor did they correlate with memory of factual/perceptual target elements. 
 No main effects were observed for memory of target or incidental temporal elements. 
Also, no significant main effects were found for memory of low emotion vs. high emotion 
task elements; there were, however, two interactions involving task reported further in the 
‘autonoetic awareness’ section below.  
 
Autonoetic awareness 
 A group main effect for autonoetic awareness during recognition of factual/perceptual 
target elements (F2,25 = 10.04, p = .004) revealed that the REMD group (M = 4.71, SD = 2.16) 
reported more “remember” responses than the CTL group (M = 2.07, SD = 1.59). 
Additionally, two group x task interactions revealed effects of REM sleep deprivation that 
were specific to low emotion, but not high emotion, target spatial elements: 1) an interaction 
for low emotion task spatial errors (F1,25 = 4.09; p < .05) in which the REMD group had 
fewer errors (M = 5.57, SD = 3.73) than did the CTL group (M = 9.71, SD = 3.25; t(12) = 
2.21, p < .05; no difference for high emotiona task), and 2) an interaction for autonoetic 
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awareness during low emotion spatial recall (F2,25 = 4.08; p < .05) in which the REMD group 
(M =1.43, SD = 1.13) reported more “remember” responses than did the CTL group (M = 
0.14, SD = 0.38; t(12) = -2.84, p < .02; no difference for high emotion task). 
 Minutes of Stage 2 sleep were correlated positively with “remember” responses for 
both factual/perceptual (r = .528, p < .05) and spatial (r = .579, p = .03) target elements. More 
specifically, minutes of Stage 2 sleep in the last third of the night correlated with autonoetic 
awareness for recognition of factual/perceptual elements (r = .594, p = .015) and with 
autonoetic awareness for recognition of spatial elements (r = .685, p = .003) whereas minutes 
of Stage 2 sleep in the first and second thirds of the night did not.  
 
Dreaming 
During REM awakenings, 11 participants (68%) reported incorporating the VR task in 
their dream, although in most instances the incorporation was only weakly related to the task, 
i.e., the average score was 2.61 (SD = 1.12) on a scale of 1 to 9. These incorporation ratings 
did not correlate with any measure of the episodic memory task. 
 Scores from the home dream logs reveal that half of the participants (N = 8) reported 
incorporating some aspect of the task in the post-VR period.  Regardless of REMD vs. CTL 
grouping, participants were classified as “incorporators” if they scored an average 
incorporation of >0; otherwise they were classified as “non-incorporators“.  As shown in 
Table 3, incorporators and non-incorporators had equal distributions of REMD and CTL 
participants and did not differ significantly in sleep stage composition. T-tests revealed that 
incorporators tended to have fewer spatial errors (M = 6.31, SD = 3.28) than did non-
incorporators (M = 9.44, SD =3.26; t(14) =-1.19, p = .08). In contrast, no significant 
differences or trends were found for measures of factual/perceptual recall (p < .20), temporal 
recall (p < .30) or autonoetic awareness (p < .40). As illustrated in Figure 5, the spatial error 
index was negatively correlated with incorporation on post-VR days 1-2-3-4 (r = -.523, p < 
.03), and (marginally) total incorporation (r = -.421, p < .10), but not with incorporation on 
days 5-6-7-8 (r = -.275, p < .30), or incorporation in dreams reported after experimental 
awakenings (r = -.329, p < .30).   
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Discussion  
 The present study used a novel VR task in conjunction with a REM sleep deprivation 
procedure to clarify the role of sleep and dreaming in episodic memory processing. The VR 
task permitted an ecologically valid measure of episodic memory by engaging participants in 
life-like events. Importantly, the task allowed a systematic manipulation of variables that are 
known to modulate encoding and recall/recognition, namely, the emotional salience of item 
locations and the participant's intention to remember.  
 Contrary to expectations, the REMD group had better recognition of 
factual\perceptual components of the episodic memory task than did the CTL group. This 
finding may relate to the fact that the REMD group also had more SWS than the CTL group, 
a notion that is supported by a positive correlation between this measure of episodic memory 
and minutes of SWS. This finding is also consistent with previous studies that have 
associated SWS with the consolidation of the factual aspects of declarative memory as seen 
in studies of word list memorization (Fowler, Sullivan and Ekstrand, 1973; Plihal and Born, 
1999; Gais, Molle, Helms and Born, 2002; Gais and Born, 2004). SWS may be conductive to 
the processing of declarative memory (Diekelmann and Born, 2010) as suggested by the 
finding that an increase in slow wave activity induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation 
during SWS improves memory on a word pair task (Marshall, Molle, Hallschmid and Born, 
2004). The current study suggests further that the beneficial effect of SWS for the 
consolidation of factual\perceptual aspects of declarative memory applies only to items that 
are actively encoded (target items). In effect, recognition of factual/perceptual items that 
participants were not instructed to pay attention to (incidental items) did not differ between 
groups and was not associated with SWS. However, the higher amount of incidental objects 
as compared to target objects may have made it more difficult to remember the former, and 
thus may account for a lack of a significant effect. Nonetheless, the memory of the spatial 
locations of incidental items was reduced in the REMD group, suggesting that spatial 
information of actively and passively encoded items is processed in different sleep stages.  
 
Autonoetic Awareness 
 Autonoetic awareness during the recognition of factual\perceptual and spatial aspects 
of the VR task was strongly correlated with the amount of late night Stage 2. As such, the 
finding that the REMD group reported more “remember” responses in relation to 
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factual/perceptual elements than did the CTL group may relate to the fact that the REMD 
group had more Stage 2 sleep during the last third of the night. These results are consistent 
with the previous finding that autonoetic awareness during recognition of the episodic-like 
“What, When, Where” task is associated with late night as opposed to early night sleep 
(Rauchs et al., 2004). While the authors attribute this effect to REM sleep due to the 
predominance of this stage during the second half of the night, their results could also be due 
to late-night Stage 2 sleep that is present at that time. Our finding of a strong association 
between autonoetic awareness and Stage 2 in the last third of the night suggests that features 
specific to late Stage 2, such as increased spindle activity (Jankel and Niedermeyer, 1985; 
Guazzelli, Feinberg, Aminoff, Fein, Floyd and Maggini, 1986), may underlie the present 
finding. Indeed, sleep spindles have been associated with declarative learning (Gais et al., 
2002; Schabus, Gruber, Parapatics, Sauter, Klosch, Anderer, Klimesch, Saletu and Zeitlhofer, 
2004; Schmidt, Peigneux, Muto, Schenkel, Knoblauch, Munch, de Quervain, Wirz-Justice 
and Cajochen, 2006; Genzel, Dresler, Wehrle, Grozinger and Steiger, 2009); and plasticity 
(Steriade, 1999). It is noteworthy that other studies examining the role of sleep stages in 
autonoetic awareness (Drosopoulos, Wagner and Born, 2005; Daurat et al., 2007) have also 
utilized an early night/late night paradigm and thus may also have overlooked a role for Stage 
2. However, in contrast to Rauchs et al. (2004) and the present findings, these studies 
reported an association of autonoetic awareness with early night sleep. This may indicate that 
sleep-dependent processing associated with the autonoetic awareness of episodic-like tasks 
(Rauchs et al., 2004) differs from that implicating autonoetic awareness of word lists 
(Drosopoulos et al., 2005; Daurat et al., 2007). 
 
Emotions 
 Contrary to previous findings of an association between emotional memory and REM 
sleep (Wagner et al., 2001; Nishida et al., 2009), recall/recognition performance on the low 
emotion and high emotion tasks were similarly affected by REM sleep deprivation. It is 
possible that both conditions were in fact emotionally arousing and novel due to the 
participation in an engaging story within a realistic, immersive environment. Indeed, greater 
differences between low emotion and high emotion conditions, such as those found between 
the neutral and emotional stories of Wagner et al., (2001) may be necessary to induce a 
differential need for REM sleep-processing. For example, in the latter study the neutral 
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stories concerned the manufacture of a bronze sculpture and clothing presented in a fashion 
show, and thus sharply contrasted with emotional stories that dealt with a child murder and 
difficulties (including sexual) of a paraplegic. We opted to remove many of the most horrific 
features available in the Oblivion program because of their disturbing nature. Thus, the 
failure to replicate a REM sleep association with items from our high emotion task may be 
the result of insufficient differences in arousal and affect between the low emotion and high 
emotion conditions. It should be noted that observed lack of significant effects may be due to 
the low number of subjects in the study, i.e., 14 subjects in two groups.  
 However, we did observe an interaction between task and group where the REMD 
group performed better and reported more “remember” responses for the spatial aspects of the 
episodic memory task in the low emotion but not high emotion tasks. This result may reflect a 
specialized role for REM sleep in the processing of emotional memory, whereas the benefit of 
the SWS increase observed in the REMD condition may have been nullified by the loss of 
REM sleep in the high emotion task but not the low emotion task. 
 
Dreaming 
 It has been previously demonstrated that dreaming of a spatial task during a NREM 
nap is associated with improved performance on that task (Wamsley et al., 2010). In this 
study, a small number of participants (N = 4; 8%) who incorporated the task into mentation at 
sleep onset (N = 3) or during Stage 2 sleep (N = 1) exhibited increased learning on a virtual 
maze task.  While we found no link between task incorporations into mentation from 
experimental REM awakenings and subsequent task performance, we found an association 
between total task incorporation on post-VR days 1, 2, 3 and 4 and performance on spatial 
aspects of the task, which occurred on post-VR day 2. This suggests that for the present study 
task incorporation is not predictive of later performance but rather a consequence of 
performance. In addition, our results are in line with those of Wamsley et al. (2010) in that 
dreaming about an episodic task is associated with improved memory for spatial aspects of 
this task, and not its temporal or factual/perceptual aspects. 
 
Increased SWS in the REMD group 
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We observed that the REMD group received more stage 4 than the CTL group. This 
serendipitous finding of increased SWS in face of REM deprivation may be of relevance to 
the current debate concerning the relationship, or lack thereof, between REM and NREM 
homeostatic processes. The relationship between regulatory processes of REM sleep and SWS 
are not well understood, with some studies suggesting that homeostatic regulatory processes 
of REM sleep are independent of those regulating NREM sleep (Vivaldi et al., 1994; 
Ocampo-Garces et al., 2000; Franken, 2002), while others suggest that the amount and 
frequency of REM sleep is regulated by the homeostatic regulation of NREM sleep 
(Benington and Heller, 1994). Shea et al., (2008) report an increased total percentage of 
NREM sleep in rats during selective REM sleep deprivation, a finding that closely parallels 
our observations. Our results similarly support the notion that REM sleep and SWS 
homeostatic processes are not independent. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 Episodic memory is a complex, multi-faceted cognitive process that engages a wide 
neural network spanning prefrontal, parietal and temporal lobes (Hassabis, Kumaran and 
Maguire, 2007; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser and Schacter, 2009). Each of its components, i.e., its 
factual/perceptual, temporal, spatial and autonoetic features, can be viewed as separate 
processes that require proper coordination such that memory traces become events that may 
be reviewed with the “mind’s eye”. With growing evidence that different components of 
sleep are associated with these different memory processes, it is not surprising that the 
elements of episodic memory identified in the present study are differentially associated with 
REM and NREM sleep attributes. The present results confirm a relationship between factual 
declarative memory and SWS, and add that this relationship may hold true only for items that 
are actively, but not passively, encoded. The results also confirm a previously reported 
association between late night sleep and autonoetic awareness during recognition, and adds 
that this relationship may be mediated by late night Stage 2 and not REM sleep as previously 
suggested. Finally, the results confirm the finding that incorporating a task into one's dreams 
is associated with better performance on the spatial features of an episodic memory task but 
not on its factual/perceptual or temporal features. Together, the results suggest that episodic 
memory benefits from the coordination of several sleep-related processes acting differentially 
upon different memory components.  
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Table1. Sleep stage differences between groups.  
 CTL REMD   
 Mean SD Mean SD t  
Min S1 38.16 (21.72) 22.34 (12.84) 1.66  
% S1 12.70 (9.65) 7.30 (3.82) 1.38  
Min S2 141.41 (32.81) 142.23 (29.78) -0.05  
1st 1/3 41.96 (17.48) 33.37 (13.75) 1.02  
2nd 1/3 42.36 (11.27) 51.06 (10.87) -1.47  
3rd 1/3 49.43 (7.55) 65.53 (16.95) -2.29 * 
% S2 42.60 (5.35) 46.64 (8.55) -1.06  
1st 1/3 13.34 (4.98) 10.31 (4.34) 1.21  
2nd 1/3 13.69 (2.08) 15.80 (4.08) -1.22  
3rd 1/3 16.20 (1.85) 19.79 (4.25) -2.05 † 
Min S3 30.29 (19.77) 36.39 (29.17) -0.46  
% S3 9.10 (5.71) 10.96 (6.82) -0.55  
Min S4 62.91 (22.27) 78.37 (24.29) -1.24  
% S4 18.91 (5.11) 25.57 (6.66) -2.10 ‡ 
Min 
REM 56.76 (24.69) 29.13 (5.44) 2.90 ** 
% REM 16.71 (5.57) 9.51 (1.08) 3.36 ** 
Min 
Total 
sleep 
329.53 (53.15) 308.46 (60.81) 0.69  
 
‡ p = .06 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 2. Results of the ANOVAs performed.  
 
Memory Performance Index –Target Items 
 Main Effect of REM sleep deprivation Main Effect of Emotions Interaction effect 
Factual F = 4.52 ; P = .03 F = 0.36 ; P = .55 F = 0.45 ; P = .51 
Spatial F = 2.22 ; P = .15 F = 0.28 ; P = .60 F = 4.09 ; P < .05 
Temporal F = 0.96 ; P = .34 F = 0.20 ; P = .66 F = 1.34 ; P = .26 
 
Memory Performance Index –Incidental Items 
 Main Effect of REM sleep deprivation Main Effect of Emotions Interaction effect 
Factual F = 0.07 ; P = .80 F = 0.13 ; P = .71 F = 0.33 ; P = .57 
Spatial F = 5.49 ; P = .03 F = 1.87 ; P = .18 F = 0.11 ; P = .75 
 
Remember Responses –Target Items 
 Main Effect of REM sleep deprivation Main Effect of Emotions Interaction effect 
Factual F = 10.04 ; P = .004 F = 0.003; P = .96 F = 0.45 ; P = .51 
Spatial F = 1.11 ; P = .31 F = 0.79 ; P = .38 F = 4.08 ; P < .05 
Temporal F = 0.03 ; P = .84 F = 0.04 ; P = .85 F = 0.35 ; P = .56 
 
Remember Responses – Incidental Items 
 Main Effect of REM sleep deprivation Main Effect of Emotions Interaction effect 
Factual F = 0.92 ; P = .35 F = 0.23 ; P = .63 F = 0.23 ; P = .63 
Spatial F = 0.38 ; P = .54 F = 0.42 ; P = .84 F = 0.04 ; P = .84 
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Table 3. Comparisons between the incorporator and non-incorporator groups. 
  
Incorporators Non-incorporators 
Group 4 REMD, 4 CTL 4 REMD, 4 CTL 
Sex 1 Male, 7 Females 2 Males, 6 Females 
% S1 12.02 (±9.41) 8.06 (±3.16) 
% S2 43.95 (±8.55) 46.50 (±5.07) 
% S3 11.22 (±6.79) 9.29 (±4.75) 
% S4 20.96 (±5.70) 20.99 (±8.71) 
% REM 11.81 (±2.49) 15.20 (±7.01) 
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Figure 1. Spatial layout of the two towns. The town of the low emotion task (A) and of the 
high emotion task (B) were similar in number and positioning of houses (identified by a 
number), target houses (circled numbers) and total navigational area (shaded area between 
houses). The arrows identify the task starting point. The “Xs” identify the location from 
which the in-task perspectives “C” and “D” were taken, whereas the triangle indicates the 
angle of the perspective. “C” was taken from the middle of the town square and looks 
towards building A-17. “D” was taken from the steps of the cathedral and looks outward to 
building B-18. Also visible are the fences that keep players within the navigational area.  
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Figure 2. Example of the interior of a house, its items, and related recall task materials. 
A) In-task perspective of what participants see when entering target house 18 of the low 
emotion task. To the right is the table containing the target object, and center left is the 
character. Also present are incidental items (desk, vase, shovel, painting, fireplace, carpet and 
chair). B) Close up view of the character. C) Recall questionnaire item concerning the spatial 
location of the target object on the table. The participant placed an “X” where she believed 
the object was placed and the difference in ¼ meters from the actual object location consists 
of the spatial error score for this item. Participants mouse-clicked the figure to place an “X”, 
and clicked again to remove it for adjustments. D) Close up view of the object (yellow 
balancing scale) on the table. All tables had candles in their centers to highlight the fact that 
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the table contains the target object. E) Layout of the room for recall questionnaire items 
situated in the room. Participants placed an “X” on a similar figure for all questions relating 
to spatial locations within the room. Each question had its own copy of the figure, and each 
room had a specific figure. Every room had a unique layout that was matched for size.  
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**p = .004 
 *p = .03 
Figure 3. Performance and “remember” (“R”) responses on the factual/perceptual, spatial, and 
temporal aspects of the recall task as a function of REM sleep deprivation. Temporal 
questions did not have an incidental component.  
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Figure 4. Factual/perceptual scores as a function of % of REM sleep and SWS. Regression 
lines for the two groups reflect opposite effects, i.e., a positive correlation with %SWS (r16 = 
.614, p > .02) and a negative correlation with %REM sleep (r16 = -.637, p < .01). 
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Figure 5. Relationships between the amount of incorporation of the task into dream content on 
post-VR days 1-4 and recall of the spatial locations of target items.  The spatial error index 
was positively correlated with incorporation on post-VR days 1-2-3-4 (r16 = -.523, p < .03). 
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Abstract 
While a substantial body of evidence links slow wave sleep (SWS) to the processing of 
declarative memory, a small but growing number of studies indicate a role for rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep in the processing of declarative memories with an emotional tone. 
One possible explanation for these results is that tasks administered for sleep-related 
emotional declarative learning are different from those used in studies investigating sleep-
related neutral declarative learning. Another, more intriguing possibility is that imbuing a 
declarative task with emotional qualities shifts its dependence from SWS to REM sleep. Here 
we examine if spatial memory, previously shown to be strongly associated with SWS, shifts 
to a REM sleep association if emotional elements are associated with the task. Participants 
navigated two virtual towns, one high emotion (high emotion or dysphoric task) and one low 
emotion (low emotion task). Half of participants were subjected to a REM deprivation 
procedure during post-task sleep (REMD group) while others underwent control awakenings 
after 25 minutes of REM (CTL group). Memory of the location of visited areas was tested 10 
to 12 days later. The REMD group performed less well than the CTL group on the emotional 
task, the performance on which correlated with the amount REM sleep. In contrast, the 
REMD group performed better than the CTL group on the neutral task, the performance on 
which correlated with Stage 4 sleep. This demonstrates, for the first time, that the presence of 
emotions during a task may modulate the sleep stage with which its consolidation is 
associated.  
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Introduction 
 It is now well established that sleep is involved in the processing of memory (Walker & 
Stickgold, 2006). The mammalian brain cycles through two dramatically different states 
throughout the night and studies are revealing how the unique properties of these states 
contribute to specific facets of memory. In particular, cortical slow wave and hippocampal 
ripple activity characterizing SWS sleep are believed to support the reactivation of 
declarative memory traces and to facilitate their integration within neocortical areas 
(Diekelmann & Born, 2010). This possibility is supported by studies finding an association 
between SWS and the learning of word lists (Fowler, Sullivan & Ekstrand, 1973; Plihal & 
Born, 1999; Gais, Molle, Helms & Born, 2002; Gais & Born, 2004) and performance on 
spatial tasks (Plihal & Born, 1999; Peigneux, Laureys, Fuchs, Collette, Perrin, Reggers, 
Phillips, Degueldre, Del Fiore, Aerts, Luxen & Maquet, 2004; Rasch, Buchel, Gais & Born, 
2007; Rudoy, Voss, Westerberg & Paller, 2009). These studies are consistent with the ‘dual-
process hypothesis’, which posits that SWS is involved with hippocampus-dependent, 
declarative memory while REM sleep is implicated in hippocampus-independent memory 
that is not of a declarative nature.  
 Notable exceptions to the dual-process hypothesis are found in three studies in which 
declarative tasks containing material of an emotional nature were found to depend upon REM 
sleep. The unique neurophysiology of REM sleep, namely the increased activity in cortical 
theta, elevated acetylcholine levels and increased amygdala activity, may implicate this stage 
of sleep in emotional memory processing (Walker, 2009; Walker & van der Helm, 2009). An 
early finding that REM deprivation reduced recall of emotional, but not neutral stories 
(Greenberg, Pearlman, Schwartz & Grossman, 1983) was confirmed and extended by Wagner 
et al. (2001) who reported that emotional, but not neutral stories are better remembered after 
sleeping for the REM-rich second half of the night as compared to the SWS-rich first half of 
the night. A more direct role of REM sleep in the processing of emotional stimuli was 
suggested by the finding that memory of emotional, but not neutral pictures, was associated 
with the amount of REM sleep during a nap and, in addition, to the amount of theta activity 
contained within the REM period (Nishida, Pearsall, Buckner & Walker, 2009). These studies 
are notable because they suggest that emotional and neutral declarative memories may be 
differentially consolidated during sleep and that REM sleep may play a specialized role in the 
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processing of emotional memory.  
 However, the relationship between REM and emotional stimuli may be task specific 
because studies that have examined emotional declarative memory used stimuli (pictures and 
stories) that differed in type from those used in studies of non-emotional declarative memory 
(word pairs & spatial learning). In fact, the neutral versions of the emotional tasks (neutral 
pictures and neutral stories) do not seem to be dependent upon SWS (Wagner et al., 2001; 
Nishida et al., 2009), suggesting that sleep-related processing of these tasks may differ in key 
respects from neutral tasks that have been found to be SWS-dependent (word lists and spatial 
learning). A strong demonstration of the specialized role of REM sleep in the processing of 
emotional declarative memory would require that a given SWS-dependent task shift its 
dependence to REM sleep when this task is emotional in nature. The current study directly 
tested this possibility by having participants undergo two matched spatial navigation tasks 
that differed only in emotional load and observing how performance in each task was affected 
by selective REM deprivation.  
 A spatial task was selected for this study because its association with SWS sleep had 
been well established by previous studies (see above). Its association with REM sleep has 
been demonstrated only for rodents; learning in the water maze task is paralleled by increases 
in REM sleep (Smith & Rose, 1997) and is disrupted by REM deprivation (Smith & Rose, 
1996; Beaulieu & Godbout, 2000; Le Marec, Beaulieu & Godbout, 2001; Yang, Hu, Wang, 
Zhang, Luo & Chen, 2008; Li, Tian, Ding, Jin, Yan & Shen, 2009). . However, the water 
maze may be considered an emotional spatial task because the rodent must find a hidden 
platform to avoid drowning. Spatial tasks used in human research are not generally 
emotional. Thus, by increasing the emotional load of a spatial task we may determine if its 
dependence on with SWS will shift towards a dependence on REM sleep. To do this we used 
a virtual reality technology to create spatial locations that differ in emotional load and 
examined if REM deprivation affected the spatial memory of the high emotion locations but 
not the low emotion locations as expected. We further predicted that the amount of post-task 
REM sleep would positively correlate with recall performance of the high emotion locations 
while the amount of post-task SWS would positively correlate with recall performance on the 
low emotion locations.  
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Methods 
Participants 
 Sixteen healthy volunteers (3 male) aged 18-36 years (mean = 25.1; SD = 5.71) 
provided written consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the ethic 
committee of Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal. Participants reported no psychiatric, 
medical, or sleep disturbances. Two participants felt discomfort during the VR task and only 
completed the low emotion task; these participants were excluded from group comparisons, 
i.e., manovas and T-tests (N = 14) but included in correlational analyses (N = 16).  
 
Procedures 
 Participants completed two VR tasks, separated by a 10-min break. Then they were 
randomly assigned to either a REM sleep deprived (REMD) or a control (CTL) group and 
slept one night in a sleep laboratory where they underwent experimental awakenings either 5 
(REMD) or 25 (CTL) minutes into each REM sleep period beginning after the first. Ten to 12 
days post-task participants returned to the laboratory to complete a spatial recall task. They 
were then debriefed and compensated 75$ for their time. As part of an unrelated study, 
participants filled out questionnaires at home two, six and nine days post-task concerning 
episodic details of the task and completed dream logs for 10 days. Results for these measures 
are not reported here. 
 
Virtual Reality (VR) Task 
 The VR task was designed with the TES Construction Kit (Bethesda Softworks) and 
run using the Elder Scrolls VI: Oblivion engine (Bethesda Softworks) on a HP XW4600 
computer (Dual Core E6850, 3.00GHz, 4 GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 8800GTX video 
card). The VR interface consisted of an eMAGIN Z800 3DVisor head mounted display in 
1024x768 resolution and a wireless mouse. Surround sound was provided by a Sony Home 
theater 6.1 channel system. The VR task was navigated from a first person perspective. 
 Participants underwent both the low emotion and high emotion version of the VR task 
in a counterbalanced order. Each VR task featured a city to be navigated in order to locate and 
enter target houses where target characters were encountered and target objects obtained (see 
Figure 1 for the spatial layout of the two cities). The two versions of the task were matched in 
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their spatial aspects but differed in the emotionality of events and stimuli contained within the 
houses. In each version of the task, participants were instructed to find and talk to a host 
character who was located in a small enclosure at the edge of the city. The host situated the 
participants within the context of the ongoing story and explained to them who they should go 
see next. For each version of the task, participants searched for and visited 4 single-room 
houses in an order dictated by the story. A compass at the bottom of the VR screen directed 
participants towards their target location at all times so wayfinding was not an obstacle to task 
completion. In each target house, participants listened to dialogue from a target character 
(thus advancing the story) and retrieved a target item. Houses not involved in the task were 
locked and could not be entered. Characters, events, and some indoor features of the houses 
of the high emotion version of the task were emotionally negative in quality, while those in 
the houses of the low emotion version were specially designed to be low in emotions (see 
Table1 for details). In addition, the storyline of the high emotion version was more 
emotionally dysphoric than that of the low emotion version in that elements within the houses 
and referred to in the storyline were dysphoric. However, the city and houses themselves were 
not dysphoric in nature. 
 
REM deprivation procedures 
 Subjects slept in a quiet, electrically shielded, room containing a single bed. A video 
camera, microphone, and intercom system were used to maintain visual and voice contact at 
all times. Subjects were recorded with an electrode montage of 19 standard 10-20 
electroencephalogram channels, 4 electrooculogram channels (left/right, vertical/horizontal), 
and 1 electromyogram channel (submental). All-night recordings were made using a Grass 
Model 12 Neurodata Acquisition System (-6 dB filters with cutoffs at 0.30 [time constant 0.4 
seconds] and 100 Hz) and archived under the control of Harmonie version 5.4 software. All 
signals were sampled at 256 Hz; electroencephalogram signals were referenced to A1 and re-
referenced offline to A1+A2. 
 Post-VR REM sleep was reduced in REMD by waking them after 5 mins of REM 
sleep beginning with REM period #2. In the CTL group, awakenings were conducted after 20 
minutes of REM sleep had elapsed. Awakenings were framed as a “dream collection” 
procedure, which we have found generates less stress and often even enthusiasm in 
participants even as they are being REM-deprived. In addition, the duration (at least 10 
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minutes) and interactive nature of the mentation collection interview, even in the absence of 
any mentation recall, ensured that participants were fully awake and did not fall back to 
sleep. Sleep tracings were scored by an experienced polysomnography technician using the 
standard sleep staging criteria (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968) and were then analyzed by an 
in-house program that calculated, for each sleep stage, 1) time in stage (number of 
minutes/night) and 2) time in stage (percentage of minutes/total sleep time). 
 
Memory Recall Procedures 
 Participants were given maps of the two versions of the spatial task (see figure 1), in 
counterbalanced order, and were instructed to mark the houses they had visited. Memory 
performance errors were assessed by counting the number of target houses the participant 
failed to identify, i.e., houses that the participant visited but that were not selected in the 
memory task (missed targets) and the number of non-target houses incorrectly identified as 
target houses, i.e., houses that the participant did not visit but that was selected during the 
memory task (wrong targets). 
 
Statistical analyses 
Data was analyzed using 2x2 manovas with condition (REMD, CTL) as a between 
groups factor and task (low, high emotions) as a repeated measures factor with missed targets 
and wrong targets as dependent measures. All other tests were T-tests, except when mentioned 
otherwise. 
 
Results 
REM deprivation measures 
 As shown in Table 2, the REMD group had fewer minutes of REM sleep (M = 29.13, 
SD = 5.44) than the CTL group (M = 56.76, SD = 24.68; t(12) = 2.89, p = .01) and lower 
%REM sleep (M = 9.51, SD = 1.08) than the CTL group (M = 16.71, SD = 5.57; t(12) = 3.36, 
p = .005). The REMD group also had more %Stage 4 sleep (M = 25.57, SD = 6.65) than the 
CTL group (M = 18.91, SD = 5.11; t(12) = -2.10, p = .058), a finding also reflected in a 
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higher SWS/REM ratio for the REMD group (M = 3.89, SD = 1.09 vs. M = 1.87, SD = .87; 
t(12) = -4.19, p = .002). 
 
Spatial Task Performance  
 A manova found no interaction effects between task (low emotion, high emotion) and 
group (CTL, REMD) for missed targets (F = 3.06; p = .93) and wrong targets (F = 3.68; p = 
.68). Nonetheless, a T-test reveiled that the REMD group had more missed targets than the 
CTL group on the high emotion version of the task (REMD: M = 2.86, SD = .38; CTL: M = 
2.00, SD = .58; t(12) = -3.29, p = .01). T-test also revealed that the CTL group had more 
wrong targets than the REM group on the low emotion version (CTL: M = 2.67, SD = .79; 
REMD: M = 1.43, SD = .787: t(12) = 2.76, p = .02). No group differences were found for 
wrong targets in the high emotion version and missed targets in the low emotion version 
(Figure 2).  
 Missed targets in the high emotion version of the task were negatively correlated with 
minutes in REM sleep (r(16) = -0.706, p = .005), and %REM sleep (r(16) = -0.714, p = .004). 
Wrong targets in the low emotion version of the task were negatively correlated with min in 
Stage 4 sleep (r(16) = -0.62, p = .01) and %Stage 4 sleep (r(16) = -0.65, p = .006) and 
positively correlated with %REM sleep (r(16) = 0.55, p = .03).  
 
Discussion  
 The current findings bridges findings showing, on the one hand, that SWS is 
associated with declarative memory and, on the other, that emotional declarative memory is 
associated with REM sleep. The REMD group in the present study received less REM sleep 
and performed more poorly than the CTL group on spatial recall of an emotionally dysphoric 
navigation task. In contrast, the CTL group received less SWS and performed more poorly on 
spatial recall of a matched low emotion navigation task. The notion that REM sleep and SWS 
played distinct roles in consolidation of the high emotion and low emotion versions of the 
task, respectively, is further reinforced by the finding that the amount of REM sleep was 
positively correlated with performance on the emotional version of the task while the amount 
of Stage 4 sleep was positively correlated with performance on the neutral version. Together, 
these findings suggest that a declarative spatial memory task will be processed by SWS 
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processes if it contains no dysphoric components whereas it will be processed by REM 
processes if the task is imbued with dysphoric stimuli. 
 The present findings thus provide an explanation for the long-standing issue of why 
spatial memory is associated with SWS in humans and REM sleep is rodents: spatial tasks 
administered to rodents are typically emotional (see Smith, 1995) while those applied in 
human research are not. In light of the current results, this important difference is interpreted 
as a methodological issue relating to the presence of emotional features at time of encoding 
as opposed to any major neurobehavioral differences between humans and rodents. This 
interpretation is consistent with accumulating evidence of functional similarities between 
human and rodent hippocampi, particularly as the latter are implicated in spatial learning 
(Kesner & Hopkins, 2006). The interpretation of the results are, however, limited by 1) the 
small number of subjects and 2) memory measurements comprising of a maximum score of 5 
which may have artificially inflated differences. In addition, the intervening memory tasks 
questionnaires (not reported here) on post-task days two, six and nine may have influenced 
the current results (e.g., prompted rehearsal), although these questionnaires concerned 
episodic details of items within houses, while the current results concern the locations of 
target houses within the town.  
Why was REM sleep specifically associated with ‘wrong targets’ but not ‘missed 
targets’ for the dysphoric task? Perhaps a bias towards generating ‘false alarms’ (mislabeling 
an unexplored location as containing threatening stimuli, i.e., wrong target), as opposed to 
‘misses’ (mislabeling a threatening location as unexplored, i.e., missed target) is adaptive 
when an individual is placed in an environment that contains threats. REM sleep’s association 
with emotional memory may promote such a bias. It is less clear, however, why REM sleep 
was associated with an increased number of wrong targets in the low emotion task. Indeed, it 
is difficult to explain how an increase in a stage of sleep can be associated with reduced 
performance. One possibility is that this finding is an artifact of a SWS effect, as SWS is 
positively associated with this task measurement and also in a seemingly reciprocal 
relationship with REM sleep. 
 The differential association of high emotion and low emotion memories with REM 
and SWS may relate to unique features of these sleep stages that correspond to known 
mnemonic processes. Performance on a spatial task in humans is associated with 
hippocampal reactivation during SWS (Peigneux et al., 2004); similarly, in rodents 
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hippocampal reactivation of pre-sleep exploratory behavior is observed at the cellular level 
during SWS (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Lee & Wilson, 2002; Ji & Wilson, 2007). This 
hippocampal reactivation occurs in conjunction with sharp wave ripples (Wilson & 
McNaughton, 1994; Molle, Yeshenko, Marshall, Sara & Born, 2006; Peyrache, Khamassi, 
Benchenane, Wiener & Battaglia, 2009) which have been associated with learning (Ego-
Stengel & Wilson, 2009; Girardeau, Benchenane, Wiener, Buzsaki & Zugaro, 2009; 
Ramadan, Eschenko & Sara, 2009) and which may promote synaptic potentiation (Bramham 
& Srebro, 1989). Hippocampal reactivation is also paralleled by replay in neocortical areas 
such as the prefrontal (Peyrache et al., 2009), parietal (Qin, McNaughton, Skaggs & Barnes, 
1997) and visual cortex (Ji & Wilson, 2007). Together these findings suggest that that SWS 
sleep is ideally suited for processing declarative memories and integrating them within 
neocortical areas (Diekelmann & Born, 2010).  
 Hippocampal reactivation of pre-sleep exploratory behavior has also been found in 
REM sleep (Louie & Wilson, 2001). However, at this time the hippocampus and the 
amygdala are co-activated and synchronized in the theta frequency band. The latter is a 
characteristic of REM sleep thought to underlie its implication in emotional declarative 
memory processing (Pare & Gaudreau, 1996; Hegde, Singh, Chaplot, Shankaranarayana Rao, 
Chattarji, Kutty & Laxmi, 2008; Karashima, Katayama & Nakao, 2010). This is suggested by 
the fact that emotional memory formation in the waking state involves the co-activation 
(Hamann, Ely, Grafton & Kilts, 1999; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli & Cahill, 2000; Dolcos, 
LaBar & Cabeza, 2004) and theta-band synchronization (Seidenbecher, Laxmi, Stork & Pape, 
2003; Pape, Narayanan, Smid, Stork & Seidenbecher, 2005) of the hippocampus and the 
amygdala. Theta band activity is involved in synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (Larson 
& Lynch, 1986; Staubli & Lynch, 1987) and in amygdala (Heinbockel & Pape, 2000; 
Pollandt, Drephal & Albrecht, 2003)In REM sleep, hippocampal/amygdalar theta 
synchronization is enhanced in association with increased P wave density (Karashima et al., 
2010). P waves, too, are associated with increased plasticity–related gene expression in the 
hippocampus and amygdala (Datta, Li & Auerbach, 2008). Thus, REM sleep is very likely 
neurobiologically suited to modulate networks critically involved in emotional memory. 
 The current findings are consistent with the notion that the unique neurophysiological 
profiles of REM and SWS may differentially benefit different facets of declarative memories. 
While both stages are associated with hippocampal reactivation and plasticity, the 
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hippocampal-neocortical interplay found in SWS and driven by sharp wave ripples suggests a 
role for declarative memories in general, while the hippocampal-amygdalar interplay found in 
REM sleep and driven by theta band activity suggests a role in emotional declarative memory 
in particular. Consequently, all declarative memories may benefit from SWS insofar as they 
are hippocampal-dependent, while emotional memories may require less SWS-processing 
because of the additional processing they receive in REM sleep. The possibility that 
emotional declarative memories are processed in REM sleep at the expense of SWS 
processing would thus account for the present finding that imbuing a spatial memory task 
with dysphoric emotions switches its association from SWS to REM sleep. Sleep stages may 
interact to effect optimal processing of declarative memories depending upon emotional 
contingencies. 
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Table 1. Select stimuli from the low-emotion and dysphoric versions of the spatial task 
 Low emotion Task Dysphoric Task 
City 
Neutral Neutral 
    
Houses 
Neutral Neutral 
    
Story 
Mild but entertaining Emotional 
 A “who-did-it” mystery concerning a 
stolen painting. 
A series of confiscations, murders and arrests 
resulting from a corrupt official’s greed. 
 
Charac
ters in 
houses 
Low emotion & Friendly Angry 
    
Dialog
ue 
Low emotion High emotion 
What the characters were doing during a 
particular night (star gazing; working); how 
the Count was a good leader. 
How the corrupt official’s actions are 
affecting the Character and the city; how to 
bring him to justice.  
♫ 
Low emotion High emotion 
Soft orchestral music in major key 
 
Sinister music in minor key 
 
Events 
Low emotion High emotion 
- Sheep walking around. Character N1 
moves away from door. 
- Character N2 reading book. 
- Character N3 faces away from front 
entrance. 
- Character N4 faces away from the door, 
bottles are on the ground. 
-Character E1 gets attacked by and kills a 
mountain lion hidden in the room.  
-Character E2 argues with a city guard who is 
in his house. The character draws a blade and 
is promptly killed. 
-Character E3 is led into a trap by another 
character and is murdered. 
-When participant picks up target item 
Character E4 cries thief. A city guard enters 
the house and arrests and attacks the 
participant. 
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Table 2. Sleep stage differences between groups.  
 CTL REMD  
 Mean SD Mean SD t 
Min S1 38.16 (21.72) 22.34 (12.84) 1.66 
% S1 12.70 (9.65) 7.30 (3.82) 1.38 
Min S2 141.41 (32.81) 142.23 (29.78) -0.05 
% S2 42.60 (5.35) 46.64 (8.55) -1.06 
Min S3 30.29 (19.77) 36.39 (29.17) -0.46 
% S3 9.10 (5.71) 10.96 (6.82) -0.55 
Min S4 62.91 (22.27) 78.37 (24.29) -1.24 
% S4 18.91 (5.11) 25.57 (6.66) -2.10 ‡
Min 
REM 56.76 (24.69) 29.13 (5.44) 
2.90 *
% REM 16.71 (5.57) 9.51 (1.08) 3.36 *
Min 
Total 
sleep 
329.53 (53.15) 308.46 (60.81) 0.69 
 
‡ p = .06 
* p < .01 
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Figure 1. Low emotion and dysphoric versions of the spatial memory task. Spatial layout of 
the city in the neutral task (A) is comparable in size, layout and appearance to that of the city 
in the emotional task (B). Navigation was limited to the shaded area by means of walls and 
fences. An “X” marks the locations of the host characters. Numbers indicate houses; circled 
numbers indicate target houses. Black and yellow icons indicate doors leading into houses. 
Arrows indicate the starting point of the task (the cathedral’s front door). To test recall, cities 
were printed on separate page with markings identifying target areas and shaded navigation 
zones removed. Participants were required to indicate the locations of target houses. 
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Figure 2. Number of recall errors for the dysphoric and low emotion tasks as a function of the 
effect of REM deprivation depends on the task. REM deprivation produced more missed 
targets for the emotional task but fewer wrong targets for the neutral task.  
**p = .01 
 *p = .02 
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Abstract 
 
NREM stage 1 sleep, known as a brief interval of transition from wake to sleep, is 
characterized by neurophysiological events and subjective sensory experiences that suggest 
the stage may be involved in memory processing. To examine this possibility, we conducted 
multiple awakenings with a trained participant during short bursts of theta activity defining 
the 5th sub stage of NREM stage 1 sleep (NREM1Ф). Awakenings provided frequent reports 
of vivid dreaming containing coherent scenes—as opposed to isolated objects often 
associated with general sleep onset imagery. Analyses of the temporal and semantic aspects 
of the memories associated with this imagery suggest that multiple memories are selected for 
incorporation in NREM1Ф imagery on the basis of their semantic proximity and temporal 
remoteness. Analyses also demonstrate a remarkable pattern in about a third of dreams in 
which distinct, semantically related memories dating from as little as 10 minutes to as much 
as 15 years ago were bound in close temporal and spatial proximity within the novel contexts 
of the imagery. This offline manipulation of semantic information, observed here at a 
phenomenological level, bears a resemblance to processes thought to underlie integrative 
encoding, i.e., the encoding of an association between events that were not experienced 
together but which are subsequently combined because they contain at least one overlapping 
element. This preliminary study provides evidence consistent with the notion that 
hippocampal-mediated memory processing occurs during the theta bursts found at sleep 
onset.  
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“I turned the chair to face the fireplace and slipped into a languorous state. Again atoms 
fluttered before my eyes. Smaller groups stayed mostly in the background this time. My 
mind's eye, sharpened by repeated visions of this sort, now distinguished larger figures in 
manifold shapes. Long rows, frequently linked more densely; everything in motion, winding 
and turning like snakes. And lo, what was that? One of the snakes grabbed its own tail and 
the image whirled mockingly before my eyes. I came to my senses as though struck by 
lightning; this time, too, I spent the rest of the night working out the results of my 
hypothesis.” 
 
Friedrich Kekulé, on his discovery of the molecular structure of benzene 
(Translated in Rothenburg, 1998). 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 Recent years have seen a surge in research examining relationships between memory 
and sleep. But despite a wealth of findings clarifying the roles of stages 2, 3 and 4 NREM and 
stage REM sleep in memory consolidation, our knowledge of the first stage of sleep, NREM 
stage 1 (NREM1), in relation to memory processes is lacking. As a brief, transitory state, 
NREM1 sleep may seem trivial or uninteresting; however, it is characterized by a highly 
dynamic brain state whose neurophysiology is likened by some to a hybrid of wake, NREM 
and REM sleep (see Table 1). For example, recent studies (Bódizs, Sverteczki, Lázár & 
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Halász, 2005; Bódizs, Sverteczki & Mészáros, 2008) have shown hippocampal activity 
during NREM1 that is characteristic of REM sleep. Rather, the impediment to studying 
NREM1 sleep is that it is the gateway to sleep and thus it does not lend itself well to current 
experimental paradigms that have been fruitful in investigating the role of sleep for learning 
and memory in humans. Nonetheless, one study (Lahl, Wispel, Willigens & Pietrowsky, 
2008) found enhanced retention of word lists after 5 min naps containing minimal amounts of 
stage 2 sleep, leading the authors to suggest that the task was processed during NREM1. 
 
—Insert Table 1 About Here— 
 
While studying memory processing during NREM1 may present particular challenges, 
its proximity to wakefulness makes it an ideal stage for probing the phenomenological 
contents of mental activity. Methods of collecting sleep mentation have recently been used to 
clarify learning and memory processes during NREM sleep (e.g., Wamsley & Antrobus, 
2009; Wamsley, Perry, Djonlagic, Reaven, & Stickgold, 2010; Stickgold, Malia, Maguire, 
Roddenberry, & O'Connor, 2000), with one study (Wamsley, Tucker, Payne, Benavides, & 
Stickgold, 2010) finding a strong link between dreaming of a task in NREM sleep and 
increased sleep-dependent learning. These studies support the notion that mentation during 
NREM sleep reflects memory processing, and may provide a unique perspective by which 
offline memory processing can be examined (see Stickgold and Wamsley, 2009).  
 It is well known that vivid visual imagery is experienced at sleep onset—and only 
remembered if the individual is awakened at this time. Early studies examined this imagery 
specifically in terms of its similarity to REM sleep dreaming (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; 
Foulkes, Spear, & Symonds, 1966; Vogel, Barrowclough, & Giesler, 1972; Foulkes & 
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Schmidt, 1983; Rowley, Stickgold & Hobson, 1998). More recent studies have either focused 
on the EEG correlates of sleep onset dreaming without considering its relationship to memory 
and learning (Germain & Nielsen, 1997; Hayashi, Katoh, & Hori, 1999; Hori, Hayashi, & 
Morikawa, 1993; Nielsen et al., 2005) or examined it in relation to a pre-sleep task without 
specifying EEG or other associated physiological correlates (Stickgold et al., 2000; Wamsley 
et al., 2010). The present study is an exploratory attempt to consider all of these factors 
together with a single, highly trained participant; i.e., to examine the imagery and memory 
processes associated with a sub-stage of NREM1 with distinct EEG correlates. The objective 
is to evaluate NREM1 dream reports for evidence of memory processing that may be active at 
this time, specifically, 1) the presence of hippocampally-mediated, declarative memories, and 
2) chronological and semantic patterns of memory representation. 
The target NREM1 sub-stage is one of nine EEG patterns first defined by Hori et al. 
(1993b) and illustrated in Table 1. Beginning with relaxed wakefulness characterized by 
alpha wave trains (sub-stage 1) and intermittent alpha >50% (sub-stage 2), a reliable 
sequence (Doerfling, Ogilvie, Murphy, & Lamarche, 1996) of sub-stages characterizes 
NREM1: intermittent alpha <50% (sub-stage 3), EEG flattening (sub-stage 4), theta waves 
(sub-stage 5), solitary humps or solitary vertex waves (sub-stage 6), hump trains or vertex 
waves (sub-stage 7), humps or vertex waves with incomplete spindles (sub-stage 8) and 
spindles (sub-stage 9). The latter sub-stage typically signals the onset of NREM stage 2 sleep.  
 Of particular interest to learning and memory is NREM1 sub-stage 5 (NREM1Ф), 
characterized by clearly visible low voltage theta waves, following which dream-like 
experiences are reported with very high frequencies (Germain & Nielsen, 1997; Hori et al., 
1993; Nielsen et al., 2005). Cortical theta is reliably associated with learning and memory 
(see Mitchell, McNaughton, Flanagan, & Kirk, 2008 for review) and is involved with 
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declarative memory consolidation during REM sleep in humans (Fogel, Smith, & Cote, 
2007). Importantly, theta is thought to underlie the interactions between hippocampus and 
neocortical areas (Buzsaki, 2006; Miller, 1991) that form the basis of episodic memory 
encoding and retrieval, i.e., the ability to re-experience an event in some perceptual detail 
(Tulving, 2002).    
Dreaming has also been described as a function of hippocampal-neocortical 
interactions that are constrained and modulated by the unique neurophysiology of REM sleep 
(Johnson, 2005; Nielsen & Levin, 2007; Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005; Paller & Voss, 2004; 
Payne & Nadel, 2004; Sil'kis, 2010; Stickgold, 2002; Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 
2001). We have argued (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005) that the hippocampus plays a critical 
role in dream construction by binding neocortical memory traces together to create the “here 
and now” experience of dreaming. Consistent with evidence described earlier that REM-
related processes such as hippocampal theta occur at sleep onset (Bodizs, et al., 2005; see 
Nielsen, 2000 for review) and that theta is associated with sleep onset imagery (Nielsen et al., 
2005), we expect that hippocampal processes will also be involved in the theta-rich sub-stage 
of NREM1Ф dreaming.  
 The notion of hippocampal involvement in sleep onset imagery, and in dreaming more 
generally, is nonetheless contested. The seemingly chaotic and isolated nature of dreaming is 
taken by some authors to indicate that dream imagery is generated with an absence of 
hippocampal input (Payne & Nadel, 2004). Moreover, the finding that densely amnesiac, 
hippocampal-lesioned patients report sleep onset imagery similar to that of controls suggests 
that dreaming at sleep onset does not utilize the hippocampally–mediated declarative system 
(Stickgold et al., 2001).  
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 The issue of hippocampal involvement in NREM1Ф has not been clarified by fMRI 
(Kaufmann et al., 2006; Picchioni et al., 2008) and MEG (Ioannides, Kostopoulos, Liu, & 
Fenwick, 2009) studies examining NREM1 because the NREM1 sub-stage has not been 
studied in isolation. Nonetheless, one fMRI study of NREM1 sleep found an increase of 
hippocampal activity from the first to the last 30 sec of the NREM1 period (Picchioni et al., 
2008). It remains an open question whether this increase in hippocampal activity occurs 
before, during or after the theta bursts of sub-stage 5. Because the hippocampus and theta 
activity are central to memory processes, their co-activation at sleep onset would be 
consistent with a possible role for this stage in memory consolidation. 
 The current study explores a novel methodological approach to this question by 
probing specific phenomenological qualities of NREM1Ф imagery for evidence of processes 
that are known to be hippocampally mediated. Imagery was analyzed for the presence of 
scene construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007) a process shown to be critically dependent on 
the hippocampus (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). The notion of scene construction as a 
hippocampally-mediated process rests on findings that patients with hippocampal lesions are 
severely hindered in remembering past experiences (Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004) and 
imagining new situations (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Similarly, fMRI 
studies with healthy participants demonstrate that the hippocampus is involved with 
recreating past experiences and imagining future experiences (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & 
Schacter, 2009; Addis & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007), as well as 
imagining fictive scenarios (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). Together these findings 
converge in demonstrating that the hippocampus is critically involved in scene construction, 
i.e., binding disparate elements of an imagined situation within a spatial framework (Hassabis 
& Maguire, 2007).  
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 Accordingly, evidence of scene construction in NREM1Ф images would be consistent 
with hippocampal involvement at this time. While sleep onset imagery is claimed by some to 
be associated with isolated objects (Mavromatis, 1987; Stickgold et al., 2000), we have 
observed complex, spatially embedded, hallucinatory activity associated specifically with the 
NREM1Ф sub-stage in several subjects (unpublished findings). To further examine this 
effect, a participant trained in self-observation was awakened multiple times from discrete 
episodes of NREM1Ф sleep during two non-consecutive nights. The participant provided 
detailed reports of the immediately preceding imagery; these were assessed for the presence 
or absence of scene construction.  
 We also examined the temporal and semantic characteristics of memories that the 
participant associated to this imagery (‘memory sources’) as evidence of memory processing 
during NREM1Ф. Previous research has demonstrated a reliable temporal pattern of memory 
source incorporation into night dreams (for review see Nielsen, 2004) that is characterized by 
a predominance of memory sources from 1-2 days prior to the dream (day residue effect) and 
5-7 days prior to the dream (dream lag effect) as compared to 3-4 days prior to the dream 
(Blagrove, Henley-Einion, Barnett, Edwards & Seage, 2010; Nielsen, Kuiken, Alain, 
Stenstrom, & Powell, 2004; Nielsen & Powell, 1989; Powell, Cheung, Nielsen, & Cervenka, 
1995). The dream lag effect has been explained as due to cellular-level hippocampal memory 
consolidation processes (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005) and has not yet been investigated in 
sleep onset dreaming. Thus, the participant in the present study was required to provide 
detailed reports of potential memory sources of NREM1Ф dreams. On the assumption that 
REM-like processes occur during NREM1Ф, we predicted that the temporal pattern of dream 
incorporations previously found for REM sleep dreaming (day residue and dream lag effects) 
would also be found at sleep onset.  
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 That REM processes occur during NREM1Ф may also indicate that imagery at this 
time will, in a manner similar to REM dreams (Fosse et al., 2003), not replay complete 
episodic episodes. While NREM stage 2 dreams contain a large number of episodic elements 
compared to SWS and REM sleep (Baylor & Cavallero, 2001), no study to date has examined 
the extent to which NREM1 dreams are characterized by the presence/absence of episodic 
replay. To address this, the present participant provided ratings of episodic integrity, defined 
as the degree to which each NREM1Ф dream consisted of a replay of a previous experience. 
We predicted that NREM1Ф dreams will not be episodic replays but, like REM sleep dreams, 
will consist of novel associations between distal memories. 
 Our specific hypotheses concerning the imagery reported following NREM1Ф 
awakenings were as follows: 
 
H1) NREM1Ф dreams will be constructed as scenes, i.e., will contain items situated in a 
three dimensional environment forming a coherent scene, as opposed to items not well 
integrated within an environment or missing an environment altogether. 
  
H2) Memory sources for NREM1Ф dreams will be influenced by similar temporal factors as 
sources for REM sleep dreams, i.e., the day-residue and dream-lag effects. Thus, memory 
sources will originate in events occurring 1 or 2 and 5, 6, or 7 days, as opposed to 4 or 5 days, 
prior to occurrence of the dream.  
 
H3) NREM1Ф dreams will not consist of the replay of whole episodic memories but, like 
REM dreams, will feature multiple memory sources from unrelated memories. 
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2 Methods 
 A single male participant (author KF, age 23) in good mental and physical health was 
previously habituated to the laboratory environment, had good dream recall, and had not used 
medications, drugs or alcohol at least 1 month prior to the experiment. He had been 
practicing dream recall and identifying memory sources of his dreams several years prior to 
the first night. He previously underwent 2 sessions of NREM1Ф awakenings (5 and 10 
awakenings each; not reported here) according to the methods described below. He was 
aware that an objective of the current study was to identify memory sources, and was aware 
of the day-residue and dream-lag effects, but was unaware of the hypothesis concerning scene 
construction.  
 The participant slept two non-consecutive nights in a sleep laboratory with EEG 
recordings made from C3, C4, O1 and O2 electrodes applied according to the standard 10-20 
system. We awakened the participant repeatedly throughout the entire night between the 
hours of 11 PM and 7 AM and exclusively during NREM1Ф sleep, i.e., when at least 5 sec 
had elapsed of Hori sub-stage 5 characterized by low voltage theta (5-7Hz) wave ripples with 
an amplitude of 20 µV to 50 µV (Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa, 1993a). The sleep stage was 
determined in real time by an experienced polysomnographer. When the stage criteria were 
met, the experimenter called the participant by his first name through an intercom preset at a 
comfortable volume. 
 The participant gave a detailed verbal report of each experience that had immediately 
preceded the call; he sometimes made drawings of the imagery for clarity. This report was 
followed by a report of any distinct memory sources he could identify for specific dream 
elements. A distinct memory source was defined as an object, person, setting or sound whose 
waking-life source the participant could unambiguously recall. He stated the approximate 
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time in days, months or years since that memory had occurred. Memory sources were later 
classified by the experimenter into one of 4 temporal bins: 0-3 days, 4-30 days, 1-11 months 
and 1 year or more.  
 The participant then verbally responded to scales measuring the presence of self (yes 
or no), perspective (first person, third person or both), self movement (yes or no), movement 
other than self (yes or no), presence of emotions (yes or no), intensity of emotions (1 to 9; 1 = 
not at all intense, 9 = extremely intense), valence of emotions (1 to 9; 1 = very negative, 5 = 
neutral, 9 = very positive), and type of emotion (open-ended). The participant also rated 
dream reports for the extent to which they reflect an actual memory, i.e., episodic integrity (1 
to 9; 1 = not at all like a replay of a memory, 9 = entirely like a replay of a memory) and the 
extent to which the dream was bizarre (1 to 9; 1 = not at all bizarre, 9 = extremely bizarre).  
 Two days following each experimental night the participant and one author (PS) 
examined the dream reports to identify recurring elements, defined as semantically similar 
elements in the dream.  
 Finally, two independent judges, unaware of the study’s hypotheses, evaluated the 
presence of scene construction in the dream; drawings made by the participant were also 
available for this task. Transcribed dream reports were classified into three bins: 1) presence 
of scene construction: imagery containing clear evidence of items well integrated within a 
three dimensional environment; 2) absence of scene construction: reports containing no 
evidence of items integrated within a three dimensional environment; and 3) ambiguous 
reports: imagery containing unclear evidence that items were integrated within a three 
dimensional environment. Items were defined as either an object or a person. 
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3 Results 
 The participant was awakened 16 times during Night 1 and 18 times during Night 2 
for a total of 34 awakenings with reports. Three awakenings produced only ‘thought-like’ 
activity (i.e., no imagery) and were discarded. The remaining 31 reports contained 
hallucinatory activity (pseudo-sensory imagery) that defined ‘dreaming’ for the present study. 
 The participant reported himself as being awake for 44 % of awakenings, as sleeping 
for 28% and as “not sure” for the remaining 28% (ratios very similar to those obtained from 
27 other subjects in our lab; unpublished data, see Table 1). A majority of awakenings gave 
rise to visual imagery (N = 31; 100%) composed of a three dimensional environment in 
which the participant was present (N = 24; 77%) and viewing the scene from a first person 
perspective (N = 24; 77%). In no case did the participant report seeing himself. While for 
about half of the reports the participant was engaged in motor activity (N=14; 45%), in most 
cases something in the environment was moving (N = 28; 90%). Emotions were present in 
most (N = 21; 67%) reports and were of generally low intensity (M = 3.90, SD = 1.70). A 
balanced mix of positive (N = 6, e.g., exhilaration of flying with a flock of geese) and 
negative (N = 5; e.g., fear of falling off a building; anxiety over another dream character 
being injured) emotions was reported.  
   
3.1 Scene construction 
 The two judges agreed on the categorization of the imagery in regards to the presence 
of scene construction in all cases but three, and resolved the discrepancies after discussing the 
matter with the participant. In most cases (N = 26; 84%) dreams were judged to be 
constructed as scenes, i.e., objects were well integrated within a three dimensional 
environment. In only four dreams (13%) was there no evidence of scene construction 
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whatsoever: in one case there occurred an environment but no object (‘protagonist traveling 
through space’); in the 3 other cases (9%) an object occurred without an environment (e.g., ‘a 
cube floating in darkness’, the participant’s headphones appearing isolated from any 
environment). In two other cases (6%) the dream began with simple objects that evolved into 
3D scenes (e.g., simple geometric shapes bouncing around becoming slowly integrated into a 
full scene); these were considered as examples of scene construction. In another case (3%) 
both an object and a background was present but there was insufficient information to 
determine whether they were well integrated within a three dimensional environment (e.g., an 
isolated white cube that seemed to have emerged from a body of water).  
 
3.2 Episodic replay 
 Only one dream was described as highly episodic, i.e., the near replay of a past event, 
and even this dream contained discrepancies with the actual event. The event in question was 
the participant sitting on a ski slope with friends 1 month prior to the experiment (score: 9 out 
of 9 for episodic integrity). Dreams were described as containing varying degrees of episodic 
integrity, with an average rating of 3.81 (SD = 2.24) on the 1-9 scale. Four dreams contained 
no bizarre elements at all, with an average bizarreness score of 4.52 (SD = 2.47) on the 1-9 
scale. Bizarreness scores were negatively correlated with episodic integrity scores (r30=-.594, 
p = .0001) and positively correlated with the number of memory sources contained in each 
dream (r30= .638, p = .0001). The number of memory sources negatively correlated with 
episodic integrity (r30= -.363, p = .045). 
 
 
 
  
116
3.3 Memory Sources 
 A total of 81 distinct memory sources were reported for 31 dreams; at least one 
memory source (and as many as 5) was identified for each dream, with an average of 2.6 (SD 
= 1.1) memory sources per dream. Six dreams (19%) produced memories from immediately 
prior to sleep (e.g., lab technician, EEG amplifier), 16 (52%) produced memories from within 
the last 3 days, and 16 (52%) produced memories from 1+ years ago (see Figure 1). The most 
distant source was 15 years ago. Surprisingly, not a single occurrence of memory sources 
from 4 to 13 days ago was reported.  
 Memory sources from immediately prior to sleep always occurred within the first four 
awakenings on both nights (N1, 11:32-12:58 AM; N2, 11:56-12:34 AM), while years-distant 
sources never appeared until at least the 4th awakening on Night 1 (12:58-5:41 AM) and the 
3rd awakening on Night 2 (12:34-5:15 AM), suggesting that time-of-night/circadian factors 
influenced reported memory sources. Twenty-one dreams (67%) produced memories from 
the last 1-11 months, however, only 3 of these dreams produced memory sources exclusively 
from 1-11 months ago. The other 18 dreams produced additional memories from the last few 
days, from years ago, or from both. Six reports (19%) produced memory sources from both 
the last 3 days and more than 1 year ago.  
 
3.4 Semantic elements 
 Recurring semantic elements (n = 18), ranging from general themes (e.g., China) to 
specific objects (e.g., a white cube), were identified for several dreams within a single night. 
In contrast, only 2 recurring elements (Buddhism and University) were found across the two 
nights, and these referred directly to ongoing, long-term concerns of the participant. Overall, 
recurring elements appeared in from 2 to 5 (M = 2.47, SD = .70) different dreams and could 
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be traced to specific memories 77% of the time (n = 14). When the memory sources of 
recurring elements could be identified, in all cases they could be traced to distinct and 
unrelated memories sometimes separated by several years. For example, the theme of ‘outer 
space’ recurred in 5 dreams on N1; memory sources were identified as three science fiction 
films seen 14 days, 8 months, and 3 years prior to the experiment, and two science-related 
books read 14 days and 3 months prior (see Table 2). The three films, for example (2001: A 
Space Odyssey, Time Cop, and Fire in the Sky), were viewed months or years apart, are 
totally unrelated to one another (e.g., not sequels, or featuring same director or actors), and 
were themselves produced over a period of nearly 30 years (1968 – 1994). Yet the common 
theme of futuristic technology and advanced forms of space-time travel was culled from all 
three films and recurred throughout a single night of NREM1 dreams alongside similar 
themes taken from books. Recurring elements were always distributed equally throughout the 
night, and were separated by an average of 3.82 (SD = 2.37) dreams between reappearances.  
 
—Insert Table 2 About Here— 
 
 Recurring elements could also be found within single dreams. In 32% (n = 10) of 
dreams, memory elements with similar semantic properties yet stemming from different 
memories separated by from 2 days to 15 years appeared simultaneously in a single dream 
(see Table 3). In most cases (8/10), semantically related items came from memories that were 
separated by from 1 to 15 years (M = 4.21, SD = 5.03). The two remaining dreams were 
particular in that semantically related items stemmed from the same location (McGill 
University Campus); the dreams were only 10 minutes apart and the memories 3 months 
apart.  
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—Insert Table 3 About Here— 
 
4 Discussion 
 To investigate the possibility that memory processing occurs during NREM1 sleep a 
trained participant was awakened 34 times from episodes of NREM1 sub-stage 5 sleep (with 
theta activity) across two non-consecutive nights for mentation reports. A majority of 
awakenings (31/34; 91.2%) resulted in detailed reports of vivid visual images that were 
constructed as integrated scenes and linked to a variety of memory sources.  
 
4.1 Evidence of scene construction 
 A vast majority of recalled dreams (84%) was judged to be composed of multiple 
items (objects or persons) that were coherently integrated within a defined spatial context, 
i.e., a three-dimensional environment. They are thus similar in nature to other imaginative 
activity in which item-in-context associations are visualized as scenes, namely, remembering 
a past event (episodic memory), thinking about a future event, or imagining a novel event 
(Addis, McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Addis et al., 2009; Addis & 
Schacter, 2008; Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann et al., 2007; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010). This type of scene construction 
is thought to reflect the hippocampally mediated process of binding together disparate 
neocortical traces into a coherent whole (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009) and, in this 
respect, our theta-linked NREM1Ф hypnagogic dreams may well be hippocampally mediated 
like these other forms of mentation.  
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 This finding appears to contradict previous reports that densely amnesic patients with 
bilateral hippocampal lesions report imagery similar to that of controls during unspecified 
NREM1 or Stage 2 sleep (Stickgold et al., 2000). However, because in the latter study the 
reported imagery consisted of pre-sleep task-related Tetris blocks dissociated from any sort of 
environment, and thus did not involve scene construction as defined by Hassabis and Maguire 
(2007), the hippocampus need not have been involved in production of the imagery. In fact, 
because the theta ripples characterizing NREM1Ф are short in duration and account for only 
a fraction of each NREM1Ф episode, it is possible that previous studies investigating sleep 
onset cognition have not awakened participants at a time when the hippocampus was active. 
Indeed, sleep onset imagery is commonly described as containing isolated objects 
(Mavromatis, 1987) and it is possible that imagery during theta bursts is unusual in its 
complexity precisely because of involvement of the hippocampus.  
While the structure of NREM1Ф dreaming was characterized by scene construction in 
much the same manner as episodic memory recall is, these dreams did not consist of replays 
of episodic memories. Instead, most were described as bizarre and as containing a wide range 
of elements relating to multiple memory sources. In fact, only 1 dream (3.2%) was 
considered highly episodic, and only 5 dreams (16%) were not considered bizarre, with most 
featuring moderate levels of bizarreness (4.5 on a scale of 1 to 9) and moderate levels of 
episodic integrity (3.8 on a scale of 1 to 9). Furthermore, the degree of episodic integrity was 
found to be negatively correlated with the degree of bizarreness and the number of memory 
sources identified in a dream. Along with the finding of a positive correlation between the 
number of memory sources and bizarreness, these results suggest that dreams of low episodic 
integrity containing a number of distal memory sources will, quite reasonably, be rated as 
bizarre. 
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4.2 Temporal aspects of memory sources 
 The predominance of recent memories during the first 4 awakenings and of distant 
memories from the 3rd awakening onward is consistent with previous findings that early-night 
REM dreams are constructed from more recent memory sources, and late-night REM dreams 
from more temporally distant sources (Verdone, 1965). This may indicate that either 
circadian or sleep-dependent processes underlie the recent/remote quality of memory source 
selection for both REM sleep and NREM1Ф dreaming and further supports the claim that 
sleep onset NREM imagery may be modulated by changes in REM propensity (see Nielsen, 
2010 for review). 
 In most cases, multiple memory sources linked to single dreams were separated by at 
least one month (see Figure 1). The intriguing possibility that memory sources within a single 
dream are targeted predominantly on the basis of distal temporal relationships is suggested by 
1) the preponderance of reports eliciting memories from both 1-11 months ago and some 
other time period (less than 4 days, more than a year ago) and 2) the negligible number of 
dreams with only 1-11-month-old memories.  
 
—Insert Figure 1 About Here— 
  
We expected to find peaks in dream memory sources arising from 1-2 days ago (day 
residue) and 5-7 days ago (dream lag) based on previous studies for nocturnal dreams 
(Blagrove, 2010; Nielsen, 2004). However, although a clear day-residue effect was found, 
with 16 reports (52%) containing a memory source from 1 day prior, there was a total 
absence of a dream lag effect (0%). In fact, there was a curious lack of any memory sources 
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from 5 to 13 days ago, suggesting an important difference between REM and NREM1Ф 
dream-incorporation mechanisms. 
 
4.3 Recurring semantic elements 
 Unexpectedly, a large number of memory sources were found to be semantically 
related. Previously, Cippoli et al., (1988) found interrelated elements in stage 2 and REM 
dreams within single nights. Here we report that during multiple sequential NREM1Ф 
episodes recurring elements are often related on a semantic level and most of these elements 
can be traced to episodic memories.  
 Eighteen recurring semantic elements were identified, ranging from simple objects 
(e.g., obelisk), personal items (e.g., pet animals), and landmarks (e.g., Asian temples), to 
more general themes (e.g., torture). With the exception of two semantic elements relating to 
pervasive personal concerns (Buddhism, University life), recurring semantic elements were 
specific to a single night. For example, the semantic element ‘science fiction’ was present in 
5 dreams distributed across Night 1 and entirely absent on Night 2 (see Table 2). The fact that 
elements recurring across several dreams are not grouped together but are well distributed 
across the night suggests that multiple instances of semantically related elements across 
multiple dreams are not simply a function of semantic priming.  
A third of all dreams contained semantically related items from distal memories. 
These items were isolated from their original context, i.e., dissociated from the memory of 
the event of which the items are a part, and integrated together in a novel scene that was 
vividly perceived. This offline manipulation of memory items bears a resemblance to 
integrative encoding, the hippocampally-mediated process by which overlapping items from 
separate events “are integrated into a linked mnemonic representation” (Shohamy & Wagner, 
  
122
2008, p. 378). While the hippocampus has been demonstrated to enable associative inference 
between overlapping elements of two events that were not experienced together (Greene, 
Gross, Elsinger, & Rao, 2006; Heckers, Zalesak, Weiss, Ditman, & Titone, 2004; Preston, 
Shrager, Dudukovic, & Gabrieli, 2004), Shohamy and Wagner (2008) demonstrated that 
overlapping elements from separate episodes are encoded to provide a rich network of 
associations that cut across multiple events. While these studies limit distinct episodes to the 
duration of the experiment lasting only a few hours, here we find merged in a single scene 
semantically related items from memories that occurred months to years apart and that arose 
in entirely different contexts. That evidence of this phenomenon occurred in a third of all 
reports suggests that NREM1Ф dreaming may be involved in linking common elements from 
memories spanning several years (the oldest memory source was a toy animal from 15 years 
ago that the participant had not thought of since that time).  
 
4.4. Similarities between NREM1Ф sleep and REM sleep 
 A century after Freud observed that past events are readily incorporated into 
dreaming, it is still unknown why certain memories are selected for incorporation, why 
specific elements within these memories are targeted for incorporation and what role the 
incorporation of such elements may play in offline memory processing. Here we provide 
preliminary evidence that during NREM1 sleep with theta waves, memory sources are 
selected on the basis of both distal temporal relationships and proximal semantic 
relationships, a finding consistent with the hypothesis put forth by Walker & Stickgold 
(2004) that the recombination of previous memories during REM sleep facilitates novel 
inferences.  
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 Indeed, both REM and NREM1Ф dreams seem to form links between loosely 
associated items. For example, previous research suggests that the REM sleep state is 
characterized by a cognitive bias towards employing weak, as opposed to strong, semantic 
associations (Walker, Liston, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2002). Similarly, one study found that 
REM sleep is associated with increased performance on a creativity task; specifically, it 
served to prime associative networks and integrate unassociated information (Cai, Mednick, 
Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009). Along the same lines, we find that a third of the 
NREM1Ф dreams featured semantically related items stemming from episodic memories that 
were separated by several years and bound together in spatial and temporal proximity within 
the imagery. Such modification of semantic information suggests that this stage of sleep may 
be involved in cross-episode integration on the scale of decades. These exploratory results 
thus provide evidence for the possibility that offline memory processes occur during NREM 
stage 1 sleep just as they do during REM sleep.  
 
4.5 Study limitations 
 The study has some important limitations. First, the study was based on a single 
participant, and thus conclusions drawn from the findings are tentative and require replication. 
Second, theta activity at sleep onset was (by necessity) visually detected but not later 
confirmed by off-line spectral analysis. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, however, the 
successful use of a single trained individual to lay bare important features of memory 
processing in dreams constitutes an important proof of principal and paves the way for future 
group-level studies. 
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4.6 Use of trained participants for the study of dreaming 
 For this study, the finding of patterns within the temporal and semantic characteristics 
of memory sources was largely due to the excellent quality of the image reports and 
associated memory sources. We have previously argued for the need to employ trained 
participants to counter difficulties inherent in gaining access to subtle features of dream 
experience (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005). Although dreams can be difficult to remember, 
recent evidence suggests that remembering the details of dreams is a learnable skill. We 
demonstrated that providing participants with training to remember dreams and to identify 
their memory sources increases these abilities (Solomonova et al., 2008). The current study 
demonstrates that a motivated participant, habituated to laboratory awakenings and trained 
and practiced in recalling dreams and memory sources can produce well remembered and 
detailed dream reports, the analysis of which may lead to a more nuanced understanding of 
the mind in sleep.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was supported by a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada grant and a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Graduate 
Scholarship.  
 
 
  
125
Table 1. Neurophysiology of NREM1 compared to NREM 2-3-4 and REM sleep and wakefulness.  
Stage sub stages1 
EEG  
Signature 
EEG Signature  
Waveform 
Subjective 
State 
Recall of 
Mentation 
Eye 
movements Hippocampal activity 
Wake 1 Alpha wave train  Awake ? 
 
? 
 
? 
 2 
Alpha wave 
intermittent 
(>50%)  
Awake ? ? ? 
NREM 1 3 
Alpha wave 
intermittent 
(<50%)  
? ? Slow and short lasting2 Diminished
5 
 4 EEG flattening (<20 µV)  
Wake: 62% 
Sleep: 16% 
Not sure: 22%10 
82%10 ? ? 
 5 Theta ripples  
Wake: 43% 
Sleep: 40% 
Not sure: 17%10 
85%10 Wake-like slow saccades2 ? 
 
 
 
6 Vertex sharp wave (<200 µV)  
? ? Wake-like slow saccades2 ? 
 
 
 
7 > 1 Vertex sharp wave (<200 µV) 
 
? ? Oculomotor slowing2 ? 
 
 
 
8 Incomplete spindle ? ? 
Oculomotor 
slowing2 Higher than wake
5 
NREM 2 9 Complete Spindle  Sleep 43%
11 Minimal 
activity Active
4 
NREM 
3-4 
 
 
 
Delta 
 
Sleep 43%11 Minimal activity Diminished
4 
REM  Theta  Sleep 82%
12 Wake-like 
rapid Active
6,7,8 
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saccades3 Higher than wake9
 
1 Hori et al. 1994.; 2 Porte et al., 2004; 3 Ogawa et al., 2009; 4 Kaufmann et al. 2006; 5 Picchioni et al. 200; 6 Only PET data available for this area in REM; 
7Maquet et al. 1996; 8 Nofzinger et al. 1996; 9 Braun et al. 1997; 10 Unpublished findings from 104 Hori sub-stage 4 and 135 Hori sub-stage 5 reports from 27 
healthy participants (Nielsen et al. 2005); 11 Nielsen, 2000 (average from 29 studies); 12 Nielsen, 2000 (average from 33 studies).
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Table 2. Example of a recurring science fiction theme spanning multiple dreams on Night 1. 
 
Time of awakening Memory source 
Semantic aspects of 
memory sources 
Temporal aspects of 
memory source 
12:22 AM, Dream # 3 Situation and 
environment from the 
movie “2001: A Space 
Odyssey (1968)” 
Particular type of high 
speed space travel  
Movie seen 14 days ago 
03:09 AM, Dream # 10 Situation and 
environment from the 
movie “Fire in the Sky 
(1993)” 
Examination by aliens 
in space ship 
Movie seen 8 months ago 
04:55 AM, Dream # 14 Objects from the 
movie “Time Cop 
(1994)” 
Particular shape of time 
travel portal 
Movie seen 3 years ago 
05:22 AM, Dream #15 Environment from 
book “The Mind’s 
Eye (2005)” 
A virtual grid 
superimposed on a 
moonscape 
Book read 14 days ago 
05:41 AM, Dream #16 Object from comic 
“Battle Angel” 
Particular shape of 
space ship 
Comics read 3 months ago 
Note: All space themes occurred during Night 1; no space theme occurred during Night 2. 
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Table 3. Examples of semantically related elements within a single dream 
 
Time of 
awakening Common Semantic Element 
Description of elements 
included in the dream 
Temporal aspects of 
memory source 
Night 1  
Dream #10 
3:09AM 
Body modification. 
Participant was on an 
operating table in a situation 
with visual and scene 
elements from 3 movies.  
Body reconstruction from 
the movie “The Fifth 
Element (1997)” 
2 months ago 
Autopsy from the movie 
“Fire in the sky (1993)” 
8 months ago 
Torture from the movie 
“The Cell (2000)”  
6 years ago 
Night 2  
Dream #13 
4:00AM 
Pets. Three pets from 3 time 
periods present in the 
backyard of childhood home.  
Pet cat 2 months ago 
Pet rabbit 12 years ago 
Teddy bear 15 years ago 
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Figure 1. Temporal characteristics of memory sources pertaining to sleep onset mentation 
reports. Circles represent memory sources situated in time (X axis) for mentation reports 
occurring across two nights (Y-axis). Black lines connecting circles indicate sources are from 
the same dream.  
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Abstract 
 
In his celebrated Discourse on Method, Descartes struggled with the notion of 
differentiating thinking in dreaming with that of the waking state. 400 years later, and 
despite numerous investigations of dream cognition, the question of how thinking is 
modulated across sleep-wake states remains poorly understood. Here we compare 
prefrontal and parietal brain regions that may be deactivated in REM and Stage 2 (S2) 
sleep with characterizations of the neural substrates of distinct phases of the reasoning 
process. Overlap between areas deactivated in REM sleep and those responsible for 
validation logic—but not for the production of logical thinking—leads to the hypothesis 
that during REM sleep dreaming the ability to think logically will be maintained while 
the ability to verify whether or not logical relationships in the dream scene are valid will 
be diminished. Laboratory awakenings and mentation sampling from REM and S2 sleep 
provide evidence that confirms the hypothesis and suggests that the production and 
validation of logic are dissociable and that such a dissociation characterizes cognition 
during these stages of sleep. Analysis of targeted mentation reports reveal that dream 
bizarreness has its basis in both violations of logic and novel item-context associations, 
the appreciation of which are dysfunctional in dreaming as predicted by sleep-specific 
modulations of fronto-parietal and hippocampal functioning, respectively. The results 
suggest a novel explanation of what makes thinking in dreaming similar to, yet so 
different from, thinking in the waking state.  
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 Does our ability to engage in logical thinking survive the important modulations 
of brain activity that occur in sleep? On the one hand, hypoactivation of the dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during REM sleep (Braun et al., 1997; Maquet et al., 
1996) is interpreted by some authors (Hobson, 2004; Hobson, Pace-Schott & Stickgold, 
1998; Muzur, Pace-Schott & Hobson, 2002) to support the claim that illogical thinking 
occurs during REM sleep dreaming. On the other hand, recent evidence that logical 
thinking is readily found in dream reports (Wolman & Kozmova, 2006) echoes 
observations from early investigators that in dreams we have wake-like thoughts 
(Aristotle, 350 BC) and that these thoughts are rational (Descartes, 1637).  
 Here we draw upon recent clarifications of the neurophysiology of sleep as well 
as recent descriptions of brain areas implicated in thinking and the detection of 
contextual novelty to revisit the question of whether and how logical thinking is 
modulated across sleep-wake states. At the heart of our hypothesis is the notion that 
different aspects of thinking are differentially modulated in sleep consciousness, as 
hinted at in a study reporting that thinking within the hallucinatory context of the dream 
is similar to waking-state thinking (i.e., rational), while thinking about the scenario 
itself is not (Kahn & Hobson, 2005).  
 
Logical validation and DLPFC hypoactivation 
 A recent meta-analysis of PET imaging results comparing waking and REM 
sleep states (Maquet et al., 2005) has revealed hypoactivation, during REM sleep, of 
specific areas within the parietal lobes and the DLPFC and other prefrontal regions. A 
combined EEG and fMRI study found a somewhat similar pattern of activation in Stage 
2 (S2) NREM sleep (Kaufmann et al., 2006). Here we focus on regions of sleep-specific 
hypoactivation which overlap neural areas associated with logical thinking.  
 Tasks involving deductive logic are typically associated with wide patterns of 
activation within frontal, parietal, temporal, occipital, basal ganglia and cerebellar 
regions (Goel, 2007). While the cerebellum, basal ganglia, temporal and occipital areas 
associated with logical thinking are active in both REM and S2 sleep, most of the 
prefrontal and parietal areas are deactivated at this time. Specifically, during REM 
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(Maquet et al., 2005) and S2 (Kaufmann et al., 2006) sleep there is selective 
deactivation of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the middle frontal gyrus (MFG), 
both of which are implicated in logical deduction (Goel & Dolan, 2003; Goel & Dolan, 
2004), logical induction (Goel & Dolan, 2004) and analogical reasoning (Luo et al., 
2003). There is also deactivation of the inferior parietal lobule, which is associated with 
logical deduction and induction (Goel & Dolan, 2004).  
Although these activity decreases suggest that the brain states of REM and S2 sleep are 
not conducive to rational thinking, a recent study (Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff & Sloutsky, 
2006) that examined specific patterns of brain activation associated with three 
hypothesized phases of deductive reasoning suggests that regions of sleep-specific 
hypoactivation overlap almost exclusively with brain areas involved in the third and 
final phase of this reasoning paradigm, i.e., the validation phase. The validation phase 
of reasoning takes place when participants decide if the conclusion they had previously 
drawn from the premises given matches the conclusion currently displayed on a 
computer screen. In contrast to the validation phase, brain regions involved in the 
processing of a premise, e.g., V = X, in the integration of a second premise, e.g., X = Z, 
and in the hypothetical production of a putative conclusion, e.g., V = Z, are similarly 
active in REM and waking state (see Table 1 for details). In S2 sleep, only 6 of 8 
regions implicated in the integration phase are active; the left parahippocampal gyrus 
and the left anterior cingulate show less activity in S2 than during the integration phase 
of waking reasoning.  
 Together, these findings suggest that in REM, and to a less extent in S2 sleep, 
regions associated with the integration of premises and the production of a putative 
conclusion remain active whereas regions associated with evaluation of the validity of 
this putative conclusion (validation) do not.  
 
---Insert Table 1 about here--- 
 
 Based on findings such as these, it seems likely that cognition during REM sleep 
dreaming is characterized by occurrences of logical reasoning for which validation of 
putative conclusions is deficient. This proposal leads to two predictions about the 
characteristics of REM sleep cognition: 1) participants will report thinking logically 
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during dream events, and 2) participants will not verify whether logical relationships 
in the dream scene are valid or not. Some evidence supports these predictions.  
 First, that logical thinking occurs in dreaming is consistent with a recent study 
reporting a wide variety of categories of rational thought, such as analytical thinking, in 
dream reports (Wolman & Kozmova, 2006). These findings question some authors’ 
descriptions of thinking in REM sleep as illogical or suffering from tenuous logic (e.g., 
Hobson, 2004; Muzur et al., 2002). However, no study has yet examined logical rigor in 
dreaming cognition by means of controlled laboratory awakenings and targeted probes.  
 Second, that putative conclusions derived from reasoning are not verified during 
dreaming corresponds to the generally accepted but little investigated characteristic of 
dream cognition that dreaming individuals are unable to appreciate bizarre qualities of 
their hallucinatory environments—no matter how illogical or impossible they may be. 
In dreams, “persons, times, and places are fused, plastic, incongruous and 
discontinuous” (Hobson, Pace-Schott & Stickgold, 2000). Dream bizarreness occurs in 
a majority of REM sleep dreams (Natale and Esposito, 2001; Rittenhouse et al., 1994) 
although its definition varies considerably. For example, bizarreness has been defined 
as “events outside the conceivable expectations of waking life” (Snyder, 1970), as 
“violations of real-world rules” (Cicogna, Occhionero, Natale & Esposito, 2007) or as 
unusual combination of features in the binding of different information sources 
(Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002).  
 While the scope of bizarreness during dreaming may be considerable, we 
propose that the curious absence of awareness about it may be understood, at least in 
part, as a failure to validate the logical coherence of dream events which, in turn, results 
from a sleep-specific hypoactivation of the brain regions responsible for logical 
validation during reasoning.  
 
Context novelty and hippocampal dysfunction 
 A second set of findings concerning impaired hippocampal functioning also has 
implications for the phenomenology of dream thought. From this literature it can be 
argued that some dream bizarreness may be viewed more as a violation of context than 
a violation of logical premises per se. For example, dreaming of a clown in a lecture 
hall might be considered bizarre because of a violation of expected context, not because 
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the clown, the lecture hall or the relationship between the clown and the lecture hall 
constitutes a violation of logic. Indeed, it is possible that the bizarre nature of some 
dreams may be understood as a novel juxtaposition of items within a context. The 
detection and encoding of contextual novelty, defined as an event or stimulus that is 
unexpected given the context in which it occurs (Kumaran & Maguire, 2007), is 
dependent on the hippocampus (Halgren et al., 1980; Knight, 1996; Strange et al., 2000; 
Strange and Dolan, 2001; Kishiyama et al.,2004; Yamaguchi et al., 2004; Harrison et 
al., 2006), a brain area whose functioning is heavily modulated in REM sleep 
(Montgomery et al., 2008; Sil’kis, 2009). The role of the hippocampus in the detection 
of novelty is believed to rest upon the ability of the CA1 region to compare incoming 
sensory information from the cortex with stored representations from DG-CA3 
networks (Hasselmo and Schnell, 1994; Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001). The 
hippocampus then generates a match/mismatch signal based on overlap between 
memory-based predictions of the DC/CA3 networks and sensory reality signals from 
the entorhinal cortex. A recent study found diminished gamma and theta coherence 
between CA1 and DG-CA3 networks during REM sleep (Montgomery et al., 2008), 
suggesting that the ability of hippocampus to function as an item-context novelty 
detector may be diminished in REM sleep on the basis of modulated communication 
between CA1 and DG/CA3 areas. It is therefore likely that during REM sleep bizarre 
elements resulting from novel item-context will not be appreciated or understood as 
bizarre by the dreamer.    
 In sum, new observations concerning the functional deactivation of prefrontal 
and parietal regions, as well as altered processing of the hippocampus during REM 
sleep provide a basis for explaining how some aspects of logical reasoning and the 
ability to detect unusual features of the environment may be modulated across sleep-
wake states.  
While in REM sleep diminished neural activity is confined to areas involved in 
the validation phase of Fangmeier et al.’s (2006) logical reasoning paradigm, in S2 
sleep an additional diminishment of activity is observed in some brain regions involved 
in the integration phase (see table 1). It is therefore likely that the ability to detect 
illogical aspects of dream bizarreness will be similar across REM and S2, whereas 
  
146
thoughts in S2 sleep mentation will be characterised as containing less logical rigor 
than thoughts in REM sleep mentation.  
 Because data on cellular-level activity in the hippocampus during S2 is lacking, 
it is unclear whether diminished CA1-DG/CA3 communication seen in REM, 
hypothesized here to underlie the ability to detect novel context-item associations, also 
occurs during S2. Nonetheless, in line with the covert REM hypothesis (Nielsen, 2000), 
which posits that REM processes within NREM stages underlie NREM dreaming, and 
considering the important role of the hippocampus in dreaming (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 
2005), we expect REM-like modulations of the hippocampus during S2 dreaming. We 
therefore expect a diminished ability to detect bizarreness characterised by novel item-
context associations during S2 as well as REM dreaming.  
 
The specific hypotheses are that: 
H1) In REM sleep, the logical rigor of thinking will be high;  
H2) Logic rigor of thinking will be greater in REM than in S2 sleep; 
H3) In REM and in S2 sleep, the ability to appreciate bizarre features will be low,  
H4) Dream bizarreness will relate to both illogical elements as well as novel item-
context associations (i.e., context novelty) within the dreamed environment for both 
REM and stage 2 mentation.  
 
  However, phenomenological observations pertaining to the modulation of 
logical reasoning during dreaming—in this case whether dream cognitions are 
predominately logical or illogical, and whether or not the illogical nature of dream 
bizarreness is appreciated—are lacking. The extent to which dream bizarreness has its 
basis in violations of logic or unusual item-context relationships is also unknown. To 
address these issues, we awakened participants from REM and S2 sleep and had them 
assess their dream cognitions immediately for a) the presence and nature of bizarreness, 
b) the degree to which bizarreness was appreciated, and c) the degree to which they 
were thinking logically during the dream. 
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Methods 
Participants 
 Thirteen female and 1 male participants aged 21-32 years (M=23.4±6.2) were 
recruited by advertisement. They reported having no history of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders, or substance abuse, and all reported being free of sleep and 
dreaming disturbances. The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of Sacré-
Coeur Hospital. Written and verbal consent was obtained from all participants who 
were compensated $75 for their time.  
 
Polysomnographic recordings 
 All participants were instructed to avoid drinking caffeine and taking naps on 
experimental days. After arriving at the laboratory, they were situated in an acoustically 
isolated, electrically shielded room containing a single bed. The polysomnograph and 
other controls were housed in an adjacent control room where an experimenter was 
present at all times. An infrared video camera and microphone ensured that participants 
were monitored visually and acoustically at all times. Sleep recordings were performed 
with a 16-channel montage that sampled the electroencephalogram (EEG) at a 
frequency of 256Hz using international 10–20 electrode placements C3, C4, O1 and O2 
(referred to A1 and re-referenced offline to linked ears), eye movements (two channels 
each for horizontal and vertical eye movements), electromyogram (2 submental and 
right tibialis EMG), oral-nasal airflow, and electrocardiogram. Recordings were 
performed using Harmonie version 4.1 (Stellate Systems, Montréal, Québec, Canada) 
and were scored for sleep stages manually according to Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968) 
criteria by an experienced polysomnographic technician who had not conducted the 
sleep recordings and who was blind to the purposes of the study. 
 
Procedures 
 Participants spent 3 nights in the laboratory including an adaptation night for 
habituation to the laboratory. Nights 2 and 3 involved 4 awakenings each per night, for 
a total of 8 awakenings, half from REM sleep and half from S2 sleep. Awakenings were 
conducted both early (2nd or 3rd cycle) and late (4th or 5th cycle), and were 
counterbalanced across participants. Awakenings took place using a 500Hz 80dB 0.5-
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second tone after 10 minutes of S2 or REM sleep had elapsed. After awakenings, the 
experimenter communicated immediately with the participant by intercom to collect a 
verbal mentation report and his/her ratings of this mentation.  
 
Content rating scales 
 Upon awakening, participants were told: “Please describe what was going on in 
your mind before the tone”. If no mental activity could be recalled, they were instructed 
to try to remember any mental activity for 5 minutes, after which they could go back to 
sleep. After describing their mentation, they verbally responded to probes concerning 
specific attributes of the mentation. Alpha activity was closely monitored on the EEG at 
this time to ensure that subjects remained awake. Responses were recorded on tape and 
later transcribed. To avoid ‘secondary elaboration’ and other demand characteristics 
(Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995), participants were also asked to rate various perceptual 
and emotional features of mentation (e.g., visual intensity) in addition to the cognitive 
variables of interest. Prior to the 1st experimental night, participants were given detailed 
instructions about the scales by the principal investigator to ensure that they fully 
understood the features being measured. Bizarreness was described to participants as 
“events, situations, people or objects outside the conceivable expectations of waking 
life”, a definition loosely based on Snyder (1970). The questions pertaining to the 
variables of interest were: 
 
1.1: Did you have any thoughts in your experience? Yes/No 
1.2: How logical were your thoughts? 1 (not at all logical) to 9 (very logical).  
1.3: Did your thoughts relate to something in the dream? Yes/No; What was it? Open-
ended 
2.1: To what extent was your experience bizarre? 1 (not at all  
bizarre) to 9 (extremely bizarre); What was bizarre? Open-ended 
2.2: During your experience, at what point were you aware that it was bizarre? 1 (not at  
all aware) to 9 (fully aware) 
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 For each participant, scores from multiple awakenings were averaged to 
produce mean scores. For yes/no type questions, “no” responses were coded as 0 and 
“yes” responses as 1. Paired t-tests were used for all comparisons unless otherwise 
mentioned. Only reports in which an experience with mentation (defined as presence of 
hallucinatory or cognitive activity) was identified were used in the analyses. Similarly, 
only instances for which bizarreness was present were included in the analyses 
pertaining to extent of awareness of bizarreness. Mentation reports were recorded and 
transcribed. An independent judge categorized the mentation reports containing 
bizarreness into four categories: 1) bizarreness relates to a violation of logic (e.g., 
defying the laws of physics, distortions of shape or size (see Cicogna et al., 2006) that 
defy logic, 2) bizarreness relates to a novel item-context relationship (the relationship 
between the item and the context is novel and unusual, and not the item or context per 
se), 3) bizarreness relates to another factor not included in categories 1 or 2, and 4) the 
mentation report lacks sufficient information to properly categorize within the previous 
three categories. Categories 1 to 3 were not considered mutually exclusive. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Group scores were compared with T-tests unless otherwise noted.  Because some 
participants did not report mentation or scores for target variables (particularly in S2), 
the number of participants included in each analysis is as follows: REM bizarreness (N = 
13), S2 bizarreness (N = 8), REM logical thinking (N = 10) and S2 logical thinking (N = 
8). 
Results 
 In total, 86 awakenings were conducted, 55 (64%) of which contained mentation 
(38 REM, 88%; 17 S2, 38%). Forty-nine reports contained visual hallucinations (35 
REM; 14 S2) and 21 contained thinking (14 REM; 7 S2). 
 
Thinking 
 As predicted by hypothesis 1, a one sample T-test revealed that ratings of logical 
rigor for S2 and REM (M = 8.30, SD = 1.12) were significantly higher than the middle 
value of the scale (5.00; t(8) = 10.11, p = .001). Thoughts were considered very logical 
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(7, 8 or 9 out of 9) in 19 cases (91%), with the remaining 2 cases (9%) scored 5 and 
6 (see Table 2).  
 Contrary to hypothesis 2, no difference was found between REM and S2 
mentation for the presence of thoughts (REM: M = 0.60, SD = 0.32; S2: M = 0.66, SD 
= 0.37; t(8) = .676, p = .51) or the logical rigor of thoughts (REM: M = 8.42, SD = 1.20; 
S2: M = 8.06, SD = 0.94; t(5) = .55, p = .606). Out of 21 reports containing thinking, 19 
(90%) also contained visual hallucinations. When hallucinations and thoughts co-
occurred, participants reported that their thoughts were related to the visual 
hallucinations in 18 of 19 cases (94%).  
 
---Insert Table 2 about here--- 
 
Bizarreness 
 Of the 49 reports with content, 35 (71%) contained some degree of bizarreness. 
As shown in Table 2, there was a large variability in the degree to which participants 
characterized their dream as containing bizarre elements. Of the 35 reports containing 
bizarreness, for 18 (51%) no awareness of this bizarreness during the dream was 
reported, and for only 2 (6%) was the bizarreness fully appreciated. In accordance with 
hypothesis 3, a one sample t-test revealed that ratings of awareness of bizarreness (M = 
2.70 SD = 2.27) were significantly lower than the middle value of the scale (5.00; t(11) 
= .-3.64, p = .003).  
 No stage differences were found for the degree of bizarreness (REM: M = 3.94, 
SD = 1.61; S2: M = 3.14, SD = 2.53; t(6) = .640, p = .546) or the degree of awareness 
of bizarreness (REM: M = 2.46, SD = 1.72; S2: M = 3.46, SD = 3.22; t(6) = -.471, p = 
.670). For all 49 mentation reports containing visual content (100%), participants 
reported not being aware that they were dreaming. 
 Of the 35 dreams rated as bizarre, dream bizarreness was judged to be the result 
of both a violation of context and of logic in 9 cases, a violation of logic alone in 4 
cases, and a violation of context alone in 16 cases (see table 3). In 6 cases the 
participant did not give sufficient information to properly evaluate the nature of the 
bizarreness. There was not a single case where the judge felt that neither violations of 
logic or context could properly explain the nature of the dreamed bizarreness.  
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Discussion 
 The results demonstrate a sleep-specific dissociation in cognitive ability in 
which the ability to think logically is maintained while the ability to critically examine 
illogical features and appreciate the novelty of item-in-context relationships within the 
hallucinatory environment is diminished. Participants awakened from REM and S2 
sleep characterized their thinking during dreaming as logically sound while, at the same 
time, reported a diminished ability to appreciate the illogical nature of the dream events. 
These findings suggest that cognition in these stages of sleep is characterized by a 
dissociation between the production of logic (the ability to generate logical thoughts) 
and the validation of logic (the ability to evaluate whether something is logical or not).  
 Because a specific aspect of logical thinking was found to be diminished during 
REM and S2 dreaming, brain areas known to be deactivated at these times may be 
associated with this particular deficit of logical thinking. REM (Maquet et al., 2005) and 
S2 sleep (Kaufmann et al., 2006) are characterized by the deactivation of prefrontal 
areas associated with logical thinking tasks, namely the MFG (Goel et al., 2003; 2004; 
Luo et al., 2003) and IFG (Goel & Dolan 2003; 2004; Parsons & Osherson, 2001; Luo 
et al., 2003). Fangmeier et al., (2006) examined the neural correlates of three temporally 
separable phases of a logical deduction task and found the MFG to be involved 
specifically in evaluating logical statements as true or false. Similarly, the IFG is 
associated with evaluating anomalous information; for example, the left IFG is 
implicated in evaluation of sentences with conceptual (vs. syntactic) anomalies 
(Kuperberg et al., 2003), anomalous (vs. conventional) metaphors (Ahrens et al., 2007), 
nonsense (vs. literal or metaphorical) sentences (Stringaris et al., 2007) and anomalous 
information in an arithmetic task (Chen et al., 2007). Because dream bizarreness 
commonly involves both an anomaly of information and a violation of logic, 
deactivation of the IFG and MFG in REM and S2 sleep offers a parsimonious 
neurophysiological account of the diminished ability to process (i.e., become aware of) 
bizarreness in sleep mentation. Despite this reduction in cognitive ability, however, 
brain regions found by Fangmeier et al. (2006) to be involved in the production of 
logical conclusions, i.e., the processing and integrating of premises into a single unified 
conclusion, remain active in REM and S2 sleep and thus likely allow the dreamer to 
  
152
think logically (see Table 1). The unusual (and seemingly paradoxical) dissociation 
in cognitive ability suggested by the current results is thus explained, at least in part, by 
the unusual pattern of cerebral activity known to characterize sleep (see Figure 1).  
---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
 
 Bizarre features in the environment were not only described as violations of 
logic (51%) but also as unusual item-in-context associations (86%) and often as a 
combination of both (55%) (see table 3 for examples). In all cases (excluding 6 cases 
that lacked sufficient information to rate), dream bizarreness could be adequately 
explained by either violations in logic or unusual item-in-context associations, 
suggesting that most dream-related bizarreness adequately fits within these two 
dimensions.  
 While sleep-related prefrontal and parietal deactivations may account for the 
diminished ability to appreciate violations of logic, we further speculated that sleep-
related modulations in hippocampal activity underlie a diminished ability to appreciate 
the novelty of unusual item-in-context relationships. While the types of novelty 
detection that are attributed to the hippocampus are still debated (see Kumaran & 
Maguire, 2007, for review), there is compelling evidence indicating a critical role for 
the hippocampus in detecting and encoding contextual novelty, i.e., an event or stimulus 
is unexpected given the context in which it occurs (Halgren et al., 1980; Knight, 1996; 
Kishiyama et al., 2004; Yamaguchi et al., 2004; Harrison et al., 2006). It is believed that 
the unique circuitry of the hippocampus enables it to compare ongoing sensory 
experiences with stored representations of past experiences (Hasselmo and Schnell, 
1994; Lisman and Otmakhova, 2001). According to this view, the CA1 region of the 
hippocampus receives two inputs from the entorhinal cortex: 1) a direct connection 
representing actual sensory information from associative areas of the cortex and 2) 
information that has passed through recurrent networks of the DG and CA3 
hippocampal areas responsible for representing associations previously encoded. The 
CA1 region thus carries out critical evaluations of overlap between stored 
representations and ongoing sensory information, with mismatches indicating 
contextual novelty. However, a study by Montgomery et al., (2008) found that during 
REM sleep theta and gamma coherence between the CA1 area and DC/CA3 networks is 
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reduced. We thus suggest that the partial isolation of CA1 from DC/CA3 networks 
observed in REM sleep may explain the current finding of a diminished appreciation of 
dream bizarreness that is rooted in contextual novelty.  
As for hippocampal activity in stage 2 sleep, very little is known because studies 
have focused primarily on REM and slow wave sleep (e.g., Montgomery et al., 2008). 
However, one study has shown that the hippocampus shows greater activation during 
stage 2 sleep than either SWS or NREM stage 1 sleep (Kaufmann et al., 2006), 
suggesting an activation comparable to that in REM sleep. The current finding of a 
diminished ability to appreciate contextual novelty in both stage 2 and REM sleep is 
thus consistent with the possibility that hippocampal functioning underlying contextual 
novelty detection is modulated during stage 2 sleep dreaming in a manner similar to that 
during REM sleep dreaming.  
 In sum, previous research has shown that fronto-parietal areas may underlie 
violations of logic, while hippocampal circuits may underlie violations of context. Here 
we show that dream bizarreness appears to consist exclusively of violations of either 
logic or context or both, and that participants report a diminished ability to detect these 
violations of logic and context while dreaming in a manner predicted by sleep-
dependent modulations of fronto-parietal and hippocampal areas.  
 This particular constraint on cognition during dreaming may allow a unique 
processing of information by which novel situations and stimuli are readily considered 
and acted upon regardless of how improbable, bizarre or illogical they may be. 
Numerous artistic endeavours and scientific breakthroughs are attributed to dreams 
(Maquet & Ruby, 2004) and perhaps our nightly bouts of extreme open-mindedness, in 
the face of hallucinatory environments that bind multiple memory sources into a 
constant flow (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005), may underlie the relationship between 
dreaming and creativity. How the unique cognition of REM and S2 sleep may be 
conducive to divergent thinking is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Absence of sleep stage differences in logical thinking 
 In addition to the patterns of frontal and parietal deactivation characterizing 
REM sleep (Maquet et al., 2005), S2 sleep also features the deactivation of two brain 
areas (left anterior cingulate, left parahippocampus; Kaufmann et al., 2006) associated 
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with the integration of premises to generate a logical conclusion (Fangmeier et al., 
2006). We therefore hypothesized that S2 sleep thinking would be characterized by less 
logical rigor than would REM sleep thinking whereas thinking in both states of sleep 
would be similarly deficient in appreciating illogical elements within the dream. The 
results demonstrate that while the ability to detect the illogical nature of dream 
bizarreness is, in fact, equally diminished in both S2 and REM sleep, contrary to our 
expectations the logical rigor of thoughts is similarly high in both stages. This may be 
due to the fact that the S2-specific deactivations of brain regions implicated in the 
“premise integration” phase of Fangmeier et al.’s (2006) paradigm (see Table 1 for 
details) is limited to 1) the left anterior cingulate, thus perhaps leaving the right anterior 
cingulate to compensate, and 2) the left parahippocampus, which may reflect the spatial 
nature of Fangmeier et al.’s (2006) experimental paradigm and not logical processing 
per se. However, interpretation of these results is limited by the small number of S2 
reports. 
 
Implications for state-dependent thinking  
 The notion of a sleep-specific dissociation between the maintained ability to 
produce logical thinking and the decreased ability to evaluate the illogical nature of 
bizarre elements, as predicted on the basis of known functional neuroanatomy and its 
modulation in REM and S2 sleep, provides a novel neurocognitive explication as to 
how dreaming is similar to, yet also different from, waking cognition.  
 The current findings nuance the controversy over whether thinking in REM 
sleep is logical or illogical. Indeed, because the validation of logic is deficient in REM 
sleep it is understandable why some authors, focusing on the delusion-like aspects of 
dream cognition, conclude that thinking is illogical in dreaming (Hobson, 2004; Muzur 
et al., 2002). At the same time, that the production of logic is functional in REM sleep 
explains why others have found evidence of rational thinking in dream reports (Wolman 
& Kozmova, 2007). Additionally, the observed sleep-specific diminishment in 
bizarreness detection may explain discrepant results in the literature concerning the 
extent to which cognition is modulated across mind-brain states. Studies supporting the 
idea that certain aspects of sleep cognition are wake-like (Kahan, 1994; Kahan, 
LaBerge, Levitan & Zimbardo, 1997; Purcell, Mullington, Moffitt, Hoffmann & Pigeau, 
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1986) have focused on cognitive accomplishments during dreaming and thus have 
not measured the ability to appreciate bizarreness. In contrast, studies supporting the 
view that cognition in dreaming is deficient (Hobson, Hoffman, Helfand & Kostner, 
1987; Scarone et al., 2007; Renvonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995) may well have confounded 
measurement of the ability to detect bizarreness with other measurements of cognition. 
These authors conclude that thinking in dreaming is characterised by “cognitive 
bizarreness,” but it remains unclear what specific elements of thinking are bizarre. For 
example, in the Hobson et al., (1987) and Scarone et al., (2007) studies, bizarreness of 
thought and bizarreness of the dream environment are not independently measured. As 
demonstrated by the present results, this distinction is critical: thinking during dreaming 
seems only to be bizarre in that the thinker cannot appreciate the bizarreness of the 
hallucinatory environment. The current study therefore underscores the importance of 
considering dream imagery (i.e., the hallucinatory environment perceived by the 
dreamer) and dream cognition (i.e., the internal thoughts of the dreamer during the 
dream) as separate in the same way as the environment and cognition are separate in 
waking life. For example, because in 94% of cases participants report that, while 
dreaming, their thoughts relate to the hallucinatory environment, the current findings 
argue against the widespread notion that “the sleeping brain can, in fact, either generate 
its own perceptions or it can think about them, but it cannot do both at the same time.” 
(Scarone et al., 2007).  
 In this regard, our findings are consistent with early examinations of dreaming 
cognition by Aristotle (350 BC) and Descartes (1637) in that the relationship between 
perceptions and internal thoughts are described as essentially similar in waking and 
dreaming, i.e., we reflect on what we perceive whether the environment is hallucinatory 
or “real.” Here we clarify how this relationship is modulated in REM and S2 sleep by 
demonstrating that in dreaming, like in the waking state, internal thoughts about the 
environment are logically sound while, unlike in the waking state, our ability to 
evaluate the novel nature of item-context relationships and the illogical aspects of that 
environment is deficient.  
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Table 1. Overlap between regions implicated in logical thinking and regions hypoactive 
in REM sleep. 
Phases of Deductive 
Reasoning Brain regions involved 1 
Status in REM 
Sleep vs. Wake 
Status in Stage 2 
Sleep vs. Wake 
Processing 
 
Middle occipital gyrus L: BA 
37 R: BA 37 
No Change2 No Change6 
Inferior occipital gyrus L: BA 
19 R: BA 19 
No Change2 No Change6 
Inferior occipital No Change2 No Change6 
Integration Medial prefrontal R: BA 10  No Change2 No Change6 
Cuneus R: 18 No 
Change3,4,5 
No Change6 
Fusiform gyrus L: 37/20 R:19 No 
Change3,4,5 
No Change6 
Anterior cingulate (R & L) BA 
32 
Increase 3,4,5 Decrease (L) 
Parahippocampal gyrus (L) BA 
36 
Increase 4,5 Decrease (L) 
Cerebellum  No Change3,4 No Change6 
Validation 
 
Middle frontal gyrus L: BA 6/9  
R: BA 6 
Decrease2 Decrease6 
Precentral gyrus L: BA 6 Decrease2 No Change 
Medial prefrontal BA 32 No Change2 Decrease6 
Inferior parietal lobule BA 40 Decrease2 Decrease (R) 
Precuneus Decrease3 Decrease 
1 Fangmeier et al., 2006; 2 Maquet et al., 2005; 3 Maquet et al., 1996; 4 Nofzinger et al., 1996; 5 Braun et 
al., 1997; 6 Kaufmann et al., 2006 
 
  
158
Table 2. Distributions of ratings for bizarreness, awareness of bizarreness and logical 
rigor.  
 
 
 
 
Degree of 
Bizarreness 
Awareness of 
Bizarreness Logical rigor 
Rating REMa Stage 2 REM 
Stage 
2 REM 
Stage 
2  
1 12 9 13 5 0 0 
2 2 2 0 2 0 0 
3 9 1 5 0 0 0 
4 1 0 2 0 0 0 
5 8 2 2 1 1 0 
6 2 1 2 0 0 1 
7 3 1 0 0 3 0 
8 0 0 0 1 3 4 
9 1 2 2 0 6 2 
Mean 
(SD) 
3.94 
(1.61) 
3.14 
(2.53) 
2.46 
(1.72) 
3.46 
(3.22) 
8.42 
(1.20) 
8.06 
(0.94) 
aEach instance represents a single dream report. 
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Table 3. Examples of bizarreness as a violation of context and/or logic. 
Example of violation of 
context 
Someone is selling cars at a student cafe. 
Participant 3; late night Stage 2.  
Example of violation of logic Participant ends up in the same bar, no matter what 
direction is taken. Participant 5; early night REM. 
Example of a violation of logic 
and context 
Participant is at the neighbour’s house in the middle 
of the night. The walls are made of cardboard. 
Participant 6; early night REM. 
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Figure 1. Dissociation of the production and the validation of logic and their status in 
REM and S2 sleep cognition. 
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CHAPTER V  
General discussion 
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Discussion of articles I and II 
 The objective of the study was to examine the effect of REM deprivation and 
dreaming on the consolidation of the “what”, “when”, “where” and autonoetic 
components of episodic memory. Contrary to our expectations, we found limited 
evidence of a link between episodic memory and REM sleep and of an association 
between episodic memory and dreaming. Factual/perceptual and temporal features of 
episodic memory, as well as autonoetic awareness, were not associated with dreaming 
or with REM sleep as hypothesized. Rather, the results of articles I and II suggest that 
different aspects of episodic memories are associated with different stages of sleep, 
echoing previous descriptions of complex relationships between tasks and sleep 
phenomena (Fogel et al., 2007).  
 SWS was found to be associated with the consolidation of factual/perceptual 
features of the task. Similarly, SWS was associated with improved memory for spatial 
elements of the task in the low emotion but not the high emotion condition. SWS may 
be conducive to the consolidation of memories by virtue of the neocortical-hippocampal 
(NC-HC) communication co-occurring with sharp wave ripples known to be associated 
with plasticity at this time. In a prevailing view of declarative memory, the hippocampal 
complex processes the spatiotemporal context of memory while its perceptual features 
are dealt with in neocortical areas. Whether the memory trace migrates to neocortical 
areas over time (Squire, 1986, Squire et al., 2004), or remains dependent on the 
hippocampus (Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997) is a matter of current debate, but both 
views share the idea that spatial features of a memory are largely (at least initially) 
hippocampus dependent, while perceptual features are dependent on HC-NC 
interactions. During SWS, replay of pre-sleep activity in the HC (Wilson & 
McNaughton, 1994; Lee & Wilson, 2002; Ji & Wilson, 2007) is synchronized with 
replay in NC areas such as the prefrontal (Peyrache et al., 2009), parietal (Qin, et al., 
1997) and visual cortices (Ji & Wilson, 2007). This HC-NC replay is synchronized to 
plasticity-inducing (Bramham & Srebro, 1989) sharp wave ripples, which have been 
associated with learning (Ego-Stengel & Wilson, 2009; Girardeau, 2009; Ramadan, 
2009). In addition, the slow EEG oscillations characterizing SWS may have a direct 
link with consolidation of declarative memories, as suggested by the finding that 
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modulating the amount and amplitude of slow wave oscillations with trans-cranial 
magnetic stimulation (Marshall et al., 2004) or auditory stimulation (Landsness et al., 
2005) produces an increase or a decrease in the recall of declarative materials, 
respectively.  
 The role of SWS in declarative memory processing is also supported by 
numerous studies finding an association between SWS and the learning of spatial tasks 
(Plihal & Born, 1999; Peigneux et al.,2004; Rasch et al., 2007; Rudoy, et al., 2009) and 
word lists (Fowler et al., 1973; Plihal & Born, 1999; Gais et al, 2002; Gais & Born, 
2004). Together, these findings suggest that SWS is ideally suited for the strengthening 
of declarative memories and integrating them within neocortical areas. If the present 
findings of an association between SWS and the consolidation of factual and perceptual 
features of episodic memory (Article I) and low emotion spatial memory (Article II) fit 
well within the current literature, the findings for REM sleep require a more nuanced 
argument. REM sleep was not found to be associated with factual/perceptual and 
temporal features of episodic memory. Rather, %REM was found to be correlated with 
spatial memory for high emotion but not low emotion locations. 
 While hippocampal reactivation of pre-sleep exploratory behavior has been 
found to take place in REM sleep (Louie & Wilson, 2001), unlike in SWS, this replay 
does not involve synchronized NC replay and suggests that the transfer of memories 
from HC to NC does not occur at this time. With the exception of a few studies (e.g., 
Rauchs et al., 2004) and of studies utilizing emotional items, REM sleep is not 
associated with the consolidation of declarative memory in humans. This may explain 
why REM sleep was not associated with factual/perceptual and temporal aspects of 
episodic memory in the present study. However, REM sleep is characterized by co-
activation of the hippocampus and amygdala, which are particularly synchronized at the 
theta band frequencies (Pare & Gaudreau, 1996; Hegde et al., 2010). Because emotional 
memory formation in the waking state involves a similar co-activation (Hamann, et al., 
1999; Canli., 2000; Dolcos et al., 2004) and theta-band synchronization (Seidenbecher, 
et al., 2003; Pape et al., 2005) of the hippocampus and amygdala, similar emotional 
declarative memory processing may occur in the two states. In the waking state, theta 
frequency stimulation characterizes synaptic plasticity in both the hippocampus (Larson 
& Lynch, 1986; Staubli & Lynch, 1987) and amygdala (Heinbockel & Pape, 2000; 
  
169
Pollandt et al., 2003). During REM sleep, theta synchronization between the 
hippocampus and amygdala is even further enhanced during episodes of increased 
PGO-wave density (Karashima et al., 2010), which is in turn associated with increased 
plasticity–related gene expression in the hippocampus and amygdala (Datta, Li & 
Auerbach, 2008). These findings are consistent with the notion that REM sleep is 
neurobiologically suited to process emotional memories.    
 However, it is less clear why emotion and REMD only influenced spatial aspects 
of the episodic memory task. Perhaps features that critically require processing from 
both the amygdala and the hippocampus, such as the spatial features of emotional 
memories, are highly sensitive to REM deprivation. These concerns notwithstanding, 
we have demonstrated, for the first time, that whether a task (in this case, a spatial task) 
is associated with SWS or REM sleep depends on its emotional value.  
 Dreaming of the VR task was associated with improved performance in spatial 
aspects of the episodic recall task, thus supporting the recent finding that dreaming of a 
spatial task at sleep onset and stage 2 sleep predicts sleep dependent learning on this 
task (Wamsley et al., 2010). Here we demonstrate that this may be specific to spatial 
learning, although it is not clear why this is the case. Nevertheless, spatial memory 
seems to be particular in that for this study it is associated with REM sleep, emotional 
memories, and dreaming. The notion that spatial aspects of episodic memories are 
central in scene construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007) may relate to this set of 
findings.  
 An informal analysis of dream reports indicated that isolated elements of the task 
were incorporated within dreaming. For example, one of the events of the negative task 
is a wild cat attacking a character. A participant dreamed of being chased through the 
jungle by a wild cat. In another example, the participant mentioned that the building she 
was in had some of the same features as the buildings in the neutral task. In all cases, 
incorporations related to select characteristics of the task (an item, character, structure, 
task objective). Moreover, these isolated elements were mixed with non-task related 
elements in the dream.  
 The tendency for REM sleep and dreaming to loosen associations between 
memory items may underlie the findings in the present study that, with the exception of 
spatial features of emotional episodic memory, REM sleep was not associated with the 
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consolidation of episodic memory and that dreaming was not generally associated 
with episodic memory consolidation. Previous research indicates that REM sleep is 
associated with increased performance in a creative performance task; it appears to 
prime associated networks and enable the integration of unassociated information (Cai 
et al., 2009). It is also associated with a bias towards weak, as opposed to strong, 
semantic associations (Stickgold et al., 1999). This suggests that REM sleep is involved 
in loosening or suppressing previous associations and even creating new ones. 
Phenomenological observations also suggest that dreaming is composed, in part, of 
fragments of episodic memory that are rearranged and result in bizarre combinations. 
Indeed, we observed that the VR-task was incorporated into dreaming in a fragmented 
manner, with isolated elements of the task being interwoven with other unrelated 
elements. REM sleep may not be suited for the consolidation of episodic memories, but 
instead be suited to the undoing of previous associations and the forging of new ones. 
This possibility was examined in article III (see below). 
 Autonoetic awareness during the episodic memory task was found to be 
associated with stage 2 during the last third of the night. This finding suggests that 
previous reports of an association between late night sleep and autonoetic awareness at 
recall (Rauchs et al., 2004) may not be related to REM sleep as the authors propose, but 
rather to late night stage 2 sleep. Although late night stage 2 sleep is characterized by 
increased spindle activity (Jankel & Niedermeyer, 1985; Guazzelli et al., 1986), which 
in turn is associated with plasticity, it is not clear how this plasticity may translates into 
an improvement in the ability to view spatial information with “the mind's eye.” 
Nevertheless, this result suggests that REMD is a useful method for gauging the relative 
contributions of different sleep stages. This may give REMD an advantage over the late 
night-early night method used in many studies; the latter authors assume, incorrectly, 
that late night sleep selectively favours REM sleep. But, in fact, stage 2 sleep is also 
abundant at this time. As demonstrated by the current results where a strong association 
between Stage 2 in the final third of the night and autonoetic awareness was found, the 
time of night may be a critical factor in the relationship between a sleep stage and the 
processing of a task or task element. 
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 Overall, the results of article II are consistent with predictions based on 
phylogenetic parallels between the evolution of memory systems and sleep stages, as 
described below.  
 
Phylogenetic relationships between sleep and memory 
 Research suggests that fish species such as salmonid (Nordgreen et al., 2010) 
and teleosts (Portavella et al. 2003; Nilsson et al. 2008) form declarative representations 
suggestive of semantic-like ‘knowing what’ knowledge about the relationship between 
food and light cues. Episodic-like memory, on the other hand, seems to be restricted to 
mammals and birds. Specifically, flexible knowledge of the ‘what’ ‘where’ and ‘when’ 
of events have been found in scrub-jays (Clayton & Dickinson, 2003), magpies 
(Zinkivskay at al., 2009), rats (Babb & Crystal, 2006) and great apes (Martin-Ordas et 
al., 2010). However, these experiments measured “episodic-like memory” because they 
could not assess phenomenological features of episodic memory. It has been argued that 
autonetic awareness is uniquely human (Tulving, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) 
and has played a large and unique role in hominid evolution (Suddendorf, 2006; 
Suddendorf & Corballis 2009).  
 To the extent that SWS and REM sleep are implicated in memory processing, it 
might be expected that animal species displaying SWS and REM sleep possess types of 
memory that are absent in species lacking SWS or REM sleep. As described earlier, 
only birds and mammals are endowed with both episodic-like memory and SWS and 
REM sleep. In contrast, the autonoetic awareness component of episodic memory has 
only been demonstrated in humans, who may be also unique (as primates) in expressing 
stage 2 sleep.  
Indeed, stage 2 sleep may be unique to primates in that it occupies a very large 
proportion (approximately half) of each sleep session. In rats and cats an intermediate 
stage characterized by high-amplitude anterior cortex spindles and low-frequency 
hippocampal theta rhythm precedes and sometimes follows REM sleep (Gottesmann, 
1996). However, such intermediate sleep only lasts 1-5 seconds in rats (1-3 seconds in 
cats), is present before REM sleep 75% of the time (27% in cats), and is only present 
after REM sleep 15% of the time (4% in cats). Intermediate sleep is therefore a very 
brief transitory period quite different from the extended episodes of Stage 2 sleep in 
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primates. To my knowledge the question of whether extended Stage 2 sleep is 
unique to primates has not been directly addressed, although Gottesmann's (1996) 
findings demonstrating its absence in rats and cats, but its presence in monkeys (e.g., 
Reite et al., 1976) suggests that it may well be.   
Together, these observations support the suggestion that the evolution of SWS 
and REM sleep in birds and mammals co-occurred with the evolution of episodic 
memory and, therefore, that the two are functionally related. Similarly, the evolution of 
stage 2 sleep in humans may have co-occurred with the evolution of the autonoetic 
awareness component of episodic memory. It is therefore predicted that SWS and REM 
sleep are involved in the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ elements of episodic memory 
while Stage 2 is involved in the autonoetic component of episodic memory. The present 
findings of associations between SWS and the “what” aspects of episodic memory, and 
of stage 2 and its autonoetic component, are consistent with these predictions and 
support the notion of functional relationships between the evolution of specialized sleep 
states and that of complex declerative memory.   
 
Discussion of article III 
 The objective of the study was to evaluate whether dreaming involves 
hippocampally-mediated, declarative memory processes. The study employed a highly 
trained participant to provide detailed descriptions of dreaming and its memory sources. 
We applied a method that produces multiple, short, well-remembered dreams during a 
period of NREM1 in which features of REM sleep (e.g., theta activity) are found 
(NREM1Ф).  
 Awakenings gave rise to reports of vivid dreaming depicting items that were 
well integrated within a three dimensional environment. These qualities of imagery, i.e., 
“scene construction”, are indicative of hippocampal involvement (Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007) and consistent with the claim that the hippocampus is involved in NREM1Ф 
dreaming at this time.  
 The results also suggest that during dreaming new associations are forged 
between distally related items and that multiple memory sources for a single dream 
appear to be selected on the basis of both semantic proximity and temporal distance. It 
may be that the novel co-occurrence of previously unrelated items within the spatial-
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temporal context of the dream reflects a mechanism by which offline integrative 
encoding occurs, a hippocampally-mediated process by which items from separate 
events are merged into a shared mnemonic representation (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008). 
 While subjects usually do not remember their NREM1Ф dreams unless they are 
awakened at this time, here we demonstrate that they are nonetheless vividly perceived. 
NREM1Ф is characterized by the appearance of saccade-like slow eye movements 
(Porte, 2004) suggesting that attentional mechanisms may be active at this time. 
Furthermore this state is characterized by the disappearance of the N300 mismatch 
negativity, which suggests a switch from external to internal processing of stimuli 
(Nittono et al., 2001).  
 The common belief (e.g., Freud, 1900) that dreams draw upon and combine 
multiple memory sources to produce coherent, often creative, imagery may be 
particularly true for sleep onset dreaming. Numerous examples illustrate how 
individuals gain important insights into a creative problem from sleep onset dreaming. 
For instance, Edison and Dali, known for their creative use of sleep onset imagery, were 
highly practiced at recalling sleep onset imagery, each having developed a technique for 
arousing themselves from such imagery and applying it to problem-solving (Dali, 1963; 
Mavromatis, 1987). Such anecdotes illustrate that sleep onset imagery may be usefully 
applied to the question of the memory sources of dreaming. Not only does it give access 
to fragments of episodic memories (e.g., Kekule’s images of ‘floating atoms’) but it is 
in many respects a learnable skill.  
 A curious property of dreams relates to the fact that loosely related associations 
are bound together into coherent representations that are bizarre, yet go unnoticed while 
the dream is unfolding. It is unclear whether this feature of dreaming is indicative of a 
generalized diminishment of cognitive ability or rather a selective reduction of a 
particular aspect of thinking. Moreover, it is unclear whether dream bizarreness reflects 
novel associations between memory items and contexts. Article 4 addresses these 
questions by examining if, during dreaming, the ability to appreciate bizarreness is 
selectively diminished. The study also examines the question of whether dream 
bizarreness is the result of novel associations. 
 
Discussion of article 4 
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 It is widely believed that during dreaming we do not realize that we are 
dreaming. Is our dream self, as Allen Rechtschaffen (1978) claimed, “isolated and 
single minded”? The fact that during dreaming we usually do not realize that bizarre 
events and objects are bizarre has led to the conclusion (e.g., Hobson, 2004) that the 
dreamer is unable to think logically. Such a pronounced deficit would appear to 
contradict the notion of cognitive equivalency between waking and dreaming states 
(Kahan and LaBerge, 1994).  
 However, apart from bizarre features, dreamers may be deceived into thinking a 
dream is reality because the perceptual qualities of the dreaming environment appear 
extremely real. Indeed, the highly efficient reality mimesis of perceptions during 
dreaming (Nielsen and Stenstrom, 2005; Renvonsuo, 2000) may render it impossible to 
distinguish dreaming from waking on the basis of perceptual qualities alone. As 
suggested by studies of lucid dreaming (LaBerge, 1985), dreamers can only become 
aware that they are in fact dreaming in reaction to inconsistencies among the elements 
of the dream, but not simply on the basis of the quality of the apparent percepts in the 
dream. Thus, what is particular about critical reasoning in sleep may be that bizarre 
elements within the dream environment cannot be questioned as long as they are 
embedded in a perceptually authentic medium.  
 This hypothesis is tested in article 4 by waking participants from REM sleep and 
directly asking them if, during dreaming, their thoughts were logical and whether they 
could appreciate the bizarre nature of their dreams. In addition, we examined if dream 
bizarreness is the result of novel associations between memory items as previously 
suggested.  
 The results suggest that participants do not appreciate bizarre features of the 
dream environment, but rather report thinking logically about them. In addition, the 
results indicate that dreamed bizarreness seems to involve elements that are out of 
context, that is, items that are associated with novel contexts. This adds to our previous 
observation (article III) that dream bizarreness often results from novel associations 
between items. Together, the findings suggest that bizarreness in dreaming is the result 
of novel associations between items and between items and their contexts. This is 
consistent with previous findings indicating that REM sleep is conducive to the 
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production of weak, as opposed to strong, associations among memory elements 
(Stickgold et al., 1999).  
 If the logical rigor of thinking is maintained during dreaming, why is the ability 
to detect dream bizarreness absent or diminished? One explanation is that while 
bizarreness is inherent to the production of dreaming, the successful detection of 
bizarreness may induce a form of self-reflection that prompts awakening. Indeed, lucid 
dreaming (the realization that one is dreaming while dreaming) is often achieved when 
one appreciates that something is bizarre in the dreamed environment (LaBerge, 1985). 
Lucid dreaming is known to produce involuntary awakenings (LaBerge, 1985) and is 
associated with high alpha activity (Ogilvie et al., 1982; Tyson et al., 1984), a marker of 
arousal from sleep (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968). It is thus possible that diminished 
awareness of bizarreness may protect sleep from the arousing effect of knowing that 
one is dreaming. Also, upon reaching a lucid dreaming state the individual sometimes 
changes the content of the dream (Kahan & LaBerge, 1994), which may be problematic 
if the content of the dream is of functional importance (c.f., Freud, 1900; Revonsuo, 
2000). Or, a function of dreaming may depend upon the individual truly believing that 
their current dream situation is reality. For example, believing that the dreamed 
environment is real is thought to ensure that engagement and emotional responses are 
maximised (Nielsen & Levin, 2008).  
 Finally, it is suggested that the diminished ability to detect bizarreness may 
relate to altered functioning of the hippocampus. The role of the hippocampus in 
novelty detection is dependent upon communication between CA1 and DG/CA3 areas 
(Hasselmo and Schnell, 1994; Lisman & Otmakhova, 2001). Diminished gamma and 
theta coherence between CA1 and DG-CA3 networks during REM sleep (Montgomery 
et al., 2008) suggests that the ability of hippocampus to function as an item-item/item-
context novelty detector may be diminished at this time. This suggests that altered 
hippocampal functioning in sleep may not only give rise to bizarreness by binding 
loosely associated memory items, but may also underlie the diminished ability to 
appreciate the resulting bizarreness.  
 
Study limitations 
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 An important limitation of articles I and II lies in the fact that the VR task and 
related memory questionnaire are novel and have not been validated. Second, there was 
no direct measure of state or trait emotional reactivity. Considering the importance of 
emotions in article II, the lack of an emotional measure is a weakness of this study. In 
addition, because of the study's emphasis on REM sleep an adaptation laboratory night 
would have been preferable to avoid the possible confounding effects of the first night 
effect (Lorenzo & Barbanoj, 2002). The study would have also benefited from a greater 
number of male participants, although the two sexes were equally distributed across the 
two groups.  
 A major drawback of article III is the use of a single participant. Conclusions 
drawn from the study are thus tentative and require confirmation. A second weakness of 
this study was that theta activity at sleep onset was (by necessity) visually detected but 
not later confirmed by off-line spectral analysis. A final weakness is that this 
participant's training procedure could have been more systematic documented. 
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, however, the successful use of a single trained 
individual to lay bare important features memory processing in dreams constitutes an 
important proof of principal and paves the way for future group-level studies. 
 A limit of article IV is that only a single judge evaluated whether dream 
bizarreness was the result of a violation of logic or a violation of context. A second 
limit is that, as in articles I and II, participants were predominantly female and thus the 
findings may not generalize to males. 
 
General summary & discussion 
 In summary, our findings and the evidence reviewed here suggest that SWS 
neurophysiology is ideally suited for solidifying existing memory associations while 
REM neurophysiology may be better suited for loosening existing memory associations 
and creating new ones. Indeed, in article I the consolidation of factual/perceptual 
elements of episodic memory was associated with SWS sleep, while REM sleep dreams 
incorporated isolated elements of the VR task that were associated with unrelated 
imagery. In article III, we found evidence that memory elements composing dreams 
reflect distal temporal relationships, consistent with the notion that dreaming is involved 
in loosening existing associations and creating new associations between memory 
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items. It is suggested that dreaming may enable items from temporally distal 
memories to be associated by virtue of their simultaneous appearance within a novel 
spatial-temporal context afforded by the dream. Article 4 also provides evidence that 
dream bizarreness often relates to novel and unusual associations between an item and 
its context and reveals that REM sleep cognition is deficient in a manner such that 
bizarreness is not questioned. Maintenance of the ability to think logically in the dream 
suggests that this deficiency is selective. This cognitive diminishment may allow the 
dreamer to believe that they are perceiving reality and to ensure that they are engaged in 
and attentive toward bizarre item-item and item-context combinations provided by the 
dream.  
 Why does dreaming have such a persuasive tendency to make use of novel and 
bizarre associations? Some authors have suggested the lack of hippocampal 
involvement in dreaming is responsible for bizarre dream features (Stickgold et al., 
2000; Stickgold et al., 2001; Payne and Nadel, 2004). However, the observation that 
scenes are constructed during dreaming in article III suggests that the hippocampus is 
active during dreaming. This leads to the notion that novel and bizarre associations 
between items, and between items and contexts in dreaming are not a sign of a deficient 
binding (Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002) or deficient hippocampal function (Stickgold et al., 
2000; Stickgold et al, 2001; Payne and Nadel, 2004) but rather suggests that this feature 
may serve a function.  
Given that hippocampal plasticity is largely experience dependent (Butz et al., 
2009; Feldman, 2009; Holtmaat and Svoboda, 2009) and modulated by attention 
(Muzzio et al, 2009, Muzzio, Levita et al, 2009), it may be that the subjective 
experience of dreaming plays a causal role in whatever memory functions occur during 
REM sleep. This is because subjective experience provides the hippocampus with an 
attention-engaging experience during which items of semantic value taken from remote 
memories are presented together in close proximity within the same spatiotemporal 
context. Although this experience may not lead to the formation of an episodic memory 
(unless the person is awakened at this time), synaptic weights in hippocampal networks 
may nonetheless undergo modification in a manner similar to the effect of waking 
experience on hippocampal plasticity; namely, strengthening associations between the 
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neural representations of the once distal items by virtue of the temporal and spatial 
proximity afforded by novel item-context configurations during dreaming.  
 The notion that the subjective experience of dreaming could enable plasticity 
echoes David Hartley’s (1749) suggestion that dreaming may alter associations of the 
mind. Today modern neuroscience considers neural ensembles (engrams) as the basis of 
memory, synaptic plasticity as the basis for the formation and modulation of memory 
and experience as the principal driver of synaptic plasticity. It would therefore be highly 
significant if it were demonstrated that the experience of REM sleep dreaming 
modulates cerebral plasticity. In particular, it would suggest a vital function for REM 
sleep and REM sleep dreaming. The following section examines this possibility. 
 
An exploratory review of how dreaming may influence brain plasticity 
 Research presented in this dissertation is consistent with the possibility that, in 
dreams, memory elements are manipulated in a manner that allows for the creation of 
novel, bizarre, item-item and item-context associations. Further, these novel 
associations may be implicated in processes of long-term consolidation. This 
exploratory review examines these possibilities, i.e., the notion that the 
phenomenological aspects of dreaming described in articles I-IV have long-term 
consequences on the plasticity of neural networks. First, the elements required for 
synaptic plasticity are reviewed. Second, whether these elements are present in REM 
sleep and REM sleep dreaming are examined. Finally, possible consequences of 
dreaming-induced plasticity on memory systems are addressed.  
 
Brain plasticity  
 The cellular basis of memory concerns changes in synaptic strength between 
neurons (Bliss & Collingridge, 1993; Bear, 1996). Through synaptic plasticity the 
mature cerebral cortex can modulate its connectivity as a result of experience. Sensory 
experiences can alter the connection strengths of neurons (synaptic plasticity) and 
change the structure of existing networks (structural plasticity) via the formation and 
elimination of synapses (Holtmaat & Svobaoda, 2009)—a process believed to underlie 
long-term memory formation (Bailey & Kandel, 1993). A major mechanism of long-
term synaptic plasticity is long term potentiation (LTP), defined as a long-lasting 
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potentiation of the excitatory post-synaptic potential of fields of two neurons that fire 
in spatial and temporal proximity. This potentiation results in the modulation of 
synaptic strength between two neurons. LTP is found, notably, in the hippocampus, 
amygdala and prefrontal cortex, and it has been suggested that all excitatory synapses in 
mammalian brain may undergo LTP (Malenka & Bear, 2004). The processes of LTP 
can be divided into early and late effects. Early LTP is a calcium-mediated, NMDA-
dependent process that is accomplished without protein synthesis. Late LTP involves 
changes in gene expression and the synthesis of proteins. Resulting proteins are 
believed to contribute to an increased number of dendritic spines and increases in the 
number of synaptic vesicles in both the pre and post-synaptic cell (Lynch, 2004). In 
addition, late LTP is believed to be involved in the production of new synapses (Toni et 
al. 1999; Antonova et al., 2009). Axonal buttons grow, are eliminated or are modified in 
response to experience (Tashiro et al., 2003; De Paola et al., 2003). Axon sprouting is 
observed as a result of environmental enrichment (Galimberti 2006) or spatial learning 
(Ramirez-Amaya 2001; Holahan et al., 2006). In sum, experiences rewire the brain and 
these modifications of neural networks are thought to reflect learning and memory.  
 Long-term depression (LTD) has also been identified as a mechanism of cerebral 
plasticity. Where LTP is involved in encoding novelty, LTD may encode the lack of 
new features (Poe et al., 2000; Romcy-Pereira et al., 2009).  
 
Plasticity in REM sleep 
Several lines of research suggest that neural plasticity can occur during REM 
sleep. First, LTP in the dentate gyrus is readily induced in wake and REM sleep but not 
SWS (Bramham & Srebro, 1989). LTP following avoidance training was also induced 
in REM sleep but not wake (Winson & Abzug, 1977; 1978). Recently, Ravassard et al., 
(2009) found evidence that REM sleep is associated with late, and not early LTP in the 
dorsal hippocampus. Neuromodulatory aspects of REM sleep—increased levels of 
acetylcholine in particular—may also benefit plasticity as this neurotransmitter is 
associated with increased LTP in the hippocampus (Aguiar et al., 2008). Acetylcholine 
is well known to enhance hippocampal plasticity (Jerusalinsky et al., 1997; Power et al., 
2003; Hasselmo, 2006) and has been recently shown to act synergistically with theta 
oscillations to promote neural plasticity (Zhang et al., 2010). While norepinephrine and 
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serotonin are greatly diminished in REM sleep, the brain is flooded with 
acetylcholine— and characterized by dominant theta oscillations— during this stage of 
sleep.  
Second, REM sleep is characterized by plasticity-related genetic expression. 
Specifically, an important experience- and plasticity-related gene, ziff-268, is expressed 
in REM sleep but not SWS (Riberio et al., 1999, 2007). Ziff-268 is reliably induced by 
LTP (Cole et al., 1989) and is strongly associated with dendritic changes resulting from 
exposure to novel environments (Wallace et al., 1995). Functional rewiring may occur 
as a result of dendritic growth (Holtmaat et al., 2009). In addition, PGO waves 
characterizing REM sleep are associated with increased plasticity–related gene 
expression in the hippocampus and amygdala (Datta, et al., 2008).  
In sum, REM sleep is characterized by tonic (high levels of acetylcholine, theta 
oscillations), phasic (PGO waves) and genetic (Ziff-268 expression) phenomena 
strongly associated with plasticity. More specifically, REM sleep is associated with 
LTP, a process related to the encoding of novel environments, and in particular late LTP 
(Ravassard et al., 2009) that is associated with structural plasticity (Holtmaat & 
Svoboda, 2009). It is therefore likely that structural plasticity associated with novelty 
occurs during REM sleep.  
It is currently debated whether SWS is a state conducive to plasticity, with some 
authors arguing for (Diekelmann & Born, 2010) and some against (Ribiero 2007) this 
notion. One the one hand, spindles characterizing NREM sleep may be associated with 
plasticity (Steriade, 1999, Sejnowski & Destexhe, 2000) and are involved in human 
memory (Schabus et al., 2008); also, SWS is characterized by activity within regions 
closely associated with plasticity (e.g., the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex; Dang Vu 
et al., 2008). On the other hand, phenomena known to be associated with plasticity, i.e., 
ziff-268 expression, PGO waves, theta and acetylcholine, are abundant in REM and 
absent from SWS sleep. That SWS plays a minimal role in synaptic plasticity is also 
consistent with the notion that synaptic downscaling may occur during this time 
(Tononi & Cirelli, 2003). Overall, when comparing SWS and REM sleep, only the latter 
seems to be characterized by an abundance of the neurophysiological features known to 
induce plasticity. 
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Synaptic plasticity & and experience  
 Several lines of evidence converge on the notion that the novelty of experience 
is an important factor in its ability to induce neural plasticity. In a review of PET studies 
examining memory, Tulving et al (1996) proposed that the probability of long-term 
storage of information varies in direct proportion to the novelty of this information. 
Exposure to new environments triggers LTP in multiple areas of the hippocampus 
(Manahan-Vaughan & Braunewell, 1999). In addition, exposure to novel environments 
lowers the threshold for LTP induction in CA1 (Li et al., 2003). Novel spatial 
exploration is also associated with theta band activity, which is argued to be critical for 
encoding information in hippocampal cell ensembles (Buzsáki et al., 2002). Indeed, the 
modulation of hippocampal synaptic weights is critically dependent on theta activity 
(Kamondi et al., 1998). Also, recent studies have demonstrated that hippocampal 
plasticity is facilitated by attention (Muzzio, Kentros et al, 2009, Muzzio, Levita et al, 
2009), motivational states and emotions (Conway, 2005). If these plasticity-enhancing 
factors—novelty, attention, motivation and emotion—are also present during dreaming, 
then there would be ample reason to believe that dreaming, too, enhances memory. The 
following section examines if these characteristics are typically present in REM 
dreaming.  
 
Elements of dreaming associated with synaptic plasticity 
Novelty 
 Because dreaming appears to combine isolated memory features of all kinds in a 
constant flow (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005), the perception of novel visual, auditory and 
motivational elements is typical. The ubiquity of character imagery in dreams illustrates 
this point. REM sleep mentation features an average of 3.9 characters per report, 48% 
of which are unknown to the individual (Kahn et al., 2002). Characters are thus a 
constant source of novelty in dreams. The results of studies presented here support the 
notion that novelty characterizes dreaming. In Article III only 1 of 31 dreams consisted 
of a replay of a previous event while all other dreams were characterized by novel 
memory item associations. Similarly in Article 4 we found several instances of novel 
and bizarre relationships between items and contexts. Dreams are therefore a source of 
constant and sometimes bizarre novelty and, in this sense, dreams provide new 
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environments that are explored (see later section on motivational states in dreaming). 
Consistent with this notion is prominent theta activity during REM sleep and during the 
REM-like Hori Stage 5 of NREM1 sleep where a majority of dreams occurred in novel 
environments in which the dreamer was engaged in (virtual) motor activity.  
 
Attention 
  Morrison (1983) has explained the consistent presence of PGO activity during 
REM sleep as a type of ongoing orienting response triggered by the constantly novel 
contents of dream imagery. In a recent fMRI study of sleep, Hong and al., (2009) 
provide supportive evidence that the rapid eye movements of REM sleep are visually-
targeted saccades and share underlying brain systems and mechanisms with waking eye 
movements. These findings are taken to suggest that attentional systems are active in 
REM sleep and reflect the visual exploration of dream imagery. While there is 
disagreement about whether all eye movements reflect a type of visual ‘scanning’ of the 
dream environment (Ogawa, et al., 2002), it is likely that at least some eye movements 
do (Herman, 1984). 
 
Motivational states & emotions 
 Motivational factors are central to psychodynamic theories of dreaming. They 
have recently been empirically studied by Smith et al. (2004) who found that 
motivational content was more frequent in REM than in Stage 2 sleep mentation. 
Emotions are also present in most dreams (e.g., Foulkes et al., 1988) and central to 
dream formation (Freud, 1900; Hobson et al., 2000). Most emotions found in dreams 
are judged by subjects to be appropriate to the dreamed situations had these situations 
occurred during wakefulness (Foulkes, 1988). 
 
The qualia of dreaming 
 Experience-driven plasticity may depend upon perceptual rather than imaginal 
experiences. For example, although imagery may activate the primary visual cortex or 
V1 (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003), there is no indication that this cortical activity can 
induce plasticity. Consequently, it might be argued that dreaming cannot induce 
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plasticity because it does not possess the same sensory quality (or qualia) as waking 
perception. Qualia here refers to the phenomenological properties of sensory 
experiences (see Hogart, 1984).  
 However, in the following section we present evidence that dreaming may 
indeed be of the same qualia as waking perception and that dreaming may thus impact 
neural networks even if they cannot be recalled.  
 
Is the neurophysiology of REM sleep sufficient to allow for wake-like perception? 
 Perception identical to waking state qualia can occur in the absence of external 
simulation. For example, hallucinations in otherwise healthy individuals, such as occur 
in Charles Bonnet syndrome, are reported to possess the same qualia as normal 
perception (ffytche, 2009). Considering the wide-ranging neural modulations 
accompanying REM sleep, the question of whether wake-like perception is possible in 
REM sleep would benefit from an examination of whether neural processes underlying 
wake-perception are available during REM sleep.   
 The ventral visual pathway, consisting of regions of the occipital and temporal 
lobes and the hippocampus system, is critical to conscious vision (Vogels & Orban, 
1996). Brain imaging studies indicate that these areas are active in REM sleep, apart 
from a distinct pattern of activation in the occipital cortex. During REM sleep, there is 
activation within extrastriate areas but not in area V1 (Braun et al., 1997, Maquet et al., 
2006). However, a recent study examining neural activation during phasic REM found 
increased activation in V1 during this time. This suggest that the neurophysiological 
characteristics of phasic REM in particular may support wake-like visual processes.  
 Several studies have linked gamma range activity (30-150 Hz) to conscious 
visual perception (e.g., Engel & Singer, 2001). For example, consciously perceived 
stimuli are associated with increased mid-frequency gamma-band activity over the 
contralateral visual cortex whether these stimuli are attended to or not (Wyart & Tallon-
Baudry, 2008). If wake-like conscious perception occurs during REM sleep, then 
gamma activity would be expected during this state. Indeed, cortical gamma rhythm has 
been found during REM sleep (Llinas & Ribary, 1993). However, REM sleep is 
characterized by the absence of gamma rhythm reset (Llinas & Ribary, 1993) 
suggesting a diminution of cortical connectivity. REM sleep gamma activity is also 
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distinct from wake by the uncoupling of gamma rhythms between perceptual and 
frontal areas (Perez-Garci et al., 2001) and suppression of gamma rhythm coherence 
between the hippocampus and the cortex (Cantero et al., 2004). Despite these 
differences, however, a study employing a passive oddball procedure suggests that the 
gamma response during sleep is similar to sensory/perceptual processing in wakefulness 
(Karakas et al., 2006).  
 In sum, dreaming may consist of sensations that are of the same qualia as in 
waking state perception. This may be especially true for dreams occurring during phasic 
REM as the primary visual cortex is activated at this time. That dreams are remembered 
as perceptually diminished experiences when compared to waking state perceptual 
experiences may relate to the fact that dreaming occurs in a vastly different context and 
a neurophysiologically distinct brain state. 
 
Functional aspects of dreaming  
 An average of 2 hours per day is spent in REM sleep and approximately 80% of 
awakenings from REM sleep provide reports of dreaming (Nielsen, 2000). If dreaming 
impacts neural networks in a manner similar to waking experiences, then what does a 
lifetime of dreaming do to the connectivity of the brain?  
  Waking experience alter neural networks in a manner that allows events to be 
visualized by means of imaginal scene construction. For example, an encounter with a 
cat will modulate neural representations related to the semantic/perceptual concept of 
cat that serves as the basis for the memory of the event. What does dreaming of this cat 
do to cat-related neural representations? As in waking experiences, it depends on what 
other items are present with that cat, as well as the context in which these items are 
found. Thus, the global effect of dreaming on neural networks may be understood by 
examining the manner in which memory items are used in dreaming. Specifically, 
during dreaming elements of waking experiences are mixed together in a manner that 
creates new item-item and item-context associations. By doing so it may loosen 
preexisting associations by presenting an item in the absence of a related item. In this 
sense, dreaming provides flexibility in mnemonic networks involved in scene 
construction by presenting item configurations that have not been provided by waking 
experience. This flexibility will be referred to as “scene construction flexibility” in 
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order to differentiate it from cognitive flexibility which does not necessarily relate to 
scene construction. 
 In the following, the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of scene construction will 
be examined in relation to dreaming.  
 
Adaptive aspects of imaginal scene construction 
 Engaging in scene construction can be highly adaptive (see Szpunar 2009 for 
review). For example, the mental simulation of events can be beneficial for emotional 
regulation and problem solving (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Scene construction may 
provide the means to anticipate obstacles and to generate hypothetical solutions (Hayes-
Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Taylor & Schnieder, 1989). Scene construction in the form 
of future projection may enhance goal achievement (Taylor et al., 1998; Pham & 
Taylor, 1999) as well as improve chances of implementing intentions (Golwitzer, 1993, 
1996, 1999). In all such studies, the beneficial aspects of scene construction rely on 
novel configurations of memory items, i.e., participants were instructed to visualize 
scenes that were novel as opposed to episodic in nature.  
Alternative associations between memory items may make memory networks 
more conducive towards forming new associations during scene construction of the 
problem solving kind. For example, new associations provided by dreams may serve to 
loosen the associations dream elements have with their original sources in waking 
experience. As William James (1890) suggested, creativity requires “(...) unheard of 
combination of elements (and) the subtlest associations (...).” (p. 456) 
 
Maladaptive aspects of scene construction 
 In a similar fashion, some scene construction can have maladaptive 
consequences. Imagery may play an important role in many psychopathologies. 
Imagery of dirt and germs is associated with contamination fears in obsessive 
compulsive disorder (de Silva, 1986). Patients with social phobias imagine themselves 
in negative social situations while those with generalized anxiety disorder imagine 
themselves in feared situations (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Disturbed imagery is also 
associated with paranoid delusions in psychotic patients (Morrison et al., 2001). In 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), pathological imagery plays a central role. In this 
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case, traumatic events are replayed intrusively and in vivid perceptual detail both 
during waking, i.e., flashbacks, intrusive memories, and sleep, i.e., replay nightmares.  
 PTSD provides an extreme example of what may occur when an episodic 
memory fails to be processed in dreaming in a manner that provides scene construction 
flexibility. PTSD nightmares are abnormal in that they replay whole episodic memories, 
suggesting that processes involved in scene construction flexibility are dysfunctional at 
this time. Whereas only 1.6% of the dreams reported by healthy participants are 
episodic replays (Fosse et al., 2003), approximately half of nightmares reported by 
PTSD patients are considered “identical to flashbacks” (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995) or 
“replicative dreams” (Schreuder et al., 2000). In PTSD, trauma memories are apparently 
not being successfully fragmented and re-associated with distal memory items or 
contexts during dreaming as should be the case.  
 Image rehearsal therapy for nightmares is highly effective in reducing all the 
symptoms of PTSD. This technique involves repeatedly visualizing a different ending to 
a nightmare, suggesting that the introduction of new item-context or item-item 
associations during waking can contribute to resolution of dysfunctional trauma 
memories. Image rehearsal therapy can therefore be understood as the manipulation of 
memory items in a dream-like manner (introductioning new item-context or item-item 
associations) in order to compensate for the lack of such processing during dreaming 
(i.e., replicative dreams).  
Conclusion 
 REM sleep dreaming can be viewed as containing elements of waking 
perception as well as novel imaginal scene constructions. As suggested in Article III, 
dreaming may use hippocampally-mediated scene construction processes to give rise to 
novel virtual environments. However, unlike imaginal scene construction during wake, 
and in a manner similar to typical stimulus-driven perception of wake, these 
environments are taken to be reality. Selective cognitive deficits described in Article 4 
allow the dreamer to remain immersed in the apparent reality of the virtual environment 
while still allowing wake-like cognition. As a result of a selective deficiency in 
appreciating the bizarreness of dream elements, the dreamer becomes immersed in, pays 
attention to, emotes and is motivated within the dream—despite its bizarre nature. In 
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turn, novelty, attention, emotion, and motivation are important modulators of 
synaptic plasticity.  
 Thus, not only is REM sleep a neurological state conductive to plasticity, but the 
principle qualities required to induce experience-related plasticity are consistently 
present during REM sleep dreaming. Novelty, a powerful driver of synaptic plasticity, 
is produced in the form of novel item-item and item-context juxtapositions. Dreaming 
qualia are akin in many respects to the types of waking perception that are necessary to 
impact neural networks. Features such as novelty and the exploration of environments 
may be even more characteristic of REM sleep dreaming than waking state experiences. 
Consequently, while the dreamed experience is not easily recalled it may significantly 
modulate synaptic weights of neural networks in a manner similar to, if not better than, 
waking experiences.  
 The manner in which dreaming impacts neural networks may depend on how it 
deploys memory items. As suggested by evidence presented in all 4 articles, dreams 
draw upon items from loosely related memories within novel contexts. Dreaming may 
therefore create novel associations between distally related memory items, and in doing 
so loosen existing associations between items. This process may enable scene 
construction flexibility. Adaptive use of scene construction may depend on the ability to 
make associations between items, and between items and contexts that are different 
from those previously experienced. Mnemonic flexibility provided by dreams thus may 
facilitate adaptive use of scene construction. In contrast, a lack of alternative 
associations between memory items may be maladaptive. Psychopathologies such as 
OCD, PTSD and schizophrenia all feature imagery that is intrusive, highly resistant to 
change, and which may exacerbate symptoms. In the case of PTSD, introducing new 
associations to the resistant, symptom-related imagery may help alleviate intrusions of 
that imagery as well as symptoms more generally. Scene construction is therefore 
adaptive if associations between memory items are flexible, but maladaptive when 
associations between salient memory items are rigid.  
 REM sleep may thus have a complementary role to SWS in the processing of 
episodic memory. SWS may be responsible for consolidating declarative memories 
while REM sleep provides links between memory items that differ from those found in 
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waking experience, a process that may enable scene construction to operate with 
optimum efficiency. 
 In closing, the ideas presented in this section are admittedly speculative. 
However, I hope to have made the case that the subjective experience of dreaming may 
have a causal role in memory processing, as opposed to the prevailing view which 
considers dreaming to be a consequence of memory processing (Wamsley et al., 2010), 
or to have no association with memory processing at all (Diekelmann and Born, 2010). 
Rather, the view espoused here is that dreaming is an elaborate orchestration of memory 
elements into novel, plasticity-inducing perceptual experiences. The latter establish new 
relationships between objects, people, places and events that are different from those 
previously encountered during wakefulness. Dreaming may therefore enhance the 
human capacity to imagine entirely new events and apply them to adaptive ends which 
is, as suggested by Jean-Paul Sartre (1940), a means of reaching “beyond reality.”  
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Appendix I 
 
Objects and characters of the neutral VR task.  
The left-most character was not involved in the recall task. 
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Appendix II 
 
Objects and characters of the emotional VR task.  
The left-most character was not involved in the recall task. 
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Appendix III 
 
The spatial layout of locations in the VR task. Locations of the emotional task are presented 
in the upper row, and those of the neutral task are presented in the lower row. 
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Appendix VI 
An example of a completed memory questionnaire.  
The actual questionnaires were in PDF form 
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